
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THE VENETIAN REPUBLIC

By

HORATIO BROWN

Alinari

VENICE ENTHRONED (Paul Veronese)

THE VENETIAN REPUBLIC

BY HORATIO BROWN

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THE VENETIAN REPUBLIC

CHAPTER I

THE RISE

I. Geography.

(*a*) ***The Plain.*** At the head of the Adriatic, between the mountains and the sea, lies that part of the Cisalpine plain which is known as "the Veneto." Its boundaries are the Mincio, the Po to its mouth, the Adriatic to the mouth of the Isonzo, the Isonzo up to the Alps, and then back again to Verona by the line of the Julian, Carnic, Dolomitic and Rhætian ranges. The plain thus enclosed is subdivided into districts, the Veronese, the Padovano, the Polesine, the Marches of Treviso, Friuli (or *la Patria*), and Venezia proper. Along the curving coast-line (roughly speaking, from the Reno to the Isonzo, or from the Alps at Monfalcone to the Apennines near Cesena) lie three great systems of lagoons, or salt-water estuaries—the lagoon of Grado, to the north-east, the lagoon of Venice, in the middle, and the lagoon of Comacchio, to the south-west. The main features of the whole district are the plain and the lagoons; the chief factors are the mountains, the rivers and the sea. As the rivers and mountains made the plain, so the rivers and the sea made the lagoons.

The most important fact about the mountains which bound this plain to the north and east is their steepness. The south side of the Alps is the escarped side. The mountains roll up

from the great central plain of Europe and break, as it were like a crested wave, upon Italy. The consequence is that the rivers on the south side are very rapid—of the nature of torrents, in fact—until they reach the plain, where their course soon becomes sluggish, and they tend to spread out into large swamps, such as the marshes round Mantua or the marish lands of the Polesine. Only the incessant industry of man prevents the whole country from being reduced to an interminable morass; and the dwellers in this plain have always been, and still are, exposed to the danger that one or other of these rivers may some day "rise from its bed" and drown them. This diurnal struggle with nature has left a deep impression on the character of the inhabitants and bred them in the ways of industry and sobriety.

But if the steepness of the southern Alpine slope is a constant menace to the plain, the torrential nature of its rivers has not only made the plain, but endowed it with its wealth of soil. The rivers themselves afford a curious proof of the way in which they have created the rich *pianura*. All of them, the Po, Ticino, Adda, Oglio, Mincio, Adige, Brenta, up to the Piave, when they impinge upon the level lands after leaving the mountains, assume an eastward trend. The reason is that the gravel and boulders which they bring down from the mountains have gradually raised a mound at the point where they debouch upon the plain, and this mound compels the rivers to turn eastward in their effort to reach the sea. Thus the plain itself, too, has been forced eastward by the deposit brought down by the rivers; the sea has slowly receded, and towns like Ravenna and Adria, that once were on the Adriatic, are now many miles from its shore.

It is probable that in pre-historic times these rivers were much larger and more impetuous than they are at present, for the whole of the Veneto really consists of a vast stratum of gravel deposited by the rivers and then covered, in the lapse of ages, by a layer of rich alluvial soil. One of the most striking features about these rivers are the gorges, or *chiuse*, which they have worn out for themselves through

the mountain barriers just before they reach the plain—the Adige at Rivoli, the Brenta at Primolano, the Piave at Vas-Quero, and so on—which suggest a vaster power than any they could now exert.

The fertility of the land thus formed by the mountains and the rivers has always been proverbial. The *flos Italiæ*, well watered, with a rich alluvial deposit lying on a gravelly bed, was famous for its crops and its horses. It must, however, at some time in its history have been profoundly modified by another element than water—by fire. The strange, isolated group of the Euganean hills, the hot springs of Abano, the bellowings of Monte Baldo, all bear witness to volcanic activity; and the tradition of some mighty cataclysm lives on in the legend of Phæton's fall into the Eridanus and the myth of the Heliades, his sisters, turned into poplars on the banks of the Po.

Besides its fertility the plain possesses two features important in its history. Its numerous rivers make water communication easy, and while it is closed to the north and north-east by the Alpine ranges, it is open to the west, that is to say, inland to Italy, and to the south and south-east, that is seaward to the Adriatic and the Levant: protected against barbarian invasion and adapted for trade and the distribution of wealth from the Orient.

(*b*) ***The Lagoon.*** As the mountains and the rivers formed the plain, so the rivers and the sea formed the lagoons—large sheets of tidal water, separated from the Adriatic by a thin line of sandy dunes, known as *lidi*. As the rivers swept down from the mountains into the plain and made for the sea, their course became sluggish, and the alluvial matter they carried with them gradually formed deltas at their mouths. At the same time the permanent current in the gulf, which sets from east to west, gradually built a bar across the outlets of the rivers, the deltas were flooded with water that was partly fresh (brought down by the rivers), partly salt (fed by the tide which found admission through breaks in the *lidi*, where the river waters insisted on getting

out to sea). The lagoons are neither a lake, nor a stagnant marsh; they are sheets of water, partly salt and partly fresh, dotted here and there with islands, where submergence has been incomplete. One of their shores is the real mainland, the other is the inner side of the *lidi*, the barrier that shuts out the sea.

The lagoon of Venice covers a surface of about one hundred and sixty square miles; it is thirty-five miles long, and at the most, seven miles wide. Originally it was the estuary of three larger rivers (the Brenta, the Sile, and the Piave), and of some smaller ones, whose waters mingled with the sea; but in course of time its inhabitants, to prevent silting up and malaria, as they thought, undertook to expel the rivers from the lagoon by the rectification and canalization of their channels, and the chief aliment of the lagoon is now the tidal salt-water of the Adriatic, which twice a day flows in and out through the breaks in the *lidi*. The important point, however, about the estuary in early days was that this large surface of water, studded with little groups of islands, offered, what it really eventually became—an asylum equally safe from attack by sea or by land.

II. Ethnography.

(*a*) ***The Heneti.*** The whole of the plain just described, with the exception of the district of Mantua, came at one time or another under the influence of the Venetian Republic; but who were its earliest inhabitants and whence they came is far from clear. We find the district occupied by a people called the Heneti. That the Heneti themselves were immigrants is generally agreed; but there are three conflicting theories as to the country of their origin. Strabo talks of the Armoric Heneti, and brings them from the neighbourhood of Brest in Brittany; another theory gives us Sarmatian Heneti, wanderers from the shores of the Baltic. The theory of

most weight makes the Heneti Paphlagonian immigrants from Asia Minor. Certain traditions of dress and speech, the Phrygian cap, the cloak, the short-cut hair, of the early Venetians favour this view. But about all three theories Strabo's cautious attitude is to be adopted, *Neque ego pro certo tamen adfirmo.*

(*b*) ***The Romans.*** The Heneti, perhaps after long struggles with earlier inhabitants, Etruscans or Euganeans, occupied and gave their name to the country. They eventually found themselves in touch with and threatened by a formidable neighbour, the Gauls, in the upper valley of the Po. For safety they joined the Romans, provided a contingent to the victorious army of the Republic, were eventually absorbed by the dominant race, and, together with Gallia proper, were erected into the province of Gallia Cisalpina; but, in accordance with Roman usage, they retained their laws, customs, form of municipal government. And then began a period of great prosperity. The agricultural wealth of the country was developed, and opulent cities like Patavinum, Tarvisium, Opitergium, Aquileia rose upon the plain; ports of importance, Ravenna, Adria, Altinum, were developed along the shore. Great roads traversed the district; the Emilia Altinate, a continuation of the Emilia Parmensis, ran north-east, crossing the Po at Sermino, passing through Este, Padua, Altino, and Julia Concordia to Aquileia; the Via Postumia, a continuation of the Via Gallica, ran nearly due west and east, starting from Verona and passing through Vicetia (Vicenza), Opitergium, Utina, to Forum Julii; and these main arteries were connected by a number of local roads. This prosperity continued under the earlier emperors down to the reign of Marcus Aurelius, when the incursions of the Marcomanni devastated the plain as far as the Piave, and gave a foretaste of those misfortunes, which two hundred years of barbarian invasions were to inflict upon the unhappy country. Finally came Attila and his Huns to complete the ruin of the mainland cities, and thereby to give birth to Venice of the lagoons.

Aquileia fell, and was followed by Altino, Concordia, Opitergium, Padua. Their inhabitants took refuge on the little islands of the lagoons, and though they returned to their mainland homes again and again, yet successive barbarian invasions sent them flying to the estuary once more, and finally induced them to abandon the mainland cities and to settle down in that curious and impregnable region of water and mud-banks that had first afforded them asylum.

The year 452, the year of the fall of Aquileia, is usually given as the birth-year of Venice, though such precision is misleading; for doubtless the earliest mainland refugees found a fisher-population dwelling on the lagoon-islands; and on the other hand it was not till some years later, in 466, that the lagoon-dwellers took the first steps to establish and demonstrate their corporate and independent existence as the people we call Venetians; nor was it till the Lombard invasion and the building of Torcello in 568 that all thought of return to the mainland was abandoned, and the history of the lagoon communities which were eventually concentrated at Rialto, the modern Venice, really begins. But the point of ethnographical importance is that the people who made modern Venice were probably Romanized Paphlagonians, and that just as Venice geographically looks eastward, so its population, very likely, retained some tincture of the Orient in its blood.

III. Early Lagoon Life.

(*a*) ***The Settlement.*** Cassiodorus, secretary to Theodoric the Great, has left us the earliest description of life on the lagoons. He was appealing to the Venetian people for assistance in transport, and may very likely have desired to flatter them; but even with that reservation it is a remark-

able picture he has drawn. The population, as was natural, were chiefly employed in fishery, winning their sustenance from the waters whereon they lived. But they were also engaged in transport through those intricate channels in the lagoon to which they alone had the key, and further they extracted a revenue from their salt-pans. In their precarious dwelling-place they had to contend with nature—to solidify the mud-banks on which they raised their houses, and to prevent corrosion by the sea; this they did by driving piles into the mud and binding them together by reed-wattling round the borders of each little lagoon-island, precisely as parts of the lagoon are reclaimed and built on to this day. They had also to find a supply of drinking water, and to do so they invented the famous Venetian *pozzo*, or well for the storage of the rainfall. Their dwellings were wattled huts, like the fishermen's shanties that one may still meet with in the desolate lagoon of Comacchio. Their boats were tied to a post before the door "like horses on the mainland." "There lie your houses," said Cassiodorus, "built like sea-birds' nests, half on sea and half on land; spread, as the Cyclades, over the surface of the waters."

With the influx of the mainland refugees came improvements. Brick took the place of wattle, and houses such as may still be seen at Burano, and other small lagoon-islands, sprang up along the sides of the deeper channels, following their curves, and eventually producing that labyrinth of canals and *calles* which is so characteristic of Venice and the lagoons. These houses were built round a courtyard, were one storey high, and on the top they had an open loggia for drying clothes, called a *liago* (from the Greek *heliacon*). In front, between the door and the water, ran a narrow strip of pathway, called then as now a *fondamenta*. The earliest refugees (who, as Cassiodorus says, had "settled like sea-birds" on the mud-banks of the lagoon) peopled twelve townships, whose names it is of importance to remember; for, before they were all concentrated at Rialto, what is now the city of Venice was only one of these, and not the largest. These twelve com-

munities were Grado, Bibiones, Caprulae (Carole), Jesolo (Cavallino), Heraclea, Torcello, Murano (Moriana), Rialto (Venice), Metamaucus (Malamocco), Pupillia (Poveglia), Clugies Minor (Sotto Marina) and Clugies Major (Chioggia).

As each fresh barbarian invasion drove the mainlanders for refuge to the lagoons, the lagoon-population steadily increased in numbers, and also developed a higher standard of comfort. Though many returned again and again to their mainland homes, some remained behind each time, and that made it easier for the next batch of refugees to do the same. And this process went on until the Lombard invasion of the year 568 finally persuaded them to abandon the mainland, and to settle permanently in the safe asylum of the lagoons. The legend of this final settlement is picturesquely told by the chroniclers, and especially how the people of Altino came to settle at Torcello. Many of them had fled to Istria, Ravenna and elsewhere; but those who remained behind were in sore doubt whither they should turn for a home. They fasted and prayed for three days, and at length came a voice like thunder saying, "Climb ye up to the tower and look at the stars." Then Bishop Paul climbed the tower, and looking up to the heavens he saw the stars lying, as it were, like islands in the lagoon. With this omen for guide the people moved to the little group of mud-banks nigh to Altino. They called the place Torcello, in memory of many-towered Altino that Alboin burned. Their first care was to build a church to Mary, the Mother of God. It was beautiful in form and very fair, and the pavement was wrought in circles of precious marbles. Then to Mauro the priest were revealed the places where other churches should be raised. "As I was walking along a *lido*," he says in relating his vision, "I saw a wonderful sight: a large white cloud, and out of it issued two rays of the sun of a glorious clarity, which fell upon me, and a liquid voice said to me, 'I am the Saviour and Lord of all the earth; the ground whereon thou standest I give thee, thereon to build a church in My name.' Then came another delicious voice, which

said, 'I am Mary, the Mother of the Lord Jesus Christ. I bid you build another church to me.' Then I came to another *lido*, and I saw the whole place filled with a multitude of people, and many bulls and cows with calves; and when I drew near, lo! an old man sitting on the ground, and he spoke to me, while nigh unto him stood a younger man. The old man said to me, 'I am Peter, Prince and Apostle, the pastor of the flock; I charge you honour me and build me a church, that there on my natal-day all the people may gather together.' Then the younger said unto me, 'I am the servant of God, Antolinus. I suffered for the name of Christ. I bid you build a little church for me, hard by my Master's fane.' Then I came to a fourth little *lido*, and I saw it was all full of heavy-clustered vineyards, and the vines bore the whitest of grapes. There came upon me the desire to eat, but I did not; and as I walked by the sea a white cloud appeared unto me; in the middle thereof was seated a little maid, fair to see, who spoke to me thus: 'I am Giustina, who suffered in Padua city for Christ's sake; I beg of you, priest of God, build me a little church in my honour.' In the next place I came to, I met a girl of tender years: a great and splendid cloud, as though it were the sun, illumined her, and it drew nigh unto me. Then I looked within, and saw a glorious man of noble mien standing above the sphere of the sun, and he said unto me, 'I am John the Baptist, the forerunner of our Lord; I pray thee in this place build me the church I now show thee.' Then he showed me all the outside of the church, and gave me the blessing of God on my bishopric of Torcello, and he placed a ring on my finger. Then I woke from the great sleep. The writing was in my hand and the ring upon my finger."

Under the quaint apocalyptic imagery of priest Mauro's vision we discern the double result of the Lombard invasion upon the lagoon; first, the resolve to make it a permanent home, and, as a consequence, a great development in building; and secondly, the transference of the ecclesiastical bodies from the mainland to the new asylum. The people leave the

mainland forever and take their priests with them. They settle finally in the lagoon-townships. These are the people who made the Venetian Republic, and it is with them and their history that we have now to deal.

The problem presented to the primitive settlers in the lagoons was twofold; first, how to preserve their independence; second, how to develop internally. The early history of the Republic is chiefly concerned with the solution of these two questions, and that solution profoundly influenced the entire course of Venetian development. The way in which the lagoon-population worked out both problems can best be studied by observing first the course of external events in their relation to the Venetians, and then the course of internal events as bearing on the growth of the constitution.

(*b*) ***External Independence.*** There is little doubt but that the original fisher-population of the lagoons was dependent for its administration upon the larger communities of the mainland. Tradition always represented Venice as being founded by "consuls from Padua," and we shall presently see that Padua put in a claim to complete control of the waterway on the Brenta down to its mouth at Malamocco. But the destruction of the mainland cities by barbarian invasion, the migration of the most prominent citizens and their settlement in the lagoons, encouraged the lagoon-dwellers to assert their independence more and more aggressively, as the mainland cities became gradually weaker, and led them to adopt the doctrine of their original independence. Their importance as a maritime people grew steadily, and when Belisarius undertook his operations against Ravenna he requested the assistance of the Venetians. Ravenna fell and the Gothic kingdom in Italy came to an end. The Eastern Emperors became masters of the peninsula, and doubtless considered that the lagoons formed part of their dominions. But the Empire was vast and weak; its capital was far away, and the question of dependence or independence was not likely to be put to the Venetians by the rulers of Constantinople. Nevertheless, by the fall of Ravenna one

of the claimants to supremacy over the lagoons appeared upon the scene; the other claimant did not emerge till Alboin and his Lombards established themselves upon the mainland of Italy. Then it was that Venice found herself confronted with the vital problem of her independent existence.

The growing importance of the Venetians was attested by the fact that Narses called upon the lagoon-dwellers to transport his army from Grado to the extreme southern corner of their own lagoon, and that they did so. Narses himself expressed to his successor, Longinus, his amazement at the vigour of the lagoon-townships, and when the Paduans appealed to Narses to restore to them their rights over the courses of the Bacchiglione and the Brenta, whose lower reaches and mouths the Venetians had seized, the lagoon-population replied by asserting that the lagoons, the islands and the river mouths were the property of those who had made them habitable; that the creature belonged to the creator. Narses declined to decide the question, and the Paduans were powerless to enforce their claim. The Venetians established a virtual independence.

But with the appearance of Alboin in 568, this question of independence began to assume a more threatening aspect. The presence of the Lombards on the mainland of Italy, and the growing strength and importance of the lagoons, inevitably raised the question as to whose subjects the Venetians were, and on which side they meant to stand. Longinus, who had been endeavouring to treat with Alboin, desired, before leaving Italy, to secure the support of Venice for the Empire. He invited the Venetians to escort him to Constantinople, which they agreed to do, and he asked them to declare themselves subjects of the Emperor, but to this they demurred. Once again they affirmed that the lagoons were theirs, because they had created them: "God who is our help and protector has saved us, that we might dwell upon these waters. This second Venice which we have raised in the lagoon is a mighty habitation for us. No power of Emperor or Prince can reach us, and of them we have

no fear." That is the clear statement of Venetian aims and contentions. The place and the people have made each other and now belong exclusively to each other. The rival claims to suzerainty advanced by East and West brought the Venetians to a consciousness of their own individual existence, and of their determination to be independent. How they achieved their object forms the main thread of Venetian political history for the next two centuries.

But though Venice had very clearly indicated her aspirations, she was neither strong enough, as yet, nor very anxious to press them too far. Longinus on this occasion acknowledged that the Venetians were indeed "a great people with a mighty habitation," but still if they would make a formal act of submission to the Emperor, he would not exact an oath for it, and would grant large concessions from the Empire. To this the Venetians agreed. An embassy accompanied Longinus to the Imperial court, and returned with the first diploma conferred upon the Venetian people as a separate body (584).

(*c*) ***Internal Constitution.*** As Attila's invasion of Italy and the destruction of the mainland towns laid the foundations of the lagoon-population, so it brought about the first independent constitutional act of the newly-formed community. In 466, fourteen years after the fall of Aquileia, the lagoon-dwellers met at Grado, not to receive officers from the mainland cities, which had almost ceased to exist, but to elect officers of their own from among themselves. They gave them the name of "Tribunes," whose duties were to govern each of the twelve townships of the lagoons, and above all to put an end to the rivalries which, with the increase of population, began to play a disintegrating part inside the lagoon-communities. It was to these *Tribuni Maritimi* that Cassiodorus, Belisarius, Narses and Longinus appealed when the assistance of the growing Venetian community was required. In internal as in external affairs, what Attila's invasion began the Lombard invasion completed. The great increase it caused to the lagoon-population, and

the resolve it induced in them to abandon the mainland, led to the expansion of the Tribunal body. Each island (584) now elected an additional Tribune. These were called *Tribuni Majores*, and formed a sort of central committee for the management of affairs which concerned the lagoon-townships generally; the original Tribunes remained at the head of the administration in each individual lagoon-island. The *Tribuni Majores* styled themselves "We, the Tribunes of the Maritime Islands, elected by the whole body of them."

It seems, however, that the institution of Tribunes did not succeed in appeasing the quarrels of the various townships. As to the actual cause of these mutual jealousies, we have no positive information, but it is possible that when the inhabitants of the mainland cities became confined at close quarters in the lagoons, the ancient rivalries between their original communes were intensified and exasperated. Whatever the cause the fact remains, and the crisis was reached when Christopher, Patriarch of Grado, found it necessary to summon a general meeting of the lagoon-people at Heraclea, then the leading township, and pointed out to them that the way of safety lay in the suppression of the twelve Tribunes, who represented too individually the interests of their respective islands, and the election of a single man as head of the State. The Venetians saw the wisdom of the advice, and in 697 Paulo Lucio Anafesto was chosen the first Doge of Venice.

The Doge was elected for two distinct reasons; first, for the defence of the lagoon-community against external attack, to safeguard its independence, in fact; second, to control and suppress internal discord, to develop the constitution of the growing State. But at the moment when they elected their first Doge, it did not occur to the Venetians to define accurately his position and powers, and the evolution of these occupy a large part in later Venetian history. In its origin, however, the Dogeship was democratic. The Doge was elected by the people from the body of the people; the Tribunes continued to administer the affairs of their respective islands, but they were now subject to the Doge and could be

dismissed by him. The Doge had the right to summon the *Concio* or general assembly, and foreign affairs were in his hands.

Here then, in the year 697, we find Venice a constituted State. It had received external recognition in the Imperial diploma of 584, and it had taken the first steps towards the development of a constitution by the creation of Tribunes and the election of a Doge. The chief problems before the youthful State were still the question of independence between East and West, between the Empire and the Lombards, and the question of internal constitutional growth, the evolution of the Dogeship.

IV. East and West.

(*a*) ***Byzantium.*** The new State had laid the foundations of its external independence and internal fusion, but much remained to be done before both were fully accomplished by the concentration of the government at Rialto, and the emergence of the modern city of Venice, the "*Città dominante*," the sole representative and embodiment of all the lagoon-communities. The factors which contributed to the decisive result were, externally, the Byzantine Empire, the Lombard, and then the Frankish kingdom in Italy and the Church; between these powers Venice had to steer a course towards undisputed independence. Internally we find rival factions, which under the pressure from without, now from East and now from West, concentrated themselves into two well-defined parties—the party which we may call aristocratic, because it leaned towards Imperial Constantinople and also displayed a tendency to make the Dogeship hereditary, and the party which we may call democratic, as it more or less represented the general aspira-

tion of the lagoon-communities towards absolute independence and free institutions, and consequently leaned more to the Church and the Western kingdoms in opposition to the Byzantizing tendencies of its rival. The aristocratic party was represented by the township of Heraclea, the native town of Anafesto, the first Doge; the democratic party was championed first by Jesolo, and then by Malamocco. The history of the lagoons down to the concentration and compromise at Rialto, and the emergence of modern Venice, is the history of the alternating success or failure of these two parties.

It must be borne in mind that though the lagoon-townships considered themselves independent of right, and meant to be so in fact, they were by no means strong enough to make that intention good. They had admitted a kind of dependence on Byzantium, and now, soon after the election of the first Doge, they were forced to enter into treaty with the Lombard King, Luitprand (709). Commercial considerations dictated both agreements. It was impossible for the young and growing community to develop its trade, except under some definite understanding with its neighbours. By the treaty with Luitprand, the earliest Venetian treaty, the boundaries of Heraclea, the leading lagoon-township, were defined, and rights to cut wood in mainland forests as well as trading privileges were acquired in return for a tribute. The lagoon-communities were thus at the very outset brought into relations with both East and West, relations which must inevitably clash when the lagoons became so important that their services were required by either party; nor was it long before the question was put to them in definite form.

The Emperor Leo, the Iconoclast, was in open rupture with Pope Gregory II. over the question of images. The Pope invited Luitprand to attack the Imperial city of Ravenna. The Lombard King, nothing loath to expand, assented. He besieged and took Ravenna, and the Exarch Paul, the Imperial governor, fled for safety to the lagoons as a part, and a locally powerful part, of his master's dominions.

He called on the Venetians to restore him to his government, and, persuaded by the Doge Orso, a Heraclean of the Byzantine faction, they consented. They recovered Ravenna for the Exarch Paul, and in return acquired rights in the city, while the Doge received the Imperial title of *Hypatos* for his services. But this swing towards Byzantium was instantly resented in the lagoons. Jesolo and the democratic party affirmed that they would not be swept towards the Empire nor allow the Doge to become supreme. They attacked Heraclea and the Doge was murdered.

(*b*) ***The Franks and the Church.*** A new and highly important factor in the history of Venice was now about to appear on the scene. The alliance between Gregory and Luitprand against the Emperor Leo had not lasted long. The Pope was soon alarmed by the steady advance of the Lombard power, which was pressing southward, and had already occupied territory in the Ducato Romano. Casting about for some one to support him, his eye fell on the Franks. Charles Martel's victory at Tours had attracted to them universal attention. Pope Stephen crowned Pepin, Charles' son, King of Italy. Pepin came to make good his title. He defeated the Lombards, took Ravenna and the Pentapolis, and made a gift of those acquisitions to his ally the Pope, while retaining a feudal superiority over them. Thus the chief rival of Venice in the Adriatic trade passed from the Greek Empire nominally to the Franks, really to the Popes. It was with the Franks and the Popes, and no longer with the Lombards, that Venice had now to reckon in the West.

To the Venetians this change was not at first displeasing. They had not grasped its significance. They dreaded the presence of the Lombards at Ravenna, but they had no objection to the presence of a weak Pope with no fleet and no commercial aspirations, and as yet they had not realized the power of the Franks. Moreover, as the result of the anti-Byzantine reaction, which had ended in the murder of Doge Orso, the democratic party was in power in the

lagoons. Accordingly the Pope received every support in his tenure of Ravenna. The intentions of the Emperor, learned by the Venetian merchants in the Levant, were instantly communicated to the Archbishop in the Pentapolis.

But when Charlemagne, on the invitation of the Pope, descended upon Italy to protect Ravenna from a threatened attack by the last Lombard king, the situation assumed a different aspect. Charlemagne destroyed the Lombard kingdom (774), confirmed his father's donation to the Pope, and knowing the Eastern leanings of a large part of the lagoon-population, he ordered the Pope to expel all the Venetian traders from Ravenna and the Pentapolis. Venice did not miss the significance of this step. It was a new threat to its independence, the most serious threat it had as yet been called on to face. The result was inevitable—a reaction towards Byzantium, in favour of the weak and distant Emperor and against the near and powerful King. This reaction towards Byzantium accentuated the divergencies between the two parties in the lagoons. The democratic party coalesced with those who dreaded the loss of commerce in the Pentapolis which would be entailed by a rupture with the Franks, and both parties centred round the Patriarch of Grado, who, as a Churchman, favoured the cause of the Pope's ally, Charlemagne. A crisis was rapidly approaching. A pretext for the explosion was offered by the new See of Olivolo (the modern Castello). This See had recently (774) been created to meet the needs of the growing lagoon-population. The Doge, Giovanni Galbaio, named a Greek, Christopher, to the vacant chair, but the Francophil Patriarch of Grado refused consecration. The Doge manned a fleet and sent his son, Maurizio, to exact compliance. Maurizio attacked Grado with violence. The Patriarch was captured, hurled from the highest tower of his palace, and killed. But the murder of the Patriarch Giovanni did nothing to alter the Frankish policy of the Patriarchal See. His nephew and successor, Fortunatus, proved just as strong a partisan

and a far abler, more restless and indomitable man. He and his followers plotted to murder the Doge. Their scheme was discovered and Fortunatus was forced to fly. He sought refuge at the court of Charlemagne and used all his powers to induce him to act against the Venetians. He urged that the lagoons were really a part of the kingdom of Italy, and yet were, obviously, wholly devoted to the Eastern Empire; the King could not afford to overlook this rebellious attitude. These arguments bore fruit in Pepin's attack on the lagoons.

Meantime the other conspirators, chiefly the family of the Obelerii, who had fled with Fortunatus and taken refuge in Treviso, a city of the Frankish kingdom, had succeeded in unseating the Byzantine Doges, the Galbaii, and had elected Obelerio as Chief of the State. But at this moment, when Venice was in the throes of the struggle for her independence, she was threatened by a danger of the very gravest. Charlemagne proposed to marry the Empress Irene, and to unite the two Empires. Had the marriage taken place Venetian independence must have disappeared; the Byzantine title and the Frankish arm must have proved irresistible. But the proposal raised such a storm in Constantinople that the Empress, who had entertained it, lost her throne and was succeeded by Nicephorus. The two Emperors subscribed a treaty, by which their respective Empires were defined, where conterminous. It is not absolutely clear what position was assigned to Venice. Eginhard, a contemporary and biographer of Charlemagne, says that the Frankish Emperor took Istria, Liburnia and Dalmatia, except the maritime cities. Dandolo, a Venetian chronicler of much later date, affirms that it was distinctly stipulated that the Venetian cities and the maritime cities of Dalmatia, which had remained faithful to the Empire, should in no way be molested, invaded or diminished, and that the Venetians should enjoy in peace the possessions, liberties and immunities which they had been accustomed to enjoy in the kingdom of Italy. We may take it that by this treaty the lagoons were really declared to form part of the

Eastern Empire, with certain trading rights in the Western kingdom. To Venice the decision was of the highest importance, for it left her nominal vassal of a weak and distant Emperor, and she could and did plead that vassalage when the Franks tried to enforce their claim to the lagoons as an integral part of the Italian kingdom; while on the other hand, the recognition of their trading rights on the mainland gave them all the connection they desired with such powerful neighbours as the Frankish sovereigns.

(*c*) ***Internal Development.*** We must turn now to note the effect of this outward pressure from East and West upon the internal history of the lagoons, and the way in which it helped to build up the constitution of Venice. The period may be described as a period of experiments in state-building. The first Doge, Anafesto, was, as we have seen, a member of the aristocratic party, a native of Heraclea, and this fact alone, this apparent supremacy of Heraclea, was sufficient to band against the leading city the other townships of the lagoons, who had determined that no one of them should become supreme. We have records of a combination of Jesolo and Malamocco against Heraclea; of a bloody battle in the pine woods (*Pineto*) that then covered the *lidi;* of a victory won by Heraclea, but so reprobated by all the other lagoon-townships that they refused to bury the dead and left them to be devoured by beasts and birds. The *Pineto* became an accursed spot, and the inhabitants removed to a new site, where they founded a township which they endeavoured to make independent of the Doge. The whole community was threatened with disruption. The distinctly Byzantine policy of the third Doge, Orso (who, as we have already seen, was murdered by the democratic faction), accentuated this danger; and the lagoon-population, tired of these internecine brawls, and resenting Orso's attempt to draw them towards Byzantium and to enhance the power of the dukedom, resolved to abolish that office, and to entrust the chief authority to an official who should combine both civil and military functions in his own person, but who should hold office for one year only. The

title of this new head of the State was *Mastro Miles*, the Master Soldier.

But the new constitution did not last for more than six years. The Master Soldier was as powerless as the Doge to repress internal jealousies. The last Master Soldier, a Heraclean, was captured by the people of Jesolo and barbarously blinded by having his eyes exposed over a brazier of live coal. A general assembly was convened, not at Heraclea nor at Jesolo, but at Malamocco, and Deodato, son of the last Doge, was elected fourth Doge of Venice.

By the election of Deodato, a step was taken in the direction of consolidating and fusing the discordant elements in the lagoon-population. The new Doge was a Heraclean, it is true, but he was elected not at Heraclea but at Malamocco, and he reigned there Heraclea and Jesolo, as incompatibles, were superseded by Malamocco, and an advance was made towards the final concentration at Rialto. But though the seat of the dukedom had been removed from Heraclea and Jesolo alike, those implacable rivals still continued the struggle as to which of them should furnish the Doge. Matters were brought to a crisis by Galla Gaulo of Jesolo seizing and blinding the Doge Deodato, and arbitrarily proclaiming himself Doge in Malamocco. This high-handed act was resented by the population, who saw in it a violation of one of their fundamental tenets—that the Doge must be elected by the people, and must never be allowed to become supreme. Galla was deposed, and the preponderance of the democratic party and of Malamocco was proclaimed by the election of a Malomoccan, Monegario (756). The advent of the Franks and the creation of a strong Francophil party inside the lagoons brought, as we have seen, the policy of Venice to a critical point. The whole lagoon-population was evidently burning up to the decisive crisis which ended in the emergence of Rialto and the creation of modern Venice.

V. Rialto.

It will be remembered that after the failure of the conspiracy in which Fortunatus and Obelerio were the chief actors, Fortunatus fled to the court of Charlemagne, while Obelerio remained in Frankish Treviso, plotting against the Doge. He was successful. Maurizio Galbaio was deposed and in his stead Obelerio was elected. This event marked the complete triumph of the Francophil party in the lagoons, and Fortunatus, its chief, was invited to return. But the triumph of one faction exasperated the other. Heraclea attacked and destroyed Jesolo, whose inhabitants appealed to the Doge of Malamocco for redress. The last step in the long process of internal fusion had now been reached. The Doge marched on Heraclea and subdued it, and by common consent, at a plenary meeting of the lagoon-population, it was resolved to end for ever these internecine feuds by removing both populations from Heraclea and Jesolo to Malamocco. This was an important advance towards that unification at Rialto which was to follow shortly. But in the meantime it meant the supremacy of Malamocco and the Frankish party in the lagoon. And the seal was set to the Francophil tendency by the visit which the Doge paid to the court of Charlemagne, where he is represented as receiving orders as to the management of the lagoon-communities. It looked as though the lagoons must inevitably be merged in the neighbouring kingdom of Italy. This strong tendency towards the Franks produced, however, its inevitable reaction among the lagoon-dwellers, as soon as they fully grasped the situation. The Byzantine faction revived again and found support among the people. They appealed to the Emperor Nicephorus, and Nicetas appeared in Venetian waters with the Imperial fleet. Fortunatus fled. The Doge and the Francophils dissembled and temporized. Nicetas was able to report the Venetians as loyal subjects of the Eastern Empire, and when the com-

mander of the Imperial fleet, a few years later (809), asked for Venetian aid in an attack on Comacchio and a futile attempt to recover the Pentapolis for the Eastern crown, it was not refused.

But to the west, on the mainland of Italy, there was one who watched the conduct of the lagoon-communities with no kindly eye. Pepin, son of Charlemagne, had been crowned King of Italy. He was resolved to make his title more than an empty formula; he desired to be King of Italy in fact, and his attention was called to that corner of Italy, the lagoon of Venice, that was growing so important, had proved itself so independent, and, but recently, by assisting the Imperial fleet in the attack on Comacchio, had shown that its sympathies lay East and not West. Pepin determined to subdue the lagoons. He gathered a fleet at Ravenna and pushed up the coast. He captured Brondolo, Chioggia, Pelestrina, and worked along the line of the *lidi* towards the capital of the lagoons, Malamocco. He was almost within striking distance when the Doge and the Venetian people took the bold resolve of transferring the capital from Malamocco, which lay exposed to attack by sea and by the *lidi*, to that little group of islands called Rialto, lying at the very heart of the lagoon, midway between the mainland and the sea. This step was fatal to Pepin's enterprise. He captured Malamocco, but it was deserted, and between him and Rialto, where the Venetians were now concentrated, stretched six miles of intricate channels and mud-banks. He attempted to force a passage, but his vessels ran on the shoals, and fell a prey to the light Venetian skiffs, manned by the people, who alone had intimate knowledge of the water-ways. The summer heats came on, the *lido* shore was unhealthy, his troops began to dwindle away. In vain he appealed to the Venetians on the ground of his right: "Own yourselves my subjects, for ye come from the kingdom that is mine." The sole answer was, "We will be the Roman Emperor's men, not yours." The son of the mighty Charlemagne had to confess himself defeated by the sturdy owners of the lagoon. He abandoned the attack and

died soon after. A treaty (810) between Charlemagne and Nicephorus recognized the position of the Venetians as subjects of the Eastern Empire, enjoying trading rights and immunities in Italy in virtue of the treaty with Luitprand.

This concentration at Rialto marks the beginning of the history of Venice as a full-grown State. Hitherto the Republic had been in the process of formation; a double fusion was slowly taking place. The people and their dwelling had been welded together under the pressure of external menace to their independence, and, further, under the same menace, the conflicting parties inside the lagoon communities had been fused into one homogeneous whole. Rialto, the modern city of Venice, emerges as the result and as the symbol of both operations. The site chosen, the midmost islands of the lagoon, was a compromise between the danger from the mainland and the danger from the sea. Attila and Alboin had proved the former, Pepin's attack demonstrated the latter. Rialto, moreover, represented a further compromise between East and West. The position of the Venetians was now assured. They were vassals of a weak and distant Empire that could never compel recognition; they were independent tributaries of a near and powerful kingdom with which they could trade. The place and the people had made one another. With the emergence of Rialto, we have to speak no longer of Heraclea, Jesolo, Malamocco, as separate lagoon-communities; we are face to face with the united Venice of modern history.

CHAPTER II

THE EXPANSION

The lagoon-communities being now concentrated at Rialto, the young Republic proceeded to expand, to develop, to grow until she reached the zenith of her splendour in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. This development may be most conveniently traced, if we observe her progress along the lines of constitution, maritime expansion and territorial aggrandizement.

I. Constitutional.

(*a*) ***The Dukedom.*** Though Venice may be said to have been fully formed by the concentration at Rialto, she was by no means fully grown. Many problems still confronted her, many struggles had to be faced before she assumed the unique position which is hers in the history of Europe. The development of her constitution, which was to lead her to that rigid oligarchy, the admiration and the despair of European statesmen, depends upon the evolution of three ideas—(1) the curtailment of the ducal prestige and powers, (2) the growth of the aristocracy and its absorption of all the great functions of government, (3) the extrusion of the people from any share in the management of the State. The central idea, the evolution of the aristocracy, is the governing

idea, for it was the aristocracy in process of growth that curtailed the ducal prestige and gradually disfranchised the people.

But in the early days of the settlement at Rialto an aristocracy can hardly be said to have existed; that only came later with the growth of Venetian commerce and wealth. At first on the constitutional side we have to deal chiefly with the ducal office and the people. During these early years of Venetian history we note a striking characteristic about the dukedom; that is the constant attempts to render it hereditary in some one powerful family, attempts which were always frustrated by the instinct of the people, who, to use their own words, had not come to the lagoons to "live under a lord." This tendency and the opposition it aroused landed the Republic in constant explosions of violence, riot, arson, murder of the Doge, but during it all the dukedom received that imprint which it retained throughout Venetian history. The dynastic tendency is chiefly illustrated by the Doges of the Particiachi, Candiani and Orseolo families. With the fall of the last the tendency came to an end, just when the new aristocracy was on the point of emerging, and found itself prepared not merely to prevent the Dogeship from becoming hereditary, but, in the interests of its own self-development, to rob the office of almost all weight in the conduct of affairs.

The concentration at Rialto was the result of an anti-Frankish reaction in face of Pepin's threatened attack, and the Francophil party, with the Doge Obelerio and the Patriarch Fortunatus at their head, were driven from power. The Venetians, assembled in their new capital, elected as first Doge in Rialto Angelo Particiaco, a Heraclean noble, bred in the pro-Byzantine sentiments of his party. Early in his reign he renewed a custom which had already been introduced by previous Doges, that of electing a Doge-Consort in the person of his son, Giustiniano. This was a device which lent itself to the dynastic tendency displayed by certain families, and eventually came to be regarded with the greatest

suspicion by the people and, therefore, abolished. As in the earlier case of the Galbaio family, so in the case of the Particiachi, the son elected Doge-Consort succeeded to the sole authority on his father's death.

The chief event of Giustiniano's reign was the translation of the body of St. Mark from Alexandria to Venice. Round this episode numberless picturesque details have been accumulated, but the point of chief moment is that, coming so soon after the concentration at Rialto, it implied the re-dedication of the State to a new patron Saint; the earlier Venice of the lagoon-communities, dedicated to St. Theodore, disappears, together with its saint, and its place is taken by the new Venice under the protection of St. Mark (828).

Yet a third Particiaco succeeded to Giustiniano—Giovanni, his brother. The people became alarmed at this evident attempt to make the dukedom hereditary. They seized the Doge, shaved his beard, and compelled him to retire to a monastery at Grado. The successor of Giovanni, Pietro Tradonico, was a nominee of the people, elected in order to break the dynastic tendency of the Particiachi, a man whose ancestors came from democratic Jesolo, the enemy of Heraclea. But during a long reign of twenty-eight years the spirit of reaction against the Particiachi wore itself out. The faction that supported that family never ceased to plot against the democratic Doge. In 864 he was murdered as he was leaving the church of San Zaccaria, and a member of the Particiachi returned to the throne. He was followed, not quite consecutively, by four more members of his house, making seven Particiachi in all who reigned in Venice. But the family appear to have dwindled before the prestige of a more powerful race, the Candiani, in whom the dynastic tendency was no less strongly developed. Five Candiani alternated with the Particiachi as Doges of Venice, until they in turn gave way to the Orseolo family, in whom the dynastic tendency was crushed for ever.

In the Candiani the tendency is more pronounced than in the Particiachi, and the hostility roused among the populace

more violent. The fourth of the name, Pietro, succeeded in convincing the Venetians that he was aiming at nothing short of sovereignty in the State. He repudiated his wife in order to marry a sister of the Marquis of Tuscany, who brought him a large dower of lands in the Marches of Treviso and Friuli; he employed the forces of the State to protect these private possessions; most unpardonable of all, he filled the ducal palace with armed foreigners as a body-guard. The people were at last thoroughly roused and alarmed. The mob surrounded the palace, but failed to force an entrance. The adjoining houses were set on fire, and the flames soon spread to the palace itself. The Doge attempted to escape by a door that led into St. Mark's, but was struck down and despatched by some of his own relations; his child, too, was slain in its nurse's arms, and the two corpses were taken to the common slaughter-house to be given to the dogs. The fire that burned out the Doge reduced St. Mark's and all the houses between the Piazza and Sta. Maria Zobenigo to ashes. Thus in blood and flame and smoke the people of Venice affirmed once more that they would never permit the dukedom to become the appanage of one family, that they had not come to Venice to "live under a lord."

Pietro Candiani was succeeded by Pietro Orseolo, the first member of the family that made a final attempt to establish a dynastic dukedom. The Orseoli were the most distinguished of the three houses that endeavoured to seat themselves in permanence on the ducal throne. When we come to consider the development of Venice in commerce, in arms and in art, we shall see how deeply she was indebted to the two Pietro of that name. But in tracing the history of the dynastic principle, what is important throughout the reigns of the Orseoli is this, that thanks to the development of Venice, we begin to perceive the germs of an aristocracy being formed among the leading families whose names emerge more and more frequently; and the struggle for the throne between the Orseoli and Candiani, who had not been completely crushed

at the downfall of Pietro IV., is carried on by the help of prominent partisans. The family of Caloprini supported the Candiani, the Morosini espoused the cause of the Orseoli, and the rivalry struck deeper and deeper and deeper into the State, and threatened to tear the community in two, until, "tired with all these," both the people and the nobles took the final steps which rendered a dynastic dukedom impossible.

The glory of the Orseoli and their chief services to the State are summed up in the reign of Pietro II., the greatest Doge Venice had hitherto produced. He was elected in 983, one hundred and seventy years after the concentration at Rialto. When he died in 1008, he left the Republic in a very different position from that in which he found her on his accession. During his reign the Venetians took their first steps down the Dalmatian coast and towards their supremacy in the Adriatic, that natural water-avenue to Venice. Pietro left the throne to his son Otho, godson of the Emperor Otho, married to a daughter of the King of Hungary, brother of the Patriarch of Grado, related to the Bishop of Torcello. Such an accumulation of honours, while it proved the high position held by Venice among European sovereigns, also demonstrated the preponderating influence of the Orseoli in the State. The anti-dynastic party gathered force and became menacing. The Doge fled to Istria, but was brought back by his own party. Nothing, however, could check the feeling in Venice which was running stronger and stronger against any attempt to create an hereditary throne. The attitude of the Republic was as it had always been. It would not brook foreign interference, nor would it endure domestic sovereignty. A pretext was soon found. The Doge was seized, his beard shaved, and himself banished to Constantinople, where he died. His successor, Flabianico, came to the throne (1032) under conditions which profoundly modified the Venetian constitution, gave a permanent imprint to the character of the Dogeship, and rendered a dynastic tendency impossible for the future. The entire family of the Orseoli was ostracized,

debarred in perpetuity from holding any office in the State. A law was passed rendering the election of a Doge-Consort illegal, and two ducal councillors were appointed to assist the Doge in the discharge of his functions; the Doge was, in future, obliged, not merely advised, to invite the more prominent citizens to lend him their counsel in affairs of moment, and here we find the germs of two great members of the later Venetian constitution—the *Consiglieri Ducali* or Ducal Privy Council, and the Senate, the *Pregadi* or "invited." From this moment onwards the Doge ceases to be the sole authority in the State, the aristocracy begins to make its appearance, and thenceforth down to the stereotyping of the constitution by the "closing of the great council" in 1296, Venetian constitutional history turns upon the action of the aristocracy in reference to both Doge and people.

(*b*) ***The Aristocracy.*** The earliest occasion on which we come across prominent families taking a leading part in the movement of events was during the struggle between the Candiani and Orseoli for the ducal throne. The Caloprini, as we have seen, stood for the Candiani, the Morosini for the Orseoli, and their feuds all but proved the ruin of Venice. The Caloprini plotted the murder of every Morosini, but succeeded in despatching only one, Domenico. That, however, was enough. The Morosinis were sworn to *vendetta*, and Venice was no safe home for Caloprini. They betook themselves to the Emperor Otho II., and their leader, Stefano, offered, if the Emperor would restore him and his clan and make him Doge, to hold Venice as the vassal of the Western Empire. The Emperor agreed, and a concerted plan of action was arranged. The Caloprini partisans inside Venice threatened revolution. Stefano and the exiles undertook to blockade Venice from the mainland, while the Emperor himself prepared to deliver an attack by sea. The danger was extreme. Venice had never been so seriously menaced. But the death of Otho came to relieve the strain. The Caloprini, robbed of their chief support, offered submission as the price of their recall. The mere sight of them

drove the Morosinis mad. Fresh bloodshed followed, and had not the strong hand of Pietro Orseolo II. come to suppress them, a war of extermination must have ruined both families.

Apart from the fact that it marks the emergence of leading families, the Caloprini-Morosini episode is of interest as illustrating one great danger to the growing State and incidentally explaining why she never succumbed to it. Why, it may be asked, did not an ambitious Doge or a turbulent faction secure their own supremacy by calling in foreign aid, as so frequently happened in other Italian cities? The answer is, that Venice was virtually impregnable. Before a foreign army could have entered the city—if ever they could have done so—in support of a faction, the traitors would have been slain, and there would have been no faction left to support. The lagoons, in fact, while securing Venice from foreign attack, also ensured internal quiet, allowed her to develop into one solid, homogeneous State, unrent by rival parties, feared and admired by the less fortunate mainland towns of Italy.

While the strong hand of Pietro Orseolo curbed the turbulent nobility, the results of his brilliant reign, which we shall consider presently, added to their wealth and importance; and so when his family was ostracized and the dynastic tendency crushed for ever, we find an aristocracy ready to emerge, and take its place in the administration of affairs by means of the two new offices of ducal counsellor (*consigliere ducale*) and of senator (*pregado*).

The growing aristocracy, if it were to assume the leading *rôle* in the constitution and management of the State, found a double task before it. It must curtail the ducal authority and absorb the Doge's powers, and it must deprive the people of all voice in the government of the State.

The aristocracy had, however, much to do before either of its objects was attained. A contemporary account of the election of Domenico Selvo as Doge in 1071, proves that the ceremony was still democratic in character, that the choice of the chief magistrate still lay with the entire Venetian community, the *communitas Veneciarum*. The population of the city

assembled at the cathedral church of S. Pietro di Castello. The Bishop of Olivolo, surrounded by the clergy, offered up prayers for the welfare of the State and for guidance in the choice of a ruler. Then cries were raised for Domenico Selvo, the people's favourite, "*Dominicum Silvium volumus et laudamus*," "*Volemo*," the same formula with which the Venetian parishioners cover the walls of their parish to this day when a cure is vacant, in protestation of their ancient right to a voice in the nomination of their *parocco*, or parish priest. On this occasion there was no opposition. Selvo was seized and carried shoulder-high to a boat, and all set out for S. Marco. During the passage the *Te Deum* was intoned, while Selvo took off his stockings, that he might enter the church with due humility; bells rang from all the towers; the lagoon was churned to foam by a thousand oars; at St. Mark's he prostrated himself and gave thanks to God and the patron Saint; then taking the staff of office from the altar and followed by the crowd, he passed into the ducal palace, where he received the oath of allegiance, and immediately gave the necessary orders for refurnishing the palace, which, in accordance with the custom of the time, had been gutted by the mob.

Such, on the testimony of an eye-witness, was the simple ceremony of a ducal election in the eleventh century. It was not to remain so much longer.

About a hundred years later, that is to say in 1172, the aristocracy definitely emerges with a policy declared, and the power to carry it through. During those hundred years, as we shall see when we come to the commercial expansion of Venice, the State made great strides forward in wealth and prosperity. It turned the Crusades to account and developed its trade in the Levant and in Syria. Acre and Tyre fell, and the foundations of Venetian maritime power were securely laid. The result of this expansion was the growth of a wealthy class in Venice, men who had helped in the achievement, and who knew how to secure the reward. They had created for themselves the largest stake in the country, and were resolved to have the chief voice in the

management of its destinies. Their opportunity arrived when the Emperor Manuel's treachery, in seizing all Venetians in Constantinople and confiscating their goods, swept the government of Venice off its feet on a wave of popular indignation and precipitated the disastrous campaign of Vitale Michiel II. (1171). On the return of the shattered squadrons and the murder of the Doge a radical change in the constitution seemed imperative.

To the Venetians considering the situation, it appeared that the Doge was too independent—for three reasons; he alone had the power of summoning the general assembly of the people, the *concione;* he had the power to name those whose advice he desired to take, and so could tune it to his own pitch; the ducal councillors were too weak to act as an adequate check on the Doge. On the other hand the people were too powerful—their numbers made them dominant at a crisis; the city, moreover, was not secure from tumult, and they and the Doge between them had swept the State into the late disastrous campaign.

The result of the modifications proposed and carried was a great advance towards the form of constitution eventually adopted by the Republic. (1) With a view to creating an efficient deliberative assembly, in a state whose population was rapidly expanding, each of the six divisions of the city was required to elect two representatives. Each member of these six groups of deputies proceeded to appoint forty of the more prominent citizens in each of their respective quarters, to serve on the council. A body of four hundred and eighty members was thus created and served for a year; on retiring they themselves, and not the people, appointed the two deputies to nominate the council for the succeeding year. But neither the form of election nor the number elected was as yet rigidly fixed. The duties of the council were the election of all officers of State by vote, and the preparation of all matters to be submitted to the general assembly or *concione*. Here we have the germ of the *Maggior Consiglio*, the basis of the Venetian constitution, which became strictly oligarchical in 1296. More-

over, by this reform the people were deprived of their voice in the election of the Doge, which was now committed to the newly-created council.

(2) With a view to restraining the Doge's independence the number of ducal councillors was raised from two to six, of course appointed by the new council.

(3) At the same time, while curtailing the ducal authority, they increased the pomp. For the future the Doge was to be carried round the Piazza in a kind of pulpit (*pozzetto*) immediately after his election, to be acclaimed by the people and to scatter largess.

When proceeding to elect a successor to the murdered Doge, Michiel, the council nominated eleven electors, who chose Sebastian Ziani, and presented him to the people not for election but for confirmation. They were met by angry cries, and were in some danger of their lives. But an empty formula of deference, "This is your Doge, an it please you," hoodwinked and appeased the mob, while it left the aristocracy the real masters of the situation.

A little later the fourth crusade, in 1204, and the partition of the Archipelago among Venetian citizens, brought a great access of wealth and strength to the aristocracy, and during this period they forged the most powerful weapon they ever invented for the curtailment of the ducal authority. When Enrico Dandolo was elected (1193), he was called upon to swear to what was known as a *promissione ducale*, a kind of coronation oath by which the Doge bound himself and his family. This *promissione* could be, and was, altered at each new election, special officers being appointed to scrutinize the actions of the deceased Doge, and to add to the new oath whatever clauses they thought necessary to check any symptoms of an independent or aggrandizing action. The weapon was a perfect instrument in the hands of the aristocracy, and was freely employed. The restrictions imposed by the *promissione* became steadily severer, until hardly anything was left to the Doge of the ancient power and independence of his office. The *promissione* once invented, no Doge

could or did escape from it, and the growing restrictions accepted by Jacopo Tiepolo (1229)—the Doge shall interfere in no ecclesiastical elections, shall pay taxes, shall not communicate with foreign princes; by Marino Morosini (1249)—theDoge shall solicit office for no one; by Jacopo Contarini (1275)—the Doge shall not accept fiefs for himself, or his sons, nor raise loans, nor allow any of his family to marry a foreigner without leave, nor buy lands outside the Ducato Veneto, nor allow his sons to hold any office but that of ambassador or captain of a ship, nor allow his wife to make presents—all prove that the ducal authority and independence were dead, and that the aristocracy had achieved its object of reducing the Doge to the position of a mere figurehead in the State, the official mouthpiece of the ruling caste.

(*c*) ***The Oligarchy.*** We are now approaching the most important moment in the Venetian constitutional history, the period in which the aristocracy stereotyped itself as a close oligarchy, supreme for ever after in the Republic. So far as we have seen, the aristocracy had achieved its double object of crushing the ducal authority and of disfranchising the people. But the aristocracy had not yet succeeded in making itself into a close caste, an oligarchy. The council created in 1171 was chosen freely from among the leading members of each quarter of the city, and the two nominators for each quarter were not necessarily members of the dominant party. No doubt there had been a tendency to confine the membership to leading families, and in 1286 motion had been made that only those whose paternal ancestors had sat in the council should be eligible for nomination to it. Had that measure been passed, it would at once have created a close caste, for election to all offices of State lay with the council alone; it was rejected, however, by 82 against 58. A similar measure was again proposed in 1296 and thrown out. But the aristocracy had on their side a Doge of strong character, Pietro Gradenigo, and in the following year the great measure, known as the "closing of the Great Council," (*Serrata del Maggior Consiglio*), was put and carried.

It provided that the highest legal authority in the State, the Council of Forty, "shall ballot, one by one, the names of those who for the last four years have had a seat in the council. Those who receive twelve favourable votes, or upwards, shall be members of the Great Council. Three electors shall be appointed to submit further names for ballot, these electors to hold office for one year. These provisions cannot be repealed, except with the consent of five out of six ducal councillors, twenty-five of the Council of Forty, and two-thirds of the Great Council itself."

The first clause created a special caste in the community—those who had during the last four years enjoyed a seat in the council. The third clause still provided an opening through which a Venetian citizen who did not belong to the favoured class might be saved from disfranchisement, might still pass within the charmed circle of the governing caste. But the three electors almost immediately laid down for their own guidance a rule which contained the very essence of the *Serrata*, and constituted the true closing of the caste. They resolved that only those who could prove that a paternal ancestor had sat in the council between the years 1172 and 1297 should be eligible as members of the present Great Council.

By these provisions the community was divided into three great classes:—(1) Those who had never sat in the council themselves and whose parents had never sat. These were, of course, the vast majority in the State; and by this act they were disfranchised, rendered ineligible for office and voiceless, forever, in the government of their country. (2) Those whose ancestors had sat in the council. These were eligible, and, as a matter of fact, were gradually admitted members of the Great Council; their sons, in like manner, becoming eligible on attaining their majority. (3) Those who were already of the council at the time this act was carried or had sat in the council during the four preceding years; their sons likewise becoming eligible on attaining majority.

We must note that the period within which it was necessary

to prove that an ancestor had sat in council covered the years between 1172 and 1297—a long period. It is probable, therefore, that few prominent families were disfranchised by the *Serrata*, and as a matter of fact the numbers of the council increased rapidly at first, as the new members proved their right and were admitted. In 1296 the numbers were 210; in 1311 they had risen to 1017, and by 1340 they were 1212, but that represented the whole of the electorate in the Venetian constitution. In 1319 the heraldic officers of the State, the *Avvogadori*, were ordered to make a visitation to establish the purity of blood, and this led to the opening of the famous Libro d'Oro, which was nothing but a register of patrician births, marriages and deaths.

The importance of the *Serrata* depended entirely on the nature of the Great Council. The functions of that council were, at first: the election of all officers of State; legislation; the management of foreign affairs and finances—almost the whole field of political activity. Exclusion from the Great Council, therefore, meant political death. But the growth of its numbers soon rendered the Great Council unsuitable for the discharge of some of these duties. The smaller body, the Senate or *Pregadi*, was better adapted for the direction of finance, the supervision of commerce, of customs, of the arsenal, the management of foreign affairs, correspondence with ambassadors, and the decision of peace and war; and these duties were gradually transferred to the Senate from the Great Council, which retained as its chief function the election to all State offices.

The Senate or *Pregadi* numbered originally sixty members, elected in the Great Council, to whom were added, eventually, other sixty, known as the "Addition," or *Zonta*. The full Senate numbered one hundred and twenty members, besides those who sat in it *ex officio*, which brought a plenary sitting up to about one hundred and eighty voices.

The six ducal councillors, or the *Consiglio Minore*, were elected from the six quarters of the city. They held the ducal powers, as it were, in commission. The Doge could

not act without them, but they could act in absence of the Doge. They opened despatches, addressed nominally to the Doge; they received petitions presented to him; in his name they prepared the motions to be submitted to the Great Council or the Senate.

Finally, there was the supreme judicial authority in the State, the Council of Forty (*Quarantia*), which, in addition to its judicial functions, superintended the Mint and the Treasury. In all these assemblies, the Great Council, the Senate, the Lesser Council, and the Council of Forty, the Doge sat and presided; he embodied and represented the spirit of the Republic; present at all deliberations, dominant in none.

Such was the constitution of the Republic at the close of the thirteenth century. It was not yet complete, as it was to stand throughout the rest of the Venetian history. It still lacked two important branches—the *Collegio*, or Cabinet, and the Council of Ten. But the first thirty-five years of the next century saw the completion of the structure. Both *Collegio* and Council of Ten were called into existence to supply defects which made themselves felt, as the State grew in size and importance and embarked on a career of territorial expansion.

The war of Ferrara, with which we shall have to deal when we come to the expansion of Venice on the mainland, had brought the Republic into collision with the Pope, and called down upon her the penalties of excommunication and interdict, with the result that Venetian goods were confiscated in England, France and Italy. Venice was in great danger, for the new government, as constructed by the *Serrata*, was not popular at home—thanks to the discontent bred by the closing of the Great Council. The crisis proved that neither the *Maggior Consiglio* nor the Senate was adequate to deal with sudden emergencies. The one was too large, the other had not yet received its full commission to handle foreign affairs. The Doge's position and powers had been virtually destroyed. The Great Council accord-

ingly elected a small commission, or *Collegio*, of seven experienced statesmen to deal with the movement of the war (1308). They were called *Savii*, or Sages. This special commission was found to work so well and to be of such eminent service that it was continued in office, was eventually enlarged, and took its place permanently in the Venetian constitution as the *Collegio*, or Cabinet. When fully developed the Cabinet consisted of six *Savii Grandi*, the *Savii da terra ferma* and the *Savii agli ordini*, or *da Mar*, the Secretaries of State, as we should call them, for war, marine and finance. It was the duty of the *Savii Grandi* to prepare all public business and to present it in the Great Council or the Senate and, when the Council of Ten was established, it lay with them to send the business either to the Senate or to the Ten. All the affairs of the Republic passed through their hands. The Doge presided, and the place in the constitution occupied by the *Collegio* was immediately below the ducal council, and above both Senate and Council of Ten.

Like the *Collegio*, the Council of Ten was called into existence to meet a defect in the constitution—the want of a swift and secret department to meet a crisis in the State. The closing of the Great Council had stirred up bitter discontent among the disfranchised, and this led to the only serious revolution that shook the internal quiet of the Republic. A premonition was given by the conspiracy of Marin Bocconio in 1300. He and his followers knocked at the door of the Council Hall and demanded their right to vote. The Doge caused the door to be opened and invited them to enter one by one to receive their dues. Their due, as the new oligarchy conceived it, was that each of them should be hung "*turpissime*," that is head downwards, between the columns near the Porto Della Carta, and that was done. But ten years later (1310) the discontent took a more serious aspect. This time it was headed by a number of nobles of the more conspicuous families—Tiepolos, Querinis, Badoers—powerful houses. The conspiracy was a complete failure. Tiepolo and his followers were defeated in the

Piazza. Quirini was killed, Badoer executed, and Tiepolo fled.

The crisis was the most serious that had occurred in the internal life of the State, for a part, and that an influential part, of the nobility was concerned in the revolution. Neither the Great Council nor the Senate was adequate to deal with a situation that demanded secrecy and rapidity, for the enemies of the State were inside her own borders. A proposal to delegate the observation, pursuit, capture and punishment of the conspirators to the commission which had been appointed to conduct the war of Ferrara, was rejected on the ground that it had enough on its hands already. Accordingly a special commission of Public Safety—to borrow a phrase from the French Revolution—was created to carry out the intention of the oligarchy to establish itself as supreme in the State. Here we have the origin of the Council of Ten. It was a temporary committee of Public Safety in its beginning; but it supplied a want in the constitution as created by the oligarchy—the need, that is, of a sure and rapid executive arm. Its tenure of existence was extended first on the plea that Tiepolo was still at large, and that his followers still menaced the State. Its value, its efficiency, became more and more obvious the longer it lived. Its lease of life was continually renewed, and finally it was made permanent in 1335.

With the creation of the Council of Ten the Venetian constitution was completed. The few changes that came afterwards were merely delegations of power, as in the case of the *Inquisitori di Stato*, or the *Executori contro la Bestemmia*, or else the creation of special departments to meet the growing needs of the growing State, such as the *Cinque Savii alla Mercanzia*, and the subdivision of the Supreme Court (*Quarantia*) into a criminal and a civil side.

This constitution which Venice evolved for herself resembled nothing else in Italy, and filled Italian statesmen with admiration and despair. Where other States had evolved a personal despot and a reigning family—a despot

to be assassinated, and a family to be expelled—with all the instability that both implied, Venice had developed a strong, impersonal constitution, impervious to the dagger and, after the final establishment of the oligarchy by the suppression of Tiepolo and the creation of the Ten, free from party feuds. And the reason for this exemption from the civil strife which wrought such havoc in other Italian states is that Venice had, thanks to her unique geographical position, escaped the imprint of Lombard, Frankish, Swabian rule—had never been subject to the feudal system. This is, perhaps, the key to, or at least the most important factor in, the development of the Venetian commonwealth. The Republic was never torn in two by the conflict between a territorial nobility with fortified houses in the city and a wealthy mercantile class, also in the city, struggling for the reins of government. She never found her very existence seriously threatened by a large part of her citizens in exile, plotting round the borders of the State how they might return by the help of some powerful foreigner. She never had the misfortune to see her own citizens more bitterly divided among themselves than united against an external foe. Patriotism was possible in Venice, whatever internal struggles she might pass through. The Venetian community made for itself a unique dwelling-place among the lagoons, and evolved for itself a unique constitution, which, after the ferment of the Tiepoline conspiracy had died away, left it a united and homogeneous State, worthy of its own proud title, *Venezia, Città nobilissima e singolare.*

II. Maritime.

The Venetian oligarchy grew, and the Venetian constitution was developed by it, thanks to the expanding commercial

importance of the State. Its commerce was created by, and also in turn demanded, expansion in two directions—by sea and by land. Both require our attention before we come to the consideration of Venetian commerce itself—the source of Venetian wealth and splendour. The maritime expansion of Venice falls into two broad divisions: first, the expansion eastward down the Adriatic and into the Levant; second, the clash with Genoa.

(*a*) ***Spreading Eastward.*** We have seen that by geographical position and ethnographic composition, no less than by her political relations, as a part of the Byzantine Empire, Venice looked eastward. She was founded on the waters—as far into the sea as she could get; her population were sailors, her element the sea. Her natural avenue of approach and departure was the Adriatic. She did not spontaneously turn landward. How her territorial expansion came to be forced upon her will be made apparent during the recital of her maritime career.

The struggle to extend seawards and eastwards was, of course, a continual one. It never ceased for a moment until the Republic had reached the culminating point. But during the conflict we may note three well-defined epochs which sum up all that had gone before them and mark decisive steps towards the goal. These epochs are associated with the names of Pietro Orseolo II., Vitale Michiel, and Enrico Dandolo, with the Adriatic, Syria and the Levant.

We have seen how the early fisher-folk of the lagoons acquired a reputation for skill in the navigation of their home-waters; how they were called upon to transport the Imperial armies of Belisarius, Narses, and Longinus; and, growing stronger yet, were even instrumental in restoring an Imperial Exarch, Paul, to his government in Ravenna. The pressure of Pepin's attack developed still further their naval resources, and almost immediately after the concentration at Rialto, we find them in possession of a war-fleet of sixty ships, with which they endeavoured to help the Eastern Emperor in his campaign against the Saracens, disastrous

alike for him and them. For the failure of the expedition to Taranto (836) brought the Sclav pirates of the Dalmatian coast swooping down upon the lagoons, which they hoped to find an easy prey. This was the first brush with these free-booters, whose nest along the broken coast-line of Dalmatia, with its numerous islands, sunken reefs, and swirling currents, was all but impregnable. And from this first encounter with Dalmatian pirates, Venice learned that she could never be safe, never hope to expand, until the robber hordes were subdued, and she alone remained mistress of her natural waterway, the Adriatic. The immediate result of this Dalmatian attack was the fortification of the lagoons, the building of two guard-ships to protect the *lido* entrance into the lagoon, and the formation of a fleet able to cope with the swift Liburnian barks.

Thus Venice acquired a war-fleet and learned the use of it. It was inevitable that she should begin to employ it for purposes of commercial expansion and the suppression of rivals. A preliminary essay was made upon an excuse of no validity against Comacchio, a port in the lagoon near Ravenna. Ravenna itself had already fallen into decay, to the great advantage of Venice, who was determined to see no other competitor established so far up the Adriatic. The expedition against Comacchio proved successful, and as far as the west side was concerned Venice had no rival now nearer than Ancona.

But on the eastern shore there still remained the Dalmatian pirates, an enemy of a far tougher fibre. More than one Doge attempted the task of subduing them. But at length, in 983, a great Doge, Pietro Orseolo II., appeared upon the scene. He began by obtaining a Golden Bull from the Emperor Basil. The terms of this document conferred on Venetian merchants in the East privileges far in excess of anything they had hitherto enjoyed. They were permitted to trade under a specially favourable customs tariff, but were bound to carry nothing but *bona fide* Venetian cargoes. Lombards, Amalfitani, and Jews were not to smuggle their

goods on Venetian bottoms. Subjects of the Doge were placed directly under the jurisdiction of the Logothetes, or Financial Secretary, and thus were spared an infinity of delay. In return for these concessions the Venetian fleet was to hold itself at the disposal of the Emperor for transport of his troops.

All this clearly points to the importance Venice had already acquired, thanks to the excellence of her fleet. The commerce of Venice was expanding rapidly, and we understand how it came about that Venetian merchants could bring to the markets of the mainland, at Pavia and elsewhere, the *de transmarinis partibus orientalium divitias*, the opulence of the East from over-seas. But still there lurked the Dalmatian pirates, unsubdued and enjoying the plunder of this wealth, as Venetian ships beat up the Adriatic, making for Venice. The Republic had attempted at first to buy them off by paying blackmail. The Doge, Orseolo, resolved to stop that. The pirates in revenge vented their fury on the defenceless population of the coast, who appealed to Venice for protection. The prosperity of the Dalmatian cities, as a source of food supply, as a store of wood, as a mart for merchandise, was no less necessary to Venice than the suppression of the pirates. At a general assembly of the people the despatch of a punitive force was approved, and Venice embarked on the first great war she had undertaken as an independent State on her own account.

On Ascension Day, May 6, 1000, the Doge set sail. The expedition was entirely successful. After capturing Curzola he struck at the central stronghold of the pirates' power, Lagosta, a rocky citadel thought to be impregnable, and after a brilliant assault it fell. In gratitude the Dalmatian towns recognized Orseolo as "Duke of Dalmatia," and that became one of the permanent titles of the Doge of Venice. Later on the Republic lost Dalmatia more than once before her hold was made absolute, but she never renounced the title she had thus acquired. Whether it was the Dalmatians themselves who threw off Venetian rule, or the kings of Hungary who temporarily occupied Zara, Venice always returned to make good the claim she now created.

In the history of the Republic Orscolo's Dalmatian expedition is of prime importance, not merely for the blow it dealt at piracy, but because it is the first great step taken towards Venetian supremacy in the Adriatic. Venetian merchants opened factories and warehouses in the Dalmatian towns; the seaboard of Dalmatia, provided the communications were kept open, could supply the capital with food, and, what was almost as important, wood for ship-building. The State marked its appreciation of this progress by establishing the ceremony of Ascension Day, the famous *Sposalizo del Mar*, when the Doge passed out by the *lido* port to wed the sea with a ring.

The Dalmatian expedition and the increase of wealth implied thereby made the Republic so powerful in the Adriatic that the Eastern Emperors turned more and more constantly to her for help against their enemies, the Normans. This Venice was always ready to grant, but usually for a consideration. For example, in 1085 they engaged King Robert, but the terms obtained from the Emperor Alexius were that Venetians should enjoy free access to all harbours of the Empire, should be exempt from customs and should acquire certain lands, factories and warehouses in Constantinople itself. And here we find the beginnings of that famous Venetian quarter in the Imperial city and the germs of the great Venetian colony, the development of which eventually wakened the suspicion of the Emperors and the jealousy of Genoa.

This steady expansion of the Republic gradually fitted her to take her place in, and to reap advantage from the Crusades. When the Crusading movement began, the claims of Venice as the port of departure and as the purveyor of transport were paramount. She was not only more powerful than Genoa or Pisa—she also lay more to the east; she was mistress of the avenue that led south-east; and her sailors had a wider experience of the waters they were about to navigate. From the very first Venice frankly acknowledged the commercial side of the interest she took in the Crusades.

When recommending the State to undertake the Crusade, the Doge insisted that Venice could not afford to allow her rivals, Genoa and Pisa, to increase their importance in the Levant. But the Emperors in Constantinople never viewed with favour this invasion of their dominions, and the creation of a Kingdom at Jerusalem was an offence to them. Accordingly when Venice joined the Crusade she incurred Imperial displeasure, and was soon made to feel it. The Pisans of Constantinople were incited to attack them, but they did so unsuccessfully. The Imperial vengeance was delayed.

The history of the Crusades, as far as Venice is concerned, is the history of a steady expansion in Syria and the Levant. A few years after Baldwin's establishment as King of Jerusalem, he invited the Venetians to help him in the conquest of the coast-towns of Syria. The Republic complied. She sent a fleet of a hundred ships and Sidon fell (1102). Venice received as her recompense a quarter in the conquered town, a church, a street, a market-place, bakery, etc., the right to use her own weights and measures.

The terms she asked for, and got, in Sidon, she asked for and got as the other Syrian towns fell one by one. And the fall of Sidon marks a further step forward in Venetian maritime expansion. She now passed out of the Adriatic, and began to build an empire in Syria.

But the expansion implied a strain on the State. Possessions, factories, warehouses in the far east of the Mediterranean were of little use to Venice, unless the line of communication between the metropolis and the colonies were secure. To protect that line implied a considerable development of the fleet. Between 1096 and 1105 Venice had placed upon the sea three hundred ships fit to fight. Her gain had been great, but her expenditure greater. And now, when she required a breathing-space, the weak point in her position, her line of communication, was exposed to attack. The Hungarians invaded and captured the coast of Dalmatia. The Doge, Ordelafo Falier, was defeated at Zara, and the

Republic lost, for a while, her supremacy in the Adriatic. Nor had she time to devote her energies to recovering it. For Baldwin was in straits, and the Pope was imploring Venice to hasten to his help. Once again under colour of religious enthusiasm, but really with an eye to further possessions in Syria, the Doge, Domenico Michiel, urged, and the people consented to, another expedition, not without protest, and not without warning from a party opposed to and alarmed at this policy of hurried inflation, and apprehensive lest the pronounced hostility of the Imperial court, coupled with the loss of Dalmatia, might land the Republic in disaster. In spite of opposition, however, a splendid fleet of seventy-two sail was manned and despatched down the Adriatic. The Doge himself was in command. He met the Saracen fleet off the Syrian coast, and by a ruse he won a brilliant victory. The Saracens were nearly annihilated, and laden with booty the Doge sailed into Acre. There he encountered divided opinions. The Christians of Jerusalem desired to attack Ascalon, those of the seaboard wished to reduce Tyre. The question was decided by lot. Tyre was chosen. But before beginning the attack the Venetians made their bargain. They were to receive in Tyre, as in Sidon, a quarter which should be extra-territorial; they were to be exempt from taxation, to use their own weights and measures and to be subject to the jurisdiction of their own magistrates.

Tyre fell (1123), and the Venetians immediately organized their own quarter in the city. They built three churches to emphasize their piety; they committed the safety of the quarter to a *Vicecomes* and justice in the quarter to a *bailie*. The kingdom of Jerusalem undertook to support these Venetian officials, and the inhabitants of the Venetian quarter took an oath of allegiance to the Doge. What was begun at Sidon was completed at Tyre. The Republic had now established along the Syrian coast a line of factories, with extra-territorial rights. She could draw the merchandise that came in caravans from the interior, ship the goods on her own vessels, and send them up to Venice for distribution throughout

Europe. The fall of Tyre marks the second great step forward in Venetian maritime expansion.

The third and final step in the eastward movement was taken during the Fourth Crusade, when the Venetians sacked Constantinople and overthrew the Greek Empire of the East.

The Byzantine court viewed with hostility the establishment of the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem and resented the part that Venice had taken therein. The Republic soon gave further cause for dissatisfaction. The Emperor Manuel called on the Venetians to assist him against the Normans, who, under Roger II., were growing powerful about the Ionian Islands. They complied and defeated Roger; but almost immediately afterwards (1148) they saw their way to a favourable treaty with the Normans, by which they secured immunity from attack for all their possessions north of Ragusa and concluded it, thereby securing still further their supremacy in the Adriatic.

This open disregard of obligations towards the Empire fostered the growing hostility towards the Republic. The Venetian quarter in Constantinople had become very populous; as many as two hundred thousand inhabitants are recorded. The Venetians were unpopular. The jealousy of the Genoese and other rivals constantly called attention to their insolence, which led to brawls. The Emperor Manuel seized on this as a pretext for striking a blow. In 1171 all the Venetians were arrested at a single *coup* and their goods confiscated. Venice flew to arms and the tide of popular indignation swept the Republic into that war with the Eastern Empire which, as we have already seen, led up to important modifications of the constitution (p. 36). To raise the money needed by so vast an undertaking as an attack on the Empire, the population was subjected to a forced loan of one per cent. on net incomes. The money so raised bore interest at the rate of four per cent. The bonds issued could be bequeathed, mortgaged or sold. And here we have the earliest instance in Venetian, or perhaps in any history, of the issue of government stock.

This expedition against the Empire proved the most disastrous failure that had ever befallen the Republic. Manuel temporized and invited discussion; the fleet went into winter quarters at Schio. Discipline broke down; the plague made its appearance; there was a suspicion of poisoned wells; the crews mutinied, and the shattered remnants of the magnificent armament reached Venice in disorder and disgrace in the spring of 1172.

With this disaster rankling in the mind of Venice, proposals for the transport of the Fourth Crusade reached the Government from the assembly at Soissons. Though the Pope expressed doubt as to the good faith of the Venetians and recommended Genoa instead, Venice was so incomparably the more powerful State that there was virtually no choice. Villehardouin, the Ambassador, summed up the situation when he declared, "*nessuna gente ha possanza come voi*," "no people possess such might as yours." A bargain was struck.

(1) Venice was to furnish transport for 4500 horses, 9000 esquires, 20,000 foot, and provisions for one year.

(2) She was to receive 85,000 marks of silver of Cologne.

(3) She was to furnish fifty galleys on her own account.

(4) She was to have a half of all conquests.

A great meeting in St. Mark's confirmed the contract. Venice fulfilled her share of the bargain punctually and fully, but the Crusaders were not equally ready to fulfil theirs. The money was not forthcoming. Then it occurred to the Doge, Enrico Dandolo, that Venice might reap an advantage. Zara and Dalmatia were still unsubdued. The Venetian avenue, the Adriatic, was not yet secured. He offered to postpone the receipt of the money due and to sail at once, if the Crusaders would undertake to attack and reduce Zara for the Republic, otherwise not a man of them should leave the *lido* where they had been interned. These terms were accepted. By October they were ready to sail. The departure was a magnificent spectacle. The three great galleys, the *Eagle*, the *Pilgrim* and the *Paradise*, towered above the rest. Each ship was pavoned with the armorial

bearings of the great French barons. The Venetian galleys flew the ensign of St. Mark, a golden lion on a crimson field. The Doge's own galley was painted vermilion. To the blare of trumpets and the chaunt of the *Veni Creator*, the Fourth Crusade set sail to do the behest of Venice.

Zara was captured in spite of an indignant protest from the Pope, and winter being now upon them, the fleet was forced to stay there.

At Zara the leaders of the Crusade came to a serious decision as to its destination. Boniface, Marquis of Montferrat, wished to go to Constantinople instead of to the Holy Land. He laid claim to the kingdom of Salonica, and hoped to make it good with the help of the Crusaders. He found Dandolo quite willing to second his schemes on the basis of a new contract, that the Venetian fleet was to be hired for another year and that the Republic should receive one hundred thousand marks. When the bargain was struck the whole Crusade set out for the capital of the Eastern Empire. Under the guidance of Dandolo and inspired by him, the Crusaders forced a passage into the Golden Horn, and after desperate fighting the Imperial city fell (1204).

On the capture of Constantinople, the Crusaders proceeded to the establishment of the Latin Empire and the election of an Emperor. There were three candidates—Boniface, Baldwin, and Dandolo. Dandolo, however, announced that he could not accept the Imperial crown if the choice should fall on him. By this refusal the Doge became the real arbiter in the election, and his influence carried Baldwin to the throne.

Throughout the Fourth Crusade it was the Venetians who played the most prominent part; theirs was the fleet that carried the Crusaders, and Dandolo was the ruling spirit. The partition of the Empire brought to the Republic a vast increase in territorial possessions and established her dominion in the Levant. To her fell the Cyclades and Sporades, and she bought Crete from the Marquis of Montferrat. She had

recovered Zara and the command of the Dalmatian coast; a continuous line of Venetian possessions extended now from Venice down the Adriatic, round the Morea to Constantinople on the one hand, to Syria on the other. But the task of making this possession actual was far from light. The Republic hit upon the device of granting the islands of the Archipelago as fiefs to her more important noble families, who would undertake to make the possession good and to hold the islands for the Republic. Thus Andros went to Dandolo; Querini took Lampsacus; Barozzi, Santorin. The Sanudo family became Dukes of the Archipelago. The material gain to Venice was very great, by far the greatest that she had as yet secured. Her possessions in the Levant raised her to the position of a European Power. But the sack of Constantinople, and the ruin of the Eastern Empire, entailed dangerous consequences of the highest moment for the Republic. The substitution of the weak Latin Empire for the Greek Empire, with all the prestige of the Roman name at its back, upset the equilibrium of the East and eventually made it easier for the Turk to plant himself in Europe. Venice had acquired the largest estate in the Eastern Mediterranean, and she was therefore left almost single-handed to defend her interests. Moreover the sudden expansion of Venice, as the result of the Fourth Crusade, roused the jealousy of the rival Italian maritime States, especially of Genoa, and entailed on the Republic a series of desperate campaigns which only closed with the war of Chioggia and the destruction of the Genoese fleet in 1380.

(*b*) ***The Struggle with Genoa.*** The fall of Constantinople, the destruction of the Greek Empire, and the weakness of its Latin successor, left the Levant, and supremacy in it, open to the two rival maritime powers of Italy—Genoa and Venice. The preponderance which Venice had acquired, thanks to the Crusades and to the Fourth especially, stirred the jealousy of her western rival. The history of the struggle between the two Republics for the mastery falls into three main periods, which centre round Acre, Constantinople and

the Black Sea. It was inevitable that the rivals, dwelling close to one another in the Levant cities, both of them with factories and treaty-rights acquired in return for services rendered to Christendom, and both there to secure a monopoly of trade, if possible, should come to blows. The immediate pretext was the question of proprietorship in the church and quarter of St. Sabbas in the town of Acre. A quarrel and a blow led to the sacking of the Venetian factory by the Genoese. Venice demanded reparation. It was refused, and she prepared for war. The Genoese in their turn were driven out of their factory in Acre. A brief truce followed, but in August 1258 an engagement, decisive for this campaign, was fought in Syrian waters. The Genoese were utterly crushed and their factory in Acre destroyed. Pope Alexander IV. intervened and a hollow truce was concluded.

At Constantinople the Venetians were endeavouring to maintain upon the throne the feeble Emperor they had been chiefly instrumental in placing there. They furnished money and a squadron for his protection, and were, in fact, the real masters in the Imperial city. But the Greeks had not abandoned all hope of regaining Constantinople, and their aspirations were personified in Michel Paleologus, the guardian of the Greek Emperor. The fact that Venice was supporting Baldwin was sufficient to make the Genoese in Constantinople favour Paleologus. In 1261, when the Venetian fleet was absent on a punitive expedition, Constantinople was surprised by the Greeks, and the Venetian *Bailo* and the Patriarch driven out. The Greek Empire of the East was restored. The effect of the fall of the Latin Empire was disastrous for the Venetians. The new master of Constantinople favoured their rivals, the Genoese, who had assisted him to the throne. Though Venetians were not actually harassed in the capital, they were no longer the dominant power. The Genoese were established in the spacious quarter of Galata and threatened to absorb the commerce of the Levant.

In the face of these altered circumstances Venice appealed to Europe to join her in restoring the Latin Empire. But

she was met by a situation which she was destined to encounter again and again in the Eastern question that she had created by her action during the Fourth Crusade. Venice could not be indifferent as to who might be master in Constantinople; her trade in the Levant, the Black Sea, and Asia Minor was intimately bound up with her relations towards the city on the Bosphorus. But Europe generally had little interest in that point, nothing at least to compare with Venetian interests. And so at each appeal for help, whether to support Baldwin or to resist the Turk, Europe replied that the affair concerned Venice chiefly, and left her alone to deal with it. So it was now. Venice failed to secure any assistance for the restoration of Baldwin, and was left to continue single-handed her struggle with Genoa for supremacy in the Levant.

A series of naval engagements, chiefly in the waters of the Morea, led up to a final battle. In 1264, Giacomo Dandolo completely destroyed the Genoese fleet under Lanfranco Borborino, off the Sicilian coast between Mazara and Trapani.

The result of this great victory at Trapani was at once apparent at Constantinople, where the Emperor Paleologus had been waiting to see which way events would turn, while secretly delighted that the two great Latin naval powers should wear one another out. But this crushing blow to Genoa made the Emperor abandon his Genoese allies and endeavour to reconcile himself with Venice. Overtures, after some debate, were accepted and ended in the conclusion of a treaty, by the terms of which Venice re-acquired her position in Constantinople. But though Venice had regained much by the battle of Trapani she was by no means supreme. Genoa was far from being crushed. The weakness of the Latin cause, to which Venice was bound by her action in the Fourth Crusade, the long constitutional struggle at home, which ended in the "Closing of the Great Council," and the burden of the Ferrarese war with the Excommunication and Interdict (p. 91) it entailed—all left the Republic comparatively weak as against her rival.

The next great campaign between the two Republics was

determined to a large extent by the final collapse of the Latin Empire and the appearance of a new and formidable power, the Ottoman Turks, upon the scene. The decrepitude of the Greek and Latin empires left the trade of the Levant and the Black Sea an open prey to the nation with the strongest fleet. Both Genoa and Venice were competing for it when, in 1289, the famous city of Tripoli fell to the Paynim host. Two years later the Mussulmans attacked and captured the still richer city of Acre, and the last remnants of the Latin dominion in Palestine, upon which the Venetian tenure of trading rights in the Syrian ports depended, were swept away. Venice knew by experience that Europe would not or could not do anything to support her in the defence of the Latin kingdom. Her whole Levant trade was threatened by the Turk. She took a course dictated by her commercial interest, and instead of fighting the Mussulman she began to treat with him. She obtained confirmation of her ancient rights from the new rulers of the Levant cities. To the scandal of Christendom, a Mussulman sultan declared it to be "his firm resolve that the Venetians shall be protected, sheltered, honoured above all other peoples in the world." The Venetians re-opened their factories in the Levant, and obtained the right to an escort, if they wished to visit the Holy Sepulchre. We find them trading in "goods forbidden to Christians," that is in slaves, ship-building timber, weapons—the sale of which to the infidel was expressly prohibited by papal bulls. Venetian policy was practical and commercial, and she soon reaped the advantage by finding herself again taking the lead in the Levant. But her rivals, the Genoese, could not look on at this progress unconcerned. They were strong in Constantinople, and they countered to the Venetian treaties with the infidel by resolving to close the Dardanelles, and to exclude Venice from trade in Constantinople and the Black Sea. This step was regarded by Venice as a *casus belli*, and the second great war began. Apart from the fleet raised by the State, the private families of Venice, who had grown rich

through Levantine trade and Levantine possessions, in a burst of patriotism contributed as many as seventy-three galleys to the Venetian Armada. They were probably aware that the struggle upon which they were about to embark was a struggle for commercial supremacy, that is to say, for their very life.

The rivals met at Aias in the Gulf of Alexandretta. The Genoese, commanded by Nicolo Spinola, won an important victory by superior tactics. But the disaster only stirred the Venetians to fresh efforts. In the city the enthusiasm was infectious. A reinforcing fleet was quickly fitted out and placed under the command of Ruggiero Morosini. Meantime the results of the defeat at Aias had made themselves felt as usual at Constantinople, where, encouraged by the Emperor Andronicus, the Genoese had attacked and sacked the Venetian factory. Morosini sailed for the capital, forced the Dardanelles, burned the Genoese quarter of Galata, and threatened the Imperial palace of Blachernæ. The Emperor was compelled to buy him off and, with a large sum of money and rich booty, Morosini returned to Venice. But the crowning engagement of this campaign took place in the Adriatic, off the island of Curzola, where Andrea Dandolo, with ninety-five sail, met Lamba Doria, who commanded eighty-five Genoese vessels. Dandolo was out-manœuvred. Doria got the weather-gauge, and, moreover, the sun at his back and right in the eyes of the Venetians; he had also detached a squadron of fifteen ships to cruise out of sight and to intervene at the decisive moment. The Genoese victory was complete. Among many prisoners captured was Marco Polo, the famous traveller. The Venetian leader, Dandolo, refused to survive the disaster, and in the night he dashed his brains out against the beams of his galley.

Venice prepared to fit out yet another fleet, but both parties were exhausted, and in May 1299, Matteo Visconti, Imperial Vicar in Milan, was able to effect a peace between the Republics upon terms that were honourable to both. There was nothing in it to indicate that Venice had just suffered a severe blow.

The campaign which closed in 1299 had not been favourable to Venice, but it had served to show how strong she was, how, in spite of defeats, she was able to put squadron after squadron on the sea. It was this remarkable recuperative power that eventually secured for her the victory over Genoa.

The Venetian system of recruiting for the navy was an outcome of this struggle with Genoa. The crews were raised in the following manner. All the males between twenty and sixty in each of the six quarters of the city were enrolled, and then divided into groups of twelve. One man was chosen by lot out of each group and served in the first draft. If more men were required, lots were cast again. Each man received from the State five lire a month, and one lira a month from each of the men of his group who were not on service. This amounted to about one shilling and eightpence a day of our money, besides food.

The peace with Genoa left Venice free to develop her trade. During the first half of the fourteenth century her commerce expanded. In order to secure markets for her goods she concluded treaties with the mainland communes, Milan, Bologna, Brescia, Como. She began to trade with England and Flanders. The population of the city is said to have reached two hundred thousand. Above all, as we shall see presently, Venice laid the foundation of a territorial dominion in Italy.

But Genoa was not crushed yet, and the Turk was just beginning to make himself felt. The struggle for the lead in the trade of the Black Sea and the Crimea brought about the next rupture between the rival maritime Republics. Jealousy about the traffic in furs brought by the Tartars to the factories at Caffa was the immediate cause. The campaign centred round two names illustrious in naval history, Nicolo Pisani and Paganino Doria. It opened with several unimportant engagements. At last the commanders met in the Bosphorus, under the walls of Pera, the Genoese quarter in Constantinople. The fight was long and bloody, and carried on far into the night by the light of burning ships.

The Venetians were defeated, though the losses on either side seem to have been about equal. Pisani begged that reinforcements might be sent to meet him in Sardinian waters, and proposed an attack on that island, a menace to Genoa herself. The Government consented, and Pisani effected a junction in spite of the Genoese admiral Antonio Grimaldi, who was sent out on purpose to prevent this. Seven months after the battle of the Bosphorus, in August 1353, Pisani again met the Genoese in the waters of Cagliari, and destroyed their fleet. Genoa lay at the mercy of Venice, and the people expected to see Pisani's galleys off the harbour. In these straits the Genoese Government took a step of great ultimate importance to Venice in her territorial expansion, and made a voluntary surrender of herself to Giovanni Visconti, Lord and Bishop of Milan. She thus obtained the protection of the powerful master of Milan, and prevented Venice from reaping the full fruits of the victory at Cagliari. Visconti endeavoured to effect a solid peace between the two maritime States, and he employed as his ambassador the poet Petrarch. But it was certain that, beautifully as the laureate might speak the praises of peace, his own prophecy concerning the Venetian-Genoese war would be fulfilled—"Necesse est ut alterum e duobus Italiae luminibus extinguetur, obscuretur alterum;" "that one of Italy's eyes would be put out, the other dimmed." Venice refused all terms to Genoa. She believed that Visconti would not really support the Republic, and that she might yet crush her rival. But she presumed too far upon the supposed weakness of Genoa. Her rival was still capable of dealing a blow, was still served by great naval commanders.

Both cities armed, but Genoa was the quicker. The Genoese fleet, under Paganino Doria, made a dash for the Adriatic, slipped by Nicolo Pisani, who was guarding its mouth, and before Venice could realize her danger, he had burned Lesina and Curzola and established his head-quarters at Parenzo, in Istria, only about sixty miles from the lagoons. The city was in great alarm. A war-tax was imposed, a

new squadron raised, the *lido* mouth fortified. But home politics at Genoa prevented Doria from pushing his advantage. A truce was signed, but did not lead to a peace, and no sooner did the truce expire than the two Pisani, Nicolo and Vettor, set sail in search of Doria in the waters of the Archipelago. They did not succeed in forcing him to fight, and presently the Venetian fleet went into winter quarters behind the island of Sapienza, at the south-western corner of the Morea. The entrance to the straits in which the Venetians lay was either carelessly or treacherously guarded. It was suggested to Doria that he might catch the Venetian fleet in a trap. On November 4, 1354, the passage was forced. The Venetians, panic-stricken, fled to land. The whole armament was captured. Nicolo Pisani, the commander, who escaped with the standard, and Nicolo Quirini, who were responsible for the disaster, were tried and condemned.

This defeat at Sapienza was the most crushing blow that Venice had ever received, and the State was at this moment exposed to still further danger by the conspiracy of the Doge Marino Falier. The causes and the object of that conspiracy are alike obscure. Contemporaries such as Petrarch, and chroniclers like Caroldo, both agree that no explanation was ever given. The Doge is represented as taking offence at an insult offered him by a young nobleman who escaped due punishment by his brother patricians. Relying upon support from the people, who also hated the aristocracy, the Doge is said to have plotted to change the constitution from an oligarchy into a despotism of the type common on the mainland. The minutes of the trial do not exist, and any explanation must be conjectural. The plot at all events failed; it was discovered, and the Doge was tried by the Council of Ten, condemned and executed 1355.

It is not easy to explain why Genoa did not press her rival closer after the battle of Sapienza and the conspiracy of Falier. Probably the war was as exhausting to the victor as to the vanquished. The Duke of Milan, at all events, seems to have found no difficulty in arranging a peace in 1355.

But as after the defeat at Curzola, so after the defeat at Sapienza, Venice set herself to recover her position. The moment she was free of war she turned to commerce, and entered into trading conventions with Egypt, Barbary, the Flemings, the Khan of Tartary. Nothing is more striking in her history than the recuperative power she continually displayed.

Genoa watched with jealous eye the rapid recovery of her rival. Occurrences, trifling in themselves, seemed to show that war must soon break out again. At the coronation of Lusignan, King of Cyprus, the Genoese and Venetian admirals quarrelled for precedence and blood was shed. It was the possession of the island of Tenedos, however, that precipitated the final struggle. Its position so near the mouth of the Dardanelles made it an object of desire to both Republics. The Emperor Paleologus, in his straits for money wherewith to fight the Turk, had applied to Venice, and had left a number of jewels as security for the sum raised. On his return to Constantinople the Venetians asked him to grant them the island of Tenedos in return for the jewels and the extinction of the debt. At first Paleologus refused, but he was told that if he did not comply Venice would come to terms with Sultan Murad, and deprive him from his throne. The Emperor was forced to yield, and thus the island became nominally Venetian. But the Genoese in Constantinople proposed to Andronicus, the son of the Emperor, to place him on the throne, if he would guarantee them the possession of Tenedos. Andronicus agreed. Paleologus was seized and imprisoned, and his son proclaimed Emperor. But when the Genoese presented Andronicus' order for the cession of Tenedos, the governor refused to recognize it and declared that Paleologus' cession to Venice alone was valid. He offered to place the island in the hands of Marco Giustinian, the Venetian commander, who accepted the cession and ran up the Golden Lion on the crimson field.

War was inevitable. Genoa prepared at once by forming a coalition of Hungary and the Carrara family, Lords of Padua, against Venice. Hungary still aspired to Dalmatia,

and Carrara feared that the extension of Venice on the mainland must soon absorb his dominions. At Venice too, the preparations showed that the Republic appreciated the importance of this last phase of the struggle for maritime supremacy in the Levant. The Standard of St. Mark was consigned with all solemnity to the great admiral, Vettor Pisani. He sailed for Genoese waters, met and defeated the Genoese off Cape Antium and came back to clear the Adriatic of Genoese ships, which were infesting the gulf from the shelter of the lower Dalmatian coast. After successful operations at Cattaro and Zebenico, he desired to return to Venice to refit, but the Senate insisted that he should winter at Pola, in Istria. Lying there, with his crews worn out and his ships in disrepair, he was surprised by the appearance of a powerful Genoese fleet under Luciano Doria. Pisani did not wish to give battle, but was forced to by the Venetian officials who had been sent by the home government to advise him. He behaved as bravely as a man could, but the Venetian fleet was destroyed. Only six galleys escaped to Parenzo. On his return Pisani was tried and imprisoned.

The situation looked extremely grave. A crisis in the struggle was clearly imminent. The lagoons, and with them Venice, lay open to attack or blockade. Pietro Doria had arrived from Genoa and had taken over the supreme command. Carrara, Genoa's ally, was master of the mainland down to the shore of the lagoon; Doria was master at sea and could close the *lido* ports. Venice might be taken by assault or starved into surrender. But the spirit of the Republic rose to the occasion. The *lido* was fortified, chains run across the entrance, troops landed to repel an assault. Doria, however, leaned to a blockade and resolved to make Chioggia his base. He proceeded to assault that lagoon-township. It fell on August 16, 1379. Carrara urged Doria to follow up his advantage and to strike at Venice itself. But the lagoon-channels were as intricate then as in the days of Pepin. Doria declined the risk and persisted in his plan of starving Venice to surrender. This proved her salvation.

With the enemy now in the lagoon, with the mainland in their hands, the situation seemed desperate. But the people combined as one man. The Doge organized the resistance. A flotilla of light boats was mustered and manned. The great leader Vettor Pisani was called from his prison to assume the command. The fleet, upon which depended the very existence of Venice, sailed away to Chioggia to engage in the last conflict with the rival State.

Doria meanwhile had made up his mind, in pursuit of his plan of blockade, to winter in Chioggia. He drew the whole of his fleet inside the lagoon and disposed them round the town. Pisani grasped the situation at once and resolved to blockade the blockaders. To do this he closed the channel inside the lagoon that led to Venice, by sinking two ships filled with stones. In the same way he prevented exit to sea by blocking the opening in the *lido* at Chioggia itself and at Brondolo, and he drew up the whole Venetian fleet opposite the town but beyond the *lido*, out in the open Adriatic. The Genoese were thus caught in a trap. Carrara, their ally, could not reach nor victual them from the mainland, for he had no boats. No food nor assistance could reach them from the sea, for the ports were closed, and Pisani was out in the open, ready to engage any succours sent from Genoa. But Pisani did not propose merely to blockade. He prepared for an assault. With this in view he occupied points upon the *lido*. The Genoese, fully alive to their danger, continually endeavoured to break out; they even attempted to cut a channel through the narrow strip of sand-bank that prevented their ships from reaching the sea. Pisani's vigilance, however, and the untiring energy of the Venetians thwarted every effort. Gradually the spirits and the provisions of the Genoese ran low; though the strain was hardly less severe on the Venetians. It required all the indomitable resolution of Pisani, nobly supported by the Doge, to keep the overtaxed crews to their duty. The leaders even promised that if the auxiliary squadron under Carlo Zeno had not arrived by January 1, 1380, they would raise

the siege. But on the very day named Carlo Zeno was in sight and the Genoese were doomed. With Zeno's help, Pisani now assumed the offensive. The enemy was gradually driven off the *lido* and forced into Chioggia. All chance of help from Carrara disappeared. They held out bravely for six months more, but in June 1380 the flower of the Genoese fleet surrendered at discretion to Venice.

Thus closed the famous war of Chioggia, the final phase in the long struggle for maritime supremacy. Genoa never recovered from the blow, and Venice remained the undisputed mistress of the Mediterranean and in full enjoyment of its commerce.

III. **Territorial.**

(*a*) ***Touching the Mainland.*** The effect of her maritime expansion upon the trade of Venice will be considered when we come to discuss her commerce. We have now to deal with her territorial expansion which follows, and to a certain extent is the result of, her maritime expansion. Venice did not take willingly to the mainland ; she was, in a manner, forced to it. Various considerations led her first to take an interest in, and then to acquire, possessions on *terra-ferma*.

For the distribution of the goods which flowed into Venice from the Levant and the East, it was necessary that she should have command both of the rivers and of the land at least up to the Alps; otherwise with the rivers and the roads in the hands of an enemy she might find, as indeed she did on more than one occasion, a cordon of tariffs drawn round the lagoons and her commerce stifled. Further, the lagoons themselves offered no corn- and meat-raising grounds. The *necessitas bladi* was always a menace to the safety of the Republic, and after a crushing defeat at sea, after Curzola, Sapienza, Pola, above all during the war of Chioggia, a victorious fleet in the

Adriatic, combined with an enemy on the mainland, might starve the city to surrender. With such causes silently but continually at work, it was inevitable that Venice should be forced into the creation of a land dominion.

The need for a market and the convenience of river-carriage originally tempted the Venetians on to the mainland; commercial considerations were the causes of their early wars. Even in the year 996 we find them securing a port and a market-place on the river Sile, and their first war on *terra-ferma* was undertaken, in 1142, in order to keep the river Brenta open. The first war of Ferrara, in 1240, was brought about by the dread of losing commercial rights in that city. The second war of Ferrara, in 1308, gives us the earliest indications of a distinctly aggressive land policy. The Doge Gradenigo formulated it in a speech urging the war. It was, he said, the duty of every good ruler and of every worthy citizen to do all that in him lay to enlarge the State. With that end in view favourable opportunities must be grasped; but these are rare. Only the fool, however, will fail to perceive them, only the madman will shrink from seizing them. The policy thus enunciated marks an epoch in Venetian history. It was the policy not of the whole State, but of a party in the State, the party which had grown rich by Levantine commerce, and had secured its supremacy in the State by the "Closing of the Great Council." The Doge who thus advocated a policy of territorial expansion was the Doge who carried the *Serrata del Maggior Consiglio;* the opposition was led by the Tiepolo, a family that took a prominent part in the revolution induced by the *Serrata.* On this question of war with the Pope over Ferrara the opposition was defeated. War was declared. The Pope placed the Republic under an Interdict with results that ruined her trade for a time. The Venetian garrison of the Castle in Ferrara was besieged, forced to surrender and put to the sword. Venice found herself compelled to sue for peace, and only on payment of an indemnity did she recover her trading rights in the Ferrarese.

(*b*) ***Scala of Verona.*** But the war of Ferrara was a war for the preservation of trading rights, not for territorial expansion, although it had called forth an expression of that aggressive policy. It is not till 1317 that we find Venice beginning to look seriously westward, and then only along the peaceable lines of commerce. She concluded treaties with Milan, Brescia, Bologna, Como, and pushed her goods as far as Flanders and England. This commercial expansion on the mainland was destined, however, to bring the Republic into contact with the various rulers of the North Italian plain, first with the Scalas of Verona, then with the Carraras of Padua, finally with the Visconti of Milan, and to compel her to embark on the creation of a land empire.

This was the epoch of the despots, the *Signori*, who, in their struggles for supremacy in North Italy, clashed and destroyed one another. The first of these great houses to emerge and begin to expand was the family of the Scalas, Lords of Verona. Under their greatest chief, Can Grande, they had made themselves masters of Vicenza and Padua, and in 1328 they took a further step towards the lagoons by besieging Treviso. Can Grande died, but Treviso fell to Mastino della Scala (1329). The Scalas were now lords of Padua, Vicenza, Feltre, Belluno, Treviso. Their possessions hemmed in the lagoons. Venice was rich, but rich only because she was able to send the merchandise of the East over Europe north and west. That merchandise had to pass through Scala territory. Mastino saw how he too might share the wealth. He began by imposing duties on the transport of Venetian goods through the districts of Padua and Treviso, and he built a fort and toll-house on the Po. Venice retaliated by cutting off the salt supply. But the tariff-war was not an equal one; Venetian commerce began to suffer severely and, more important still, the food supply from the mainland was at the mercy of Scala. There was imminent danger of Venice being starved into accepting Scala's terms. Recourse to arms became inevitable.

A party in Venice strongly opposed the war. The Doge

urged that the Republic had no army and would be obliged to employ mercenaries; that the true policy of the State lay in avoiding the complications of the mainland, the faction fights and continual revolutions which tore the cities on *terra-ferma*. But all such adverse considerations were of no avail face to face with the fact that Venetian commerce was likely to be ruined, and Venice herself in danger of starvation. War could not have been avoided, though the resolution to go to war marks a turning-point in Venetian history. Venice embarked on her first serious mainland campaign, and was drawn into the circle of North Italian politics. Acquisition now became imperative and acquisition roused envy; at the same time it furnished an object for envy to attack. Hitherto the geographical isolation of Venice had been one of her greatest safeguards; now she was about to acquire a land frontier, a frontier that could be assailed, defended, or enlarged.

The growing power of the Scala family had already wakened the jealousy and alarm of other Italian States, and when Venice declared war on Verona, she found Florence, the Rossi of Parma, Visconti of Milan, and Gonzaga of Mantua ready to support her. She raised a native army from her male population between the ages of twenty and sixty years. Rossi was so powerful that Mastino della Scala endeavoured to come to terms with Venice. He chose as his agent Marsilio di Carrara, one of the family that had lately ruled in Padua and had been displaced by the Scalas. When Carrara reached Venice, instead of acting in Scala's interests, he came to secret terms with the Doge. He undertook to place Venice in possession of Padua—where he was governor for Scala—on condition that the Republic established him once again in his native city as its lord, but under obligation to levy no new taxes on Venetian merchandise, and to leave Venetians in enjoyment of their property in the Padovano.

The treachery of Marsilio and the strength of the league proved too powerful a combination for Scala to withstand. On

his western borders Visconti was attacking Brescia, and Scala hurried to its aid. In his absence Padua fell to Pietro Rossi. Venice immediately took formal possession of it, and, in the terms of her agreement with Marsilio, conferred the lordship on the Carraresi once more. The loss of Padua and the fall of Brescia forced Mastino della Scala to a peace. By the terms of this instrument (1339) Venice secured her first territorial possessions on the mainland, Treviso and Bassano, that is to say, a large corn-growing district on the plain, and the command of one of the passes that led north into Germany; furthermore she recovered her original trading rights in Vicenza and Verona.

(*c*) ***Carrara of Padua.*** The Scalas ceased to be a threat to Venice; she was now conterminous with the Carraresi, who held Padua on a quasi-tributary tenure. The Republic had invested them with the lordship of Padua, and they really depended on the protection of Venice for their existence. For, beyond the borders of Paduan territory was the growing power of the Visconti, certain to expand, and, in its expansion, doomed to come into collision with Venice. The Republic was forced to support Padua at the risk of finding herself conterminous with, and threatened by, a greater power than the Scalas, and virtually every attack by Visconti on the Carraresi was a menace to Venice.

But although this was the real position of affairs, the Carraresi could not escape the prevailing ambition; they, no less than the Scalas, the Visconti, Rossi, Polentas, were bent on creating a dynasty and a state. To the Lords of Padua Venice was a formidable and aggressive rival, much nearer and more dangerous than Visconti. Wherever it was possible they sided against the Republic. It was the conduct of the Carraresi that determined the next step in Venetian territorial expansion.

The disasters of the Genoese campaign which ended in the crushing defeat at Sapienza, and the internal confusion and consequent weakness produced by the conspiracy of Marino Falier (p. 61), led King Lewis of Hungary to revive the

ancient pretensions to Dalmatia. On the appearance of an Hungarian army, the Counts of Gorizia and the Patriarch of Aquileia, neighbours of Venice to the east of the Trevisan Marches, joined the invader. Carrara declined to ally himself with Venice. He professed to remain neutral, but in fact he lent secret aid to the Hungarians, who had marched through Friuli and were besieging Treviso. By this conduct he sowed the first seeds of suspicion in the mind of his powerful neighbour and suzerain in the lagoons.

The war was concluded by the peace of Zara. A special clause in the treaty protected Carrara from molestation; but the animosity of the Republic still smouldered. Carrara's conduct showed her that she could never be safe as long as Padua was in the hands of a family that was always secretly, and sometimes openly hostile. The relations between the two became more and more strained. Carrara menaced the freedom of the Brenta by building forts along it even as far as Oriago. His intention evidently was to establish himself on the lagoon if he were able, and to work his own salt-pans, which would help to render him still more independent of Venice. Venice could not submit to this; Carrara must retire or war would be the consequence. War broke out. Carrara was at once supported by his ally the King of Hungary. But the King's nephew, the Vaivode of Transylvania, fell into Venetian hands, and as the price of his freedom the Hungarians were withdrawn, and Francesco Carrara, left to himself, was forced to sign a treaty of peace (1373) entirely favourable to Venice. By its terms Carrara agreed to pay a large indemnity, to pull down all the forts on the Brenta, to draw salt from Chioggia only, to hand over Feltre as security for the observance of the terms.

The policy of both parties was by this time too sharply defined to allow any peace to be lasting or solid. It was now certain that Carrara intended to establish himself as an independent ruler in the territory round the lagoons; it was equally certain that the Republic, under the pressure of such a threat, would be forced to absorb Padua or to perish.

When the final struggle with Genoa came on in the War

of Chioggia, Francesco Carrara took active sides with the Genoese. It was he who blockaded the lagoons on the mainland side; it was he who urged Pietro Doria to strike at the city of Venice; it was he who fed the Genoese troops in Chioggia until the arrival of Carlo Zeno's men put a stop to him; it was, moreover, he who during the whole struggle at Chioggia was besieging Treviso: it was to save Treviso from him that Venice gave it to the Duke of Austria.

The War of Chioggia, while it crushed Genoa and left Venice without a rival at sea, merely proved how powerful Carrara was on land. The necessity of crushing his family and the problem of how to do so were both apparent to the Republic. Carrara was not slow in proving that what the Scalas had attempted to do he intended to accomplish; that was to establish himself on the mainland, in command of the passes, and to draw a tariff-cordon round the lagoons, thereby securing for himself a share in the immense wealth which was flowing into Venice from the East, now that her rival Genoa no longer disputed her monopoly. He bought from the Duke of Austria Treviso in the plain, Ceneda and Feltre, commanding the Ampezzo route into Germany, and, in addition, he held Bassano, commanding the Val Sugana route into Tyrol.

But there was yet another claimant for the lordship of the North Italian plain. Beyond the district of Verona, still feebly held by the last of the Scalas, lay the growing power of the Visconti, the *Biscione*, the great snake, of Milan waiting the moment to absorb the Veronese territory and to spread further eastward still. It was inevitable that Carrara and Visconti, both in the ascendant, should clash and quarrel over the prey that lay between them. They began in agreement, however—in a treaty to partition the Scala dominions. Visconti was to take Verona, Carrara was to have Vicenza. But the execution of their scheme revealed Visconti's true intention. His general captured Verona, but instead of waiting there he pushed on and seized Vicenza as well, before Carrara realized what was happening. Then both the rivals turned for aid to Venice. Carrara urged that it would be

highly dangerous for the Republic to have Visconti as an immediate neighbour. He appealed for help on the ground that his existence was essential as a buffer between Venice and Milan. But too late he recognized the truth of the situation, that his very life depended on loyalty to Venice. The Republic had neither forgotten nor forgiven the assistance to Lewis of Hungary, the War of Chioggia, the purchase of Treviso, the conspiracy in the very city itself. Visconti on the other hand was ready to surrender Treviso, Ceneda and Feltre to the Republic if she would assist him in crushing and despoiling Carrara. She accepted his offer. Treviso and its district passed once more under the Lion of St. Mark, while Gian Galeazzo Visconti acquired Verona, Vicenza and Padua, and a landed territory from Milan to the lagoons.

Carrara was right when he warned Venice that Visconti would prove a dangerous neighbour. The Lord of Milan was clearly aiming at a kingdom of North Italy. After absorbing Verona, Vicenza and Padua, he attacked Florence and Bologna. Venice, invited to join a league against him, complied and performed her part of the contract by restoring Carrara to his lordship in Padua. She hoped that the lesson of his expulsion by Visconti would teach him to be submissive and loyal to herself. The peace of Genoa (1392) embodied this arrangement. But Visconti had no intention of renouncing his dream of a North-Italian crown. Slowly and carefully he restored his treasury and matured his plans. He was very rich. All the great commanders of the day were in his service. It was doubtful whether there was any power, or combination of powers, strong enough to withstand him. But just when his schemes were ripe, in the very height of his career, death cut him short (1492). His vast possessions (which his widow was too weak, and his children too young, to hold together) began to fall to pieces. His generals helped themselves. There was a scramble for the Viscontean succession.

The death of Gian Galeazzo produced a decided effect on the relations between Venice and Carrara. The Republic had

no longer a pressing need for Carrara to stand between her and Milan, and both she and Carrara were determined to secure a share of the spoil, and the shares they coveted were identical. Carrara put forward his claim to Vicenza, out of which he had been choused by Visconti, when they were both busy despoiling Scala. He proceeded to attack Vicenza, and the widowed Visconti Duchess appealed to Venice for aid. The Republic demanded Bassano, Vicenza and Verona as the price of its help. The Duchess's ambassador had no choice but to consent.

Venice called on Carrara to abandon the siege of Vicenza, and, on his refusal, declared war. The younger Carrara, Jacopo, was shut up in Verona, and Francesco, the elder, in Padua. The Carraresi were made desperate by the knowledge that this, at last, was a life-and-death struggle. After an heroic resistance both cities fell. The two Carraresi were brought to Venice, where the mob clamoured for their blood, though the Government inclined to leniency. But the discovery of a vast plot, reaching to some of the highest officials in the State, produced a change of sentiment towards the prisoners and entailed harsher treatment. The Council of Ten, after a close enquiry, declared that the plot could be traced to the Carraresi. Both were strangled in prison in January 1405.

By the fall of the Carraresi Venice came into possession of a large land territory. The frontiers of the Republic were now the Adige, the sea, the Tagliamento and the Alps. And this territory she held in almost unbroken tenure down to the fall of the Republic. But this territorial expansion profoundly modified the nature of the Republic. We can no longer consider her as a maritime commercial state, with interests chiefly eastward, aloof from and exempt from the politics and the complications of the Italian mainland. She is now an Italian State with a land frontier to be attacked and to be defended. She takes her place in the comity of Italian principalities, and becomes involved in the complications of Italian politics. On the other hand the acquisition of a land

territory virtually closes the period of Venetian growth, of Venetian expansion. After the Tiepoline conspiracy her constitution is fully developed; after the War of Chioggia her maritime supremacy is achieved; after the fall of the Carraresi her territorial position is established and defined. In each direction during her period of splendour, she underwent, as we shall presently see, certain modifications, and expanded to a certain extent. But to all intents and purposes, as Venice found herself at the opening of the fifteenth century, so she remained till the fall of the Republic at the close of the eighteenth.

CHAPTER III

THE SPLENDOUR

I. Commerce.

(*a*) ***Origin and Growth.*** At the basis of this constitutional, maritime and territorial expansion which we have just traced, lay the cause and, in a reflex manner, the effect of it all, the commercial development of Venice. It was commerce that made her aristocracy; it was commerce that led her down the Adriatic; it was commerce that induced her to push inland up the rivers of the Lombard plain, and eventually compelled her to challenge, engage, and defeat her immediate territorial neighbours.

Her geographical position destined Venice to a commercial career. The city lay at the head of a great sea-avenue leading south-east to the Orient, the land of fabulous wealth; she was the sea-port furthest into the heart of the European continent, nearest to the Lake of Constance, the centre whence France, Germany, Austria, Poland, Russia might most easily be served.

As capital to start her on her career she possessed first, a sea-born, sea-faring population, by whose energy she developed a carrying trade; secondly, she enjoyed an almost exclusive monopoly of salt. The sea-farers filled the city with merchandise; the dwellers on the mainland were compelled to come into Venice for their salt, and there saw the comforts and luxuries of the East exposed for sale, to be bought either for use or for barter further west and north. Gradually Venice became the recognized mart for one

necessity and for many commodities. The mainland came to depend upon the sea-port, and the sea-port found that out. She used her power to extract large concessions from her mainland neighbours, and gradually established her own markets, free of customs, upon the river banks and along the great high-roads. Venetians became not only importers of Oriental produce, but exporters as well. As Venice grew in importance the few other ports on the Adriatic dwindled. Ravenna was silted up and fell out of competition; Ancona and Fano were crushed; Ragusa remained for some time as a considerable rival. But, on the whole, Venice established a supremacy in the Adriatic and grew steadily richer, and as the city grew in commercial riches the Government assumed a more and more dominant attitude in all that related to commerce, till we shall eventually find that, though the trade of Venice is carried on by individual Venetians, the direction is entirely in the hands of the State, and strictly protectionist in the interests not of the dependencies, but of the capital, of the *Città dominante* and of the State revenue.

(*b*) ***The Fleet.*** In the preceding chapter we traced the maritime and territorial expansion of Venice, and indicated the wide sweep of commercial activity implied thereby. To serve this commerce a fleet was gradually called into existence. The chief feature about it is that it was a State fleet. Private individuals might and did build ships of their own and navigate them, but for safety, if not on compulsion, these private vessels sailed with the State fleets, were under the orders of the commander appointed by the Government, and subject to all the regulations which governed the State fleets. Moreover their owners were strictly forbidden to sell their vessels to any but a Venetian. Both State and private ships, though of various build and rig, were by law constructed to a fixed size and pattern; that is to say, each galley would resemble exactly all the other galleys, each galleass all the other galleasses, each galleon all the other galleons. The reason was two-fold; ships of the same capacity and similar build and rig would behave in a similar way under stress of weather, and there

would be less likelihood of their parting company; and secondly, the consuls and agents at various ports could be sure of serving an outfit when the vessels calling at those ports were of uniform builds. The size of the shipping developed gradually till, in 1486, we find a record of a full-rigged ship (*una nave*) of four thousand tons, which was floated out of Chioggia by the help of two galleys, which served as a kind of floating dock.

At first these ships were convertible—traders or fighters, as the case required. Fully-armed they were men-of-war, half-armed they were merchantmen able to give a good account of a buccaneer; and this convertibility explains how it was that Venice, after such severe defeats as Curzola or Sapienza, could, in so brief a period, replace her shattered navy. But as time went on the State found it necessary to build ships for naval purposes only, to act as convoy to her merchant fleet in Turkish waters, and probably, to leave more room for cargo in her strictly trading vessels, and the distinction grew up between ships that were "armade" and ships that were "dal traffegho," and we find the State with a navy of galleys, galleasses and great galleons.

The crews were originally free Venetian citizens, but galley-slaves for service at the oar were gradually introduced as the build of ships and tactics changed. As long as boarding formed the climax of sea-engagements, it was highly dangerous to arm a crew composed of condemned criminals or prisoners of war, Turks, Barbary pirates, and so forth; but when ramming took the place of boarding it was possible to chain the slave to his bench and employ him merely as a piece of machinery.

The build, outfit, equipment of each ship, and the duties of the crew were strictly prescribed by law. The number of the crew was in proportion to the burthen, one man for every ten thousand pounds of capacity. The number of anchors, cables, etc. were defined. Each ship was bound to carry its own band of music. The crew were assigned so much space for their mattress and sea-chest, their keg of

wine, their barrel of water. Passengers paid for the space they occupied. In case of shipwreck the crew were bound to stay by her during fifteen days for salvage operations. The capacity of each ship was carefully measured, and officers appointed to see that no ship left port with sunken load-line.

It is difficult to arrive at the number of ships, in dock or afloat, which formed the naval resources of Venice, but at the height of her glory, it is said that she could dispose of 3300 ships, 36,000 mariners and 16,000 dock hands. Certain is it, however, that from the days of Dante onwards the arsenal of Venice impressed foreigners by its size and activity. Pietro Casola, Fra Felix Faber, de Comines, all agree in extolling the arsenal as they saw it during the fifteenth century. "Mirum est videre," says the Frate, "multitudinem navium onerarium continue intrantium et exeuntium."

As to the speed of these ships we have little trustworthy information, but in 1408 we hear of a vessel, filled with pilgrims for the Holy Land, that made the journey of one thousand six hundred miles from Venice to Jaffa in thirty-three days.

The chronicler Malipiero has left us a brief description of a ship (a man-of-war, it is true) of 1498, from which we may gather what a Venetian considered a well-appointed vessel. "Andrea Loredan," he says, "commander of two armed ships, kept them both, especially his own, in excellent order. Not a man gambled or swore without being punished. The four nobles (officers) in the ship were never left alone together with closed doors, but always open, so that every one could see what they were about. They had separate berths. The captain kept his own cabin most beautifully. It was all in carved wood with a gilded ceiling. It had cupboards for his own things, and for those of his suite; the bed was covered and hung with silk. He always slept on the poop. He entertained all the masters and merchants owners of galleys at Beyruth and has an excellent name."

But, as we have already noted, the trading fleet was a State

fleet. The Government built most of the ships and let them out to Venetian merchants, who manned and loaded them and were bound to return them intact at the close of the voyage. The route to be taken, the number of ships, the commander-in-chief, and the captains were all selected in the Senate.

(*c*) ***The Trade-Routes.*** The main trade-routes of the Republic were, roughly speaking, two by sea, to east and to west, and one, to the north, by land. They were marked out by the Government in their general outlines, and the Senate determined the details of each voyage. These great trade routes were represented on a large planisphere or *mappamondo* painted on the walls of the colonnade at the Rialto where the merchants congregated.

The route to the East led down the Adriatic by the Ionian Islands, round Cape Matapan to Crete, where it branched. One line made north for the Dardanelles, Constantinople, the Black Sea and the Sea of Azof. The ships by this line took out chiefly cloth-of-gold, damask, silks and furniture for sale at Constantinople, and returned with furs, pitch and hemp for cordage, from Tana on the Sea of Azof. A second line traded with the shores of the Morea and the Greek islands, as far as the Dardanelles. A third touched at the ports of Asia Minor, Smyrna and Aleppo, and Syria, passing Cyprus, and reaching Alexandretta, Tripoli in Syria, and Beirut. A fourth traded with Alexandria and Egypt. The last two were the richest of the Oriental lines, for they tapped the great caravan routes that led either from Suez to Alexandria, or from Ormuz, on the Persian Gulf, to Aleppo or to Beirut. By these lines were poured into Venice the carpets, damasks, jewels, amber, gold and silver work, that made the shops at the Rialto one blaze of gorgeous colour ; the spices, drugs, coffee, sugar that were to be distributed over Europe from the great mart at the head of the Adriatic. Along these lines, too, travelled with their bales of western cloth, of Venetian beads and crystal, merchant-venturers like Marco Polo, merchant-diplomats like Giosafatte Barbaro, who pushed into the heart of Asia Minor, Persia, India and

Cathay. So long as Venice was supreme in the Mediterranean, so long as this was the sole known route between East and West, the Republic held the monopoly of the traffic, and levied her toll for the transport of Eastern products to Western markets.

The western trade route passed down the Adriatic and reached Sicily. There one line branched off to trade with Tunis, Tripoli in Barbary, and the ports of Spain. Another, and that the main western line, pushed on beyond the Straits of Gibraltar and, touching England, reached the ports of Flanders. This line was served by the famous Flanders galleys. Southampton was their principal port of call on both journeys, and graves of Venetian seamen are said to have been seen in the church of North Stoneham, but the Venetians also made Dartmouth, Plymouth, Sandwich, and Rye. They brought with them alum, glass, sugar, silk, sweet wine from Crete, currants and spices, and took away tin, wool, hides and broadcloth for eventual barter in the East. By 1412 a Venetian factory was established in London in addition to the factory already opened in Bruges. Thus a great trade-route was established from north-west to south-east, from Bruges and London to Syria, Persia and India, and Venice was mistress of that route.

The northern route, which served for traffic with Germany and Central Europe, led either by the Ampezzo valley due north to the Pusterthal, and thence to Innsbruck and Munich, or by the Po to Brescia, Bergamo, the Lake of Como, the Splügen Pass to Constance. Only a small portion of these lines were in Venetian territory, but by them Venetian goods were forwarded to the great fairs, such as Cologne and Frankfort, chiefly by German agents residing in Venice, who consigned to their principals in the great towns of Germany. The German merchants in Venice centred round the German Change-house, the Fondaco dei Tedeschi, a great palace on the Grand Canal immediately above the Rialto, whose façade still bears some traces of its sumptuous decoration by Giorgione. In the Fondaco, merchant-princes, like the

Fuggers, had their counting-houses and their private chambers, and bargained for the produce of the East and the issues of the famous Venetian printing-press.

It is not easy to realize what Venice must have looked like with this teeming life along her quays and streets, when the pulse of the commercial world beat fullest at Rialto; but there stand forth, to assure us of its splendour, the enthusiastic descriptions of Frate Faber, Pietro Casola, above all of Francesco Petrarch, who bursts into panegyric. "From my windows on the Riva degli Schiavoni," he says, "I see vessels as large as my house with masts taller than its towers. They sail to all parts of the world, and brave a thousand dangers. They carry wine to England; honey to the Scythians; saffron, oil, linen to Assyria, Armenia, Persia and Arabia; wood to Egypt and Greece; they return laden with merchandise to be distributed all over Europe. Where the sea ends, their sailors quit the ships and travel on to trade with India and China; they cross the Caucasus and the Ganges, and reach the Eastern Ocean." And the enthusiasm of the poet is endorsed by the painters. The vivid tones, the sumptuous accessories, the decorative splendour of canvases by Vivarini, Crivelli, Bellini, above all by Carpaccio and Mansueti, prove to us the carnival of colour that must have spread in glowing procession from the Riva, by S. Marco, up the Merceria, to Rialto, when Venice was the commercial capital of the world.

(*d*) ***Industries.*** Venice was a great trading city, a central mart for exchange, but a great manufacturing city she is not, nor ever has been. Of the cargoes in vessels outward bound, noted in the passage just quoted from Petrarch, not one, with the exception perhaps of wood, was a home product. They are all the produce of other lands in process of distribution—English woollens for the east, or Eastern damasks for Flanders. But it would be a mistake to suppose that industries did not exist. The local industries for the supply of the city's needs were numerous, and the majority were very early erected into guilds, whose bye-laws are now in course of publication.

The greater industries, whose products to some extent furnished cargoes for outward-bound vessels or caravans, were first and foremost the glass manufactory. This industry covered various kinds of products, beads, goblets, window-glass, looking-glasses—much of this for export. Work was carried on day and night at the furnaces of Murano, to which island the industry had been removed for fear of fire. The shifts for the workmen were six hours' work and six hours' rest. Saturday was a whole holiday and so, of course, were the numerous feast-days. The Government carefully fostered the industry, forbidding the export of sand and alkali, and guarding trade secrets by the penalty of death for revealing them.

The manufacture of silk was introduced into Venice by refugees from Lucca flying before the tyranny of Castruccio Castracane. The industry was carried on round the church of the Volto Santo, near the monastery of the Servi. The kindred manufactures of cloth-of-gold and cloth-of-silver were encouraged by the Government, and the Venetian ambassadors at Constantinople frequently called for webs of these materials as presents to the Sultan and his pashas. Metal-work, including bell-founding, formed another staple industry. The stamped-leather-workers counted fifty shops in the city, and sent much of their produce to Spain. Lace was made in private families, but for exportation. Venetian lace figures at the coronation of Richard the Third of England. Finally Venetian printers and booksellers did a thriving business with Germany, sending large bales yearly to the fair at Frankfort-on-Maine.

(*e*) ***The Counting-house.*** The movement of all this extended trade and active industry, with the disposal of the wealth derived therefrom, was governed from the counting-houses of those merchant-princes, all of whom sat in the Great Council and many in the Senate. The counting-house was on the entresol (*mezzanino*) of the private palace. There the merchant went in the morning to deal with the day's affairs, to apportion their work to his clerks. Thence he

set out for the Rialto—the exchange of Venice—to gather the news. His clerks and dependents were frequently joint-sharers in his ventures. The great bell of St. Mark announced that a galley was in sight of port, and was a sound of joy, not to the patrician merchant only, but to his clerks, his dependents, the smaller tradesmen down to the guild of dock-labourers (*bastazi*) waiting to unload. In fact the whole city was solid in its interests in commercial enterprise. Venice at the period of its highest commercial prosperity may be considered as one vast joint-stock company for the exploitation of the East, and justified the remark of a later observer, *Ce peuple est une famille.*

(*f*) ***Banking.*** The State itself was the first banker in Venice. The earliest bank was known as the *Monte* (the Fund), expanded into the *Monte Nuovo* and *Nuovissimo.* Its capital was the funds raised by loans, compulsory or voluntary; the security it offered was the State revenues. It paid 4 and 5 per cent. The *Monti* were the usual investment for charity funds, and crowned heads and distinguished foreigners frequently sought leave to bank with it, but the privilege was granted only as an act of grace and on the passing of a special motion in the Senate.

Private banking was widely diffused during the period of greatest commercial prosperity, but with little success. In 1498 bank failures followed one another with alarming rapidity. The Garzoni bank broke, and was followed by the Lippomano and another, in spite of assistance from the Government to the extent of ten thousand ducats. Other two banks were in danger. The Lippomani fled before the storm; but the Government gave them protection. The chronicler observes: "The failure of these two banks is worse news than the capture of Brescia," and adds in puzzled wonderment: "For all the throes through which Florence has passed its ten banks are still solvent." Some days later the Pisani and Augustini banks suffered a sharp run on them. The creditors broke into the bank-parlour and took the pen from Messer Aloise Pisani's hand;

but the tumult was quieted by the prompt action of the Government, who published the names of sixty guarantors for payment of credits in full to the amount of three hundred and twenty-four thousand ducats. Pisani seemed to think this proceeding merely prudent, for he remarked that "if those rascals of Lippomani had only stuck to their bank, they would have weathered the storm in the same way that we have, for when confidence in its banks is gone the country has lost its credit." The Pope, in Consistory, read these private bank failures in the same light, and declared that "it must be all over with the Venetian Government." But upon this point he was put right by Cardinal Ascanio, who observed that the failure of private banks was due to the carelessness of the bankers, and did not imply impoverishment of the State coffers. He was correct in his view of the case, but the Venetian Government did not intend to expose itself to such calls for the future, and in 1502 it appointed a magistracy, the *Proveditori sopra Banchi*, to supervise private-banking business.

The whole question was discussed in the Senate towards the close of the sixteenth century, when it was resolved to close the old State Banks and found a new one, which was eventually known as the Banco-Giro, and continued down to the end of the Republic. During the debate and speaking against private banks, the Senator Morosini reviewed the history of Venetian private banking and indicated the causes of failure. Of one hundred and three private banks, he said, whose history is known, ninety-six had failed. The chief cause was the vast extent and consequent fluctuation in the business of the Venetian market. Rumour of a loss in the far East ; a breath of suspicion at Rialto ; the cashing of a large draft by a Venetian house, and immediately came a run on the bank. "Money is not received by the bankers to lie idle in their safes. It is invested at a profit in the Levant, and so on. But it is easier to invest than to realize, and failure in one speculation may precipitate disaster. Banking is a harmony of too many subtle chords ; a false note pro-

duces an universal discord. Further, most men cannot resist the temptations which assail the banker to indulge his taste in splendid houses, furniture, jewels, dress, when they can be had by a stroke of the pen ; nor will he refrain from seeking brilliant matches for his daughters at the expense of his capital. Finally, there is the temptation to keep his old friends and gain new ones by granting them accommodation on insufficient security." So far Morosini on private banking in a speech of admirable lucidity, as is usual with Venetian statesmen of the Splendid Age.

The chief point, however, to be observed is that while the State Bank of Venice was admirably managed and enjoyed the highest reputation for security, private banks were most insecure owing to a double cause—the extent, vivacity and fluctuation of Venetian commerce; and the beginnings of that luxury which even as early as the fifteenth century is symptomatic of the decline.

II. Arms, Military and Naval.

Military.

(*a*) ***Extension on the Mainland. The Emperor and Friuli.*** At the opening of the fifteenth century Venetian territorial possessions in Italy embraced Verona, Vicenza, Padua, and the Marches of Treviso. Between Treviso and the mountains to the east lay the district of Friuli, ruled immediately by the Counts of Gorizia and the Patriarchs of Aquileia under the Emperor. The powers, therefore, with which Venice was now conterminous were the Empire to the east and the Duchy of Milan to the west. On the death of that powerful Prince, Gian Galeazzo Visconti, in 1402, his mercenary generals had seized and partitioned his Duchy. His Duchess, left in charge of three young boys, was too weak to be a menace to the Republic, which

was thus enabled to absorb and consolidate its possessions undisturbed by her western neighbour. But to the east the situation was not so fortunate. The Emperor Sigismund was far from content to see the Republic established in Dalmatia, and the last survivors of the Scala and Carrara families were at his elbow suggesting how he might harass Venice by restoring them to Verona and to Padua. The Hungarians under their brilliant leader, Filippo Scolari, entered Friuli and pressed on till they were within sight of Venice itself. But they were defeated on the Livenza and a truce patched up. When, however, an attempt was made to convert the truce into a peace, the possession of Dalmatia proved an insuperable obstacle. War broke out again in Friuli. The Patriarch of Aquileia captained the Imperial cause, the Republic was supported by the Savorgnan, the leading family in the country. Her arms were entirely successful, for the Emperor was unable to render any assistance to his own party owing to the fury of the Hussite war then raging in Bohemia. Sacile fell, followed by Cividale, Prata, Portogruaro, Feltre, Belluno. Finally Udine, the capital of Friuli, surrendered. The Republic became mistress of the whole province, and completed her eastern land possessions up to the Carnic Alps (1420). It was an acquisition of the highest importance, for it gave her an extensive corn-growing, horse-breeding territory, and it rendered her eastern frontier far more secure than it had hitherto been.

(*b*) ***Visconti and Brescia.*** But to the west Filippo Maria Visconti, the second of Gian Galeazzo's sons, had been slowly but surely recovering his dukedom from the hands of his father's usurping generals. The distinguished soldier, Francesco Bussone da Carmagnola, was his able instrument. Visconti had inherited the ambitions of his father. The dream of a North-Italian Kingdom was in his brain. He determined not only to recover the whole of his Duchy, but to extend its borders. That being so, it was inevitable that he should eventually clash with the Venetian Republic, the other growing power in Northern Italy. Visconti's schemes were well laid. While Venice was occupied with Friuli and

Dalmatia, the Duke recovered Brescia and Genoa, and Venice deemed it prudent to enter into an alliance with him (1422) for fear of being caught between the Emperor and the Lord of Milan. This suited Visconti's schemes, for he intended to press southward and challenge Florence, and the Florentines saw proof of his immeasurable ambition and of the danger they were in when Visconti occupied Forli that same year (1422).

The political situation was now declared. Venice was the centre of it. She could not escape the consequences of having embarked upon a land empire. Visconti threatened Florence, and to secure a free hand he desired an alliance with the Venetians. Florence was aware of the threat, and as a protection she also sought an alliance with Venice. The crucial question was now put to the Republic, which proposal should she accept? If she allied herself with Florence she ran the risk of seeing Visconti ally himself with the Emperor. If she held by her treaty with Visconti she ran the risk that Florence, in order to divert the Visconti attack, would grant whatever he asked and assist him in despoiling Venice. In fact an embassy from the Florentine Republic threatened as much when they declared that "Just as the Genoese, unsupported by us, made Visconti their Lord, so we, if unsupported by Venice, will make him King."

The dilemma revealed two parties and two policies in the Republic. One, the party of the old Doge, Tomaso Mocenigo, was for a policy of peace, trade and retrenchment; advocating a defence of present frontiers, but no extension of them, and the development of traffic with Milan. The basis of their theory was that in the material sphere wealth constituted the real power of the nation, that trade meant wealth and war meant ruin; in the moral sphere unjust wars would bring down the vengeance of heaven. The other party, led by Francesco Foscari, and flushed with the recent acquisition of Friuli, was all for territorial expansion. To them Visconti was a dangerous and aggressive despot who would turn to rend Venice when he had swallowed Florence.

Mocenigo died in 1423, and was succeeded by Francesco Foscari before any final decision was taken by the Republic. Foscari continued to urge his policy of attacking Visconti. The serious reverse to Florentine arms at Zagonara (1424) strengthened his argument, and an accident did much to determine the wavering Senate. Carmagnola, Visconti's successful general, had become too successful, too popular with his troops, too rich. His master grew jealous of him. Carmagnola suspected treachery and fled eventually to Venice. Foscari was able to introduce him to the Senate in order to clinch the passionate appeals of the Florentine envoys. Carmagnola's reputation stood higher than that of any other mercenary in Italy. In his address he minimized the strength of Filippo's forces, and held out prospects of a large extension of their frontiers, if the Republic would vigorously attack the Duke of Milan. Foscari carried his point, and in 1425 Venice entered on an alliance with Florence against Visconti, and gave the command of her troops to Carmagnola.

The formation of a land empire inevitably led Venice into land wars, and, as inevitably, to the employment of mercenary generals. The career of Carmagnola in her service taught her the dangers of that system. In three campaigns against his old master, Carmagnola was invariably successful, yet on each occasion he seemed to let the full fruits of his victories slip through his fingers. Was he deliberately treacherous to Venice; was he in the pay of the Duke; was he merely behaving as other mercenaries behaved, whose business was war, and who had no desire to see it finished, who had no interest in annihilating a foe who, on the cessation of hostilities, might become a paying employer; or was he unwilling to drive the Duke of Milan to extreme reprisals against his wife, his child and his property, all of which were in the Duke's hands? Whatever be the truth about his conduct, Venice first conceived not unnatural suspicions and then asserted that she had actual proof of his treason. She summoned him to Venice, tried and executed him between the columns of the Piazzetta (1432).

But though Venice had been defrauded of her fullest hopes, though she never saw her arms in Milan, and Visconti in flight from his capital, the campaigns of 1426-27 and -29 were successful, and secured to her a large increase of territory towards the west. Brescia and Bergamo were now included in the dominions of the Republic, and her frontier was shifted from the Mincio to the Adda. She never lost permanent hold on that position, though Visconti relaxed no whit of his endeavours to obtain the mastery in Northern Italy. Venice was compelled to undertake a long and exhausting series of campaigns under mercenary generals, Gattamelata, Gonzaga, Sforza and Colleoni, for the maintenance of her territory. These drained her purse, weakened her claim to independence, and forced her to seek a precarious title by suing for investiture from the Emperor. The empty ceremony took place at Prague in 1437, and the dominions of the Republic were defined as all lands "lying east of the Adda." The war with Milan continued, however, and was marked by such brilliant feats as Gattamelata's march from Brescia to Verona by the mountains, and by such achievements of engineering as the transport of a flotilla from Venice to the Lake of Garda. But in 1447 Visconti died, and after two stormy years Sforza became Duke of Milan in 1450. Four years later an accommodation between Sforza and Venice brought the long series of Lombard campaigns to a close, leaving Venice mistress of North Italy from the Julian Alps to Brescia, Bergamo and Crema, and back again along the line of the Po nearly to its mouth.

(*c*) ***The Advent of the Foreigner.*** Had the external relations of Northern Italy remained unchanged after the death of Visconti, the Lombard campaigns, which are so intimately connected with the policy and the reign of Francesco Foscari, would undoubtedly have brought a large access of power to Venice, and left her the preponderating factor north of the Apennines. She possessed one signal advantage over her rivals of Milan, be they Visconti or Sforza—she was a Republic, a corporation with a continuous life; they were a

dynasty liable to extinction by revolution, by the assassin's dagger, by infecundity. The death of a Doge left the Signory of Venice untouched. The death of Visconti shook the Duchy of Milan to its foundations.

But, more than this, by it the French claim on the Duchy of Milan through Lewis, Duke of Orleans, who married Valentina Visconti, daughter of Gian Galeazzo, became vital, and a momentous change came over the whole aspect of Italian politics. The effect was not made obvious at once, but nevertheless the centre of political gravity was shifted from Italy to the ultramontane powers. The solution of the political problem was confined no longer to the Italian States; the sovereigns of Europe intervened as factors, and as far as Venice is concerned, the gate was opened for the hostile combination of the League of Cambray.

(*d*) ***The Pope and Ferrara.*** As we shall presently see, Venice herself was among the first to adopt that pernicious policy of appealing to the foreigner in order to thwart a rival or to avert an attack. But in the meantime from the peace of Lodi (1454), throughout the remainder of Foscari's splendid but unhappy reign, and down to 1479, the Republic was fully occupied in the East, where the fall of Constantinople and the apparition of the Turks compelled her to embark upon a war the fortunes of which will require our attention in the following section.

On the Italian mainland matters were comparatively quiet. Venice absorbed and consolidated her new dominions, while the Sforza family was engaged in establishing itself in the Duchy of Milan. But presently a storm sprang up to the south. Venice had embarked on a land empire and could not escape the dangers implied by aggressive neighbours, doubtful frontiers, vexatious customs dues. All these points brought her into conflict with Ercole d'Este, Marquis of Ferrara. The enemies of the Republic accused her of wilfully forcing on a war in order to absorb the duchy of Ferrara, and pointed to her action as a proof of her "insatiable greed" for land dominion, the formula under which the League of Cambray subsequently justified its proposals for the dismemberment of

the Republic. It is certain that the outcome of Foscari's reign and the Venetian expansion in Lombardy led to the conviction that the Republic was a grasping and aggressive power. By the year 1480 disputes about the salt-pans at the mouth of the Po, about dues on that river, about the true course of the river itself, had produced such heat between Venice and Ferrara that a spark was sufficient to set both in a blaze.

The Venetians, from very early times, had enjoyed special privileges in Ferrara. They were represented by a *Visdomino* or Consul-General who exercised independent jurisdiction. The Visdomino arrested a priest for debt. But Ferrara was a fief of the Holy See, and the Papal Vicar excommunicated the consul, who withdrew to Venice. The excommunication was cancelled and an apology offered to the Republic. But the Marquis refused to reinstate the Venetian official, and war was declared. The Pope, as over-lord of Ferrara, ordered Venice to desist, and on refusal the Republic was placed under an Interdict. The Venetian ambassador in Rome declined to forward the Bull. The Patriarch in Venice, when ordered to present it, feigned illness and secretly warned the Government. The Council of Ten issued a proclamation that, Interdict or no Interdict, the Sacred Offices of the Church must be performed on penalty of death, and at the same time they made formal appeal to "a future Council." The upshot of the whole matter was that the Pope, Ferrara, the King of Naples and the Duke of Milan entered into a combination to thwart the designs of Venice, which were supposed to be aimed at the absorption of Ferrara. This alliance proved too powerful for the Republic; moreover the long campaigns in Lombardy and, as we shall presently see, the recent strain of the Turkish War, had well-nigh exhausted her treasury; private resources were all but wrung dry; taxes had been raised one-third; all gold and silver plate had been called into the Mint; the revenue from the mainland was falling; the arsenal was all but empty; plague was decimating the city. In these straits Venice, holding Sforza and the King of Naples to be her most pressing foes, adopted the fatal

policy of appealing to France to make good her claim on Naples and her claim on Milan. The threat of a possible French invasion alarmed Lodovico Sforza (il Moro). He charged his general, Gianjacopo Trivulzio, to open negotiations with the Venetian commander Sanseverino. The Republic was ready for peace, and the result was the Treaty of Bagnolo (1484), reconfirming the peace of Lodi, but adding to the dominions of the Republic Rovigo on the Adige and the district of the Polesine, and bringing her southern frontier down to the Po.

This marks the utmost limit of Venetian expansion on the mainland. The fifteenth century had seen her acquire Padua, Vicenza, Verona, Feltre, Belluno, Friuli, Brescia, Bergamo, Rovigo and the Polesine. A notable dominion in Northern Italy; likely to impress Europe by its extent and the rapidity of its construction. But all the same the War of Ferrara was distinctly disastrous. It convinced Italian statesmen and Europe, that Venice intended to absorb Northern Italy, and by the close of the fifteenth century all the actors, the Emperor, the French, the Pope, Naples and Milan, who were to take part in the combined attack on the Republic which ushered in the sixteenth, were already on the scene.

Naval.

(*a*) ***In the Levant. The Advent of the Turk.*** To turn now to the naval side of Venetian arms during the period of her greatest splendour. At the close of the last chapter the Republic had all but reached the point of her widest maritime expansion, Cyprus alone remaining to be added to her empire in the Levant, for her temporary occupation of the Morea in the seventeenth century can hardly count. During the fifteenth century her naval history is entirely absorbed by her struggle with the Turk. It is this that attracted the attention of Europe, and procured for her the title of "bulwark of the West." To the outer world this single-handed conflict with the Ottoman Power made Venice famous,

and Christendom professed to be grateful. But Europe left the Republic to carry out the task alone and it killed her; nor did the other Powers hesitate to charge her with selfishness and infidelity when, at the end of her resources, and to save her maritime possessions and her commercial position, she came to terms with her powerful foe. The truth is that the Republic never liked the task. She would rather have traded with than fought the Turk. Though her campaigns were made illustrious by frequent victories, and by many deeds of personal prowess, not one of them, with perhaps the exception of the campaign that ended at Lepanto, was really successful.

Venice came first into definite relations with the Ottoman Turk when Mahommed I., after defeating his brother Musa, concentrated the Ottoman Power in his own hands. With him the Republic signed a treaty (1413) by which her colonies were secured from Turkish aggression. But it was one thing to promise, another to fulfil. In spite of the treaty, Turkish ships continued to harry Venetian merchantmen, and the Venetian commander, Pietro Loredan, was forced to engage the enemy at Gallipoli in 1416. His own report on the engagement gives a glowing account of Venetian prowess. The upshot was a complete victory for Loredan. He killed all the renegade Christians he found in the Turkish fleet, and closes his despatch with the following singularly fallacious forecast of the future for the Turk: "From this day forward we may say that the power of the Turk by sea is, for a long time to come, completely destroyed, and it is hardly possible that it should ever rise again."

The battle of Gallipoli procured for Venice a fresh treaty with Mahommed, and the despatch of a Turkish ambassador to Venice. But standing as it does by itself, and brought about as it was by accident, the battle can hardly be considered as more than a first brush with the enemy, not as a regular campaign. As a matter of fact the Turks were not yet in Constantinople, and no one dreamed that they would ever be able to force the Imperial City. That they would soon be a European Power, and, for Venice, the most im-

portant European Power, probably never entered the head of a Venetian statesman at the opening of the fifteenth century.

(*b*) ***The Fall of Constantinople.*** Venice was just on the point of concluding her land campaigns in Lombardy, and acquiring Brescia and Bergamo thereby, when news came that Constantinople had fallen (1453), and Europe found itself face to face with the Ottoman Turk seated in the capital of the Empire. A year earlier the Emperor Constantine had sent to implore help from the Western Powers, and more especially from Venice. The Republic pleaded that her Lombard campaigns incapacitated her for any effectual assistance. The rest of Europe was too much occupied with its own wars to heed what was taking place in the East. Constantine was left to his fate. The Venetians in Constantinople, along with the Genoese and other foreigners, made a brave defence, but the city fell.

Venice intended to preserve the peace with Mahommed if possible. Bartolomeo Marcello was sent as ambassador to the new lord of Constantinople. But orders were also given to the commander-in-chief in those waters to fortify Negropont. The Republic clearly felt doubts as to the turn affairs might take. The conqueror professed willingness to treat with Venice. None of the European Powers showed any disposition to make common cause with her against the Turk. An accord was reached whereby previous treaties were confirmed, and full trading rights were granted to the Republic. All Venetian feudatories in the islands of the Archipelago were included in the treaty. Venice was immediately called upon to justify her conduct before the Pope and Christendom, and she pleaded necessity. With many of her nobles and citizens prisoners in the hands of the Turk, with her commerce and possessions exposed to immediate attack, she was compelled to come to terms with the conqueror, if only to maintain herself as a bulwark between Italy, Europe and the advancing Ottoman Power.

(*c*) ***The First Turkish War.*** But it was not possible to check the rising flood of Islam. The Turks soon

made themselves masters of the Peloponnese. In spite of the bravery of Scanderbeg, Epirus fell before their arms, and the Ottoman ensigns were on the Adriatic. In these circumstances it is obvious that Venice could not long avoid a collision with the Turk. Though very much afraid of rousing the suspicion of the foe, and thereby exposing her Levantine possessions to attack, the Republic did not cease to urge the Pope and the other sovereigns of Europe to concerted action against the advancing infidel. The Pope, Pius II., preached a crusade and threw himself with ardour into the enterprise. He failed to rouse the other Powers to an active enthusiasm, but Venice, under the Doge, Cristoforo Moro, committed herself heartily to the undertaking, all the more readily that, by this time (1463), the fall of the castle of Argos had already involved her in a rupture with the Turk. The Pope, though infirm, had moved with the Sacred College to Ancona, where he proposed to concentrate his projected crusade. In obedience to the Papal invitation, the Doge sailed in person for Ancona, in command of twenty-four galleys. Moro reached Ancona on August 12, 1464, only to find the Pope at death's door, and the following day he died. All hope of combined European action against the Turk disappeared, and Venice was left alone to conduct the war single-handed with a powerful foe now thoroughly convinced of her hostility.

The position of the Republic was anything but reassuring. She had only just concluded a long and costly series of campaigns in Lombardy, and now she found herself called upon to fight for her very existence in the Levant without the remotest hope of assistance from Europe. She did what she could to encourage and support Usunhasan, the Persian sovereign, in his war upon the Turk, even after the defeat of Terdschen, but with little profit to her own cause. By 1470 the Venetians had lost Negropont, and by October 9, 1471, twenty thousand Turks were in Istria and Friuli, burning and plundering. The inhabitants took refuge in Venice, and slept under the arcades of the ducal palace till

a lodging could be provided for them at Sant' Antonio, and they were fed at the charge of the State.

The loss of Negropont, the sight of the refugees from Friuli, the failure of every effort to induce the King of Cyprus or the Grand Master of Rhodes to declare war on the Turk, the defeat of their ally Usunhasan at Terdschen, all combined to incline the Republic to peace, if possible. But the demands of the Sultan were excessive, including the surrender of more islands in the Levant, and the payment of an annual tribute. They were rejected. The war dragged on. Scutari was besieged by the Turks, and defended with the utmost bravery. The Republic implored aid from the Pope, but was told that he had no money. She strained her own resources to the breaking-point, and in 1474 she raised 51,600 ducats from her subject cities of the mainland, and applied 100,000 ducats out of the Colleoni bequest to the purposes of the war. But all in vain. Scutari was besieged afresh. Croya fell, so did Drivasto. Scutari, thanks to the bravery of Antonio da Lezze, still held out. But the Republic was now *in extremis*, and in 1479 Venice determined to sue for peace. This was accorded upon the following terms, which are of great importance, as the future position of Venice at Constantinople was governed by them. The Republic was to maintain an ambassador (*bailo*) at Constantinople, with jurisdiction over Venetians. The Republic would pay 10,000 ducats a year for trading rights; and further, would pay 100,000 ducats in two years in quittance of all outstanding claims. Scutari, Stalimeni, and places in the Morea captured by the Turk were ceded to him, while the Republic recovered all that had been captured from her up to her old frontier in the Morea, for the exact delineation of which a Commissioner would be sent from Venice.

A disastrous conclusion to a ruinous war bravely carried on single-handed against the Turk. The sovereigns of Italy attacked Venice for her action and suspected her motive for yielding. But any other course was impossible, and she cannot be blamed if, after being left alone to bear the weight

of the war for sixteen years, she declined to enter a league against the Turk proposed to her the very year after she had been forced into so humiliating a peace.

(*d*) ***The Acquisition of Cyprus.*** No sooner had Venice concluded a peace with the Turk than, as we have seen (p. 90), she found herself involved in a war with Ferrara, which lent some colour to the accusation that she had made peace with the infidel in order to attack the Christian. We have dwelt on the calamitous nature of the Ferrarese War, which, coming on the top of the ruinous Turkish War, did much to cripple the resources of the Republic. But before the final storm of the League of Cambray broke over her, Venice was to achieve one further success in the Levant, the acquisition of Cyprus.

The story is somewhat complicated. The validity or otherwise of the Venetian pretensions turns upon the genealogy of the family of Lusignan, Kings of Cyprus, Jerusalem and Armenia. In 1381, James I. Lusignan was acclaimed by the Cypriotes as their sovereign. His son John succeeded him, but was taken prisoner by the Soldan of Egypt, and was succeeded by his son John II. John died in 1460, and left one legitimate daughter, Charlotte, his true heir, married to Luigi of Savoy, and a bastard son called James. James, with the help of the Soldan of Egypt, seized the kingdom and expelled his sister and her husband. Relying on Venetian help, the bastard James drove out the Genoese and established himself securely on the throne. He proposed for, and married, Caterina Cornaro, daughter of Marco Cornaro, a Venetian nobleman, and the Republic of Venice adopted the lady as its own child.

Caterina was sent to Cyprus with all the pomp and honours due to sovereignty, but her brief life in the island was one continuous tragedy. Her husband James, the bastard, died almost immediately, and the young queen was surrounded by intrigue of every kind. Her husband had left a bastard daughter, and the Archbishop of Nicosia endeavoured to bring about a match between this child and a bastard son of

Ferdinand, King of Naples, with a view to eventually deposing the reigning queen. Venice undertook the protection of her adopted daughter, and sent a fleet to Cyprus for the defence of the queen and her ministers. Meantime Caterina gave birth to a posthumous son by her husband. But the infant died at once. It was now clear that on the queen's death the island would pass out of the sphere of Venetian influence, and the Republic had no intention of allowing that to take place. On the plea of safeguarding the young queen, Marco Cornaro was sent to Cyprus in 1474. The dangers which menaced the throne were many. The King of Naples, the Soldan of Egypt, the House of Savoy, and perhaps the Turk, were all supposed to have designs upon the island. Plot followed plot. The queen's life was in constant danger. Finally, in 1488, Venetian suggestions succeeded, and Queen Caterina made a formal renunciation of Cyprus in favour of her native city, receiving in exchange the little township of Asolo. There she lived in semi-royal state till her death in 1510.

The acquisition of Cyprus was a source of satisfaction to Venice after the disasters of the Turkish War, and the humiliating peace of 1479. But it was her last effort of expansion as a maritime power. As in the sphere of commerce, so in the sphere of arms, military and naval, the fifteenth century, the century of greatest splendour for the Venetian Republic, closed with obvious indications that the beginning of the decline had already set in.

III. Government.

(*a*) ***The Constitution.*** About the constitution of the Republic not much remains to be said. It was to all intents and purposes completed by the closing of the Great Council, and the creation of the Council of Ten. Its chief character-

istics were its conservative rigidity, which left little scope for change or movement. As far as any development can be discerned, it lay along the lines already marked out. The oligarchy persevered in its two-fold task of crushing the Doge and extruding the people. The coronation oath of the Doge, Tomaso Mocenigo (1413), established the right of the law-officers to impeach the Doge, denied him the ancient right to summon a General Assembly of all the population without the consent of a majority of the Great Council, forbade him to display his family arms, and as a matter of fact the election of Mocenigo was the last to be formally approved of by the General Assembly of the whole community. The election of his successor, Foscari, took place without consulting the people or receiving their approval, even *pro formâ*. With the election of Foscari (1423) the last shred of popular government disappeared from the Venetian Constitution. The fact of the election was simply announced, and the formula "Communitas Venetiarum" was changed into the word "Signoria."

Contemporaneously with this change in formula an ominous symptom began to manifest itself in the electoral body. There is a suspicion of corruption about Foscari's election. When Procurator of St. Mark's he had divided what were said to be unclaimed funds among "the poor nobles." The existence of these "poor nobles," who were known as *Barnabotti*, eventually proved a serious danger to the State. In virtue of their birth they were entitled to a vote in the Great Council; a combination of their votes might have a decisive effect upon an election, and their poverty made them fit subjects for bribery by a foreigner or by an ambitious patrician of Venice.

With the growth of Venetian commerce and the frequency of war on the mainland or in the Levant, the machinery of government naturally became more complex. The Senate gradually delegated its powers, and established new magistrates to relieve the pressure on the Executive; its legislative powers it retained intact, but in the spheres of police,

finance and commerce the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries saw a large development of governmental machinery.

The most notable feature in the Constitution of Venice during this period is the increasing power of the Council of Ten, pushed to the length of illegality in the famous invitation to the Doge Foscari to abdicate. When the invitation failed, the Ten went a step further and ordered him to abdicate. This was an infringement of the Constitution of 1382, which forbade the Doge to resign his office, except on a vote of the majority of the Great Council. The Ten, however, carried their point, and the whole episode of the Foscari family misfortunes is a testimony to the preponderating power of that body in the State.

Whether in consequence of this unconstitutional action of the Ten or not, a reform was carried in the Great Council, in 1468, by which the competence of the Ten was defined as applying to certain cases then specified, but the words "and such like" were introduced into the bill. Under cover of this vague phraseology the Ten continued to avocate to itself most matters of importance. In 1529 the Council added to its numbers and authority by decreeing that the "Addition," or "Zonta," of fifteen principal magistrates, which it was the custom to appoint for the hearing of special cases, should be made permanent. As the "Zonta" carried with it spending powers independent of the Senate, the change was of radical importance. The friction between the Ten and the larger body of the nobility continued to increase till 1582, when matters were brought to a crisis by three cases which were held to prove the overweening influence which the Ten had arrogated to itself. In two of these the Ten sought to impose a nominee of their own upon the Great Council; in the third it displayed a contempt for the body of the nobility by supporting the claims of a riotous band of *bravi* against a riotous band of young patricians.

It says much for the inherent stability of the Venetian Constitution that such a question, deeply affecting the influence of the most powerful body in the State, could be freely

and fearlessly discussed in the largest assembly known to the Republic, the Great Council, the assembly of the whole electorate. No definite measure was passed, but the "Zonta" was virtually abolished by non-election, and in consequence all the spending power of the Ten, which was bound up with the "Zonta," and was not inherent in the Ten itself, fell to the ground. The Senate resumed its normal function of voting supplies and the Ten, reduced to its original proportions, ceased to threaten the stability of the Constitution.

(*b*) ***Maritime and Territorial Possessions.*** It must be borne in mind that Venice always regarded herself as a City-state. She probably never conceived, and certainly never embraced, the idea of the Republic as a territorial State. The city of Venice was not merely the capital of a number of co-ordinated cities and districts; she was herself the whole State, the *Città dominante;* all else were dependents. And just as inside Venice there was, for the vast majority of her citizens, no admission within the pale of the governing caste, so Padua, Verona, Brescia or Corfu, Crete and Cyprus had no voice in the direction of the policy adopted by the Republic. They were not colonies with independent legislatures, merely tied to the mother-country by some nominal bond; they were dependencies, possessions of Venice called upon to recognize her undoubted supremacy. So far was this principle of no admission for dependencies carried, that the very patricians who, on the invitation of the Government, took up their residence in Crete in order to colonize the island, were subsequently told that they had forfeited their place in the governing caste. Crete revolted (1364), and it cost the Government a series of campaigns before the island was subdued. But Venice insisted on her position as the *Città dominante*, and a great opportunity for welding her maritime possessions into one solid body with herself was lost. The result was that those possessions, debarred from active participation in the destinies of Venice, expected the Republic to provide for their defence, and thus became a source of weakness, not of strength, in the struggle with the Turk. On

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the other hand, provided her title to undisputed supremacy were recognized, Venice, in the case of her Italian mainland possessions, showed remarkable tenderness for local laws, customs, predilections. She avowed her intention to bind her subjects to her in bonds of affection, "*ut habeamus cor et amorem subditorum nostrorum*," as she phrased it. And she succeeded. Her Italian dependencies returned to her of their own accord after the wars of the League of Cambray, and it was entirely due to the wisdom of her policy in this respect that she was enabled to survive that disastrous combination against her.

To come now more closely to her methods. Her maritime possessions were of two kinds. First there were the Levant Islands, except Crete, which came into her possession after the Fourth Crusade. These were held by Venetians upon a very loose feudal tenure, which implied tribute to Venice and assistance to Venetian traders, and in return protection by the Republic as far as possible. It is very doubtful whether the tribute ever reached the Treasury; but Venice did her best to fulfil her side of the bargain, as, for example, when she insisted that the Duke of Naxos, and other Venetian nobles, lords of islands in the Archipelago, should be included in her treaty with Mahommed the Conqueror in 1454.

Another kind of maritime possession was the islands such as Corfu, Zante, Crete and Cyprus, which the Republic kept in her own hands and governed directly. Crete, the earliest of her Levantine acquisitions, received a constitution slightly different from the other islands. At the head of the government was the so-called "Duke of Candia," a Venetian nobleman elected in the Great Council at Venice. His functions were military, and he was assisted by two councillors. Under the duke came the Civil Governor, or *Proveditore*, the Captain-General, and the Civil Rectors of the various cities. There was a Great Council to manage the local affairs of the whole island, and in it sat both Cretan nobles and those Venetian patricians who had accepted the

proposals for the plantation of the island. The duke and the *Proveditore* reported straight to Venice, the other officials to them.

In like manner the other islands were governed by a *Proveditore*, elected at Venice and reporting continually to the Senate, from whom he received instructions. The *Proveditore* was assisted in all matters relating to commerce, shipping, customs dues by a Council of Twelve, chosen from among the leading merchants of the islands. The *Proveditore* disposed of the local police and the local militia. It was his duty to collect and remit to Venice customs dues, to see that the island was properly victualled and in an efficient state of defence. He and his Council of Twelve tried and sometimes hanged pirates who infested those waters.

In the government of her Italian possessions, Venice, as we have already remarked, showed great tenderness for local laws and customs, provided that her position as the *Città dominante* were fully recognized. She preserved, as far as possible, the ancient statutes or constitutions of each city. Her system was as follows:—Each district or province was governed by captains, or military governors, and podestàs, or civil governors. Both were elected in Venice, and both reported to the Senate, and when acting or reporting together were styled the Rectors. Half their salary was paid by Venice, half by the district they governed. The local authorities, the councils, varied slightly in size and construction according to original constitutions of the various communes. If we take Vicenza, for example, we find that the podestà had three assessors, a vicar, who performed his functions when he was absent, the Civil Court judge and the Criminal Court judge. The local councils for the management of local affairs were the Council of Five Hundred, elected from the whole body of the citizens, and the Council of One Hundred composed of the officers of the trade guilds. There was a local government board for the management of roads, water, bridges, agriculture. A court of eight judges, called the *Consolato*, for the

administration of local law, and a poor law board, *Avvocato e Sindaco dei Poveri.* The fiscal chamber in the case of Treviso, at all events, and probably elsewhere, reported every two months to Venice and presented accounts. In the case of atrocious crimes, or such felonies as coining, which affected the Republic as a whole, the Rectors reported to Venice, and the Council of Ten either avocated the cause to itself, or delegated its powers to the Rectors.

Protests against the captain or the podestà, or against legislation passed by the Government of the Republic, likewise appeals from the findings of the local courts, could all be heard in Venice itself. The aggrieved province chose ambassadors ("orators" they were called) and sent them to the capital. There they sought the protection, or advocacy, of some Venetian noble, were admitted to the Cabinet, laid their petition before it, and received an answer either that the case would be sent before the proper Government department, or that it was rejected.

From the foregoing remarks it will be seen that while Venice kept a firm hold on the financial and military government of her Italian dependencies, she left them comparatively free in the management of their own affairs. Citizens of subject towns had abundant scope for activity in their local governments, while the younger Venetian nobility were trained in the methods of administration as captain or podestà in the mainland cities.

(*c*) ***Finance and Trade.*** Considering the immense private wealth of Venice, the long wars she waged, and the splendid figure she presented to the world, the public resources were never large, nor were the finances of the Republic ever flourishing. The Government was always unwilling to impose taxation, and resorted to it only in extremity. It preferred to rely on the generosity of its citizens, and it did so successfully till the Lombard campaigns and Turkish wars wore out private as well as public purses. In 1423 the Doge Mocenigo calculated that trade with Lombardy alone was bringing in to private purses a net

profit of two millions of ducats per annum, while calculations made at the end of the fifteenth century give the total revenue of the State as one million one-hundred-and-forty-five-thousand five-hundred-and-eighty ducats.

The main sources of revenue were customs dues, salt monopoly, the so-called tithe tax on property, tribute from the mainland possessions, and tribute from the maritime possessions.

Tithes, customs and salt brought in		615,750	ducats
The mainland yielded	... ...	329,830	„
The islands yielded	... ...	200,000	„

All this latter item was absorbed by the Government, for the victualling and defence of the islands themselves. The expenditure is calculated at 545,580 ducats, and was appropriated to the payment of interest on debt, payment of salaries, which, from the Doge downwards, were very moderate, the payment of the army, and above all the up-keep of the arsenal. Though it is difficult to arrive at the proximate value of money, we may perhaps take the ducat as worth five shillings, and multiply it by ten to give us its modern equivalent.

The administration of finance lay with the Senate. The system was extremely complicated, consisting of many magistracies, invested with administrative as well as financial powers, whose functions frequently seem to overlap. The Senate commanded the purse of the Republic, and voted payments to be made upon one or other of the boards of receipt, the *Rason*, which drew the revenues of the mainland, the *Proveditori al Sal*, which managed the salt monopoly, the *Savii sopra le decime*, which assessed and drew the property tax. I cannot find that any general budget was prepared and presented to the Senate, though the state of account at each board of receipt was no doubt fully known to that body, which drew upon them, and it became the habit to charge certain expenses upon certain boards.

The commercial policy of the Republic, as well as its finance, was in the hands of the Senate, though here again the process of delegation to special offices took place as the

business of the Senate increased. The chief of these delegations was the office of the *Cinque Savii alla Mercanzia*, or Board of Trade, of which more presently. The original tendency of Venetian commercial policy was distinctly protectionist—protectionist that is in favour of Venice, of the *Città dominante*, not only as against foreigners, but against its own subjects of the islands. Everything was done to foster the carrying trade of the Venetians, and the character of Venice herself as a universal mart. With this object in view measures were taken to prevent the natives of the subject islands from selling their produce direct to foreigners. Crete was compelled to send her wine and oil, Zante her currants, to Venice first, thence to be distributed over the markets of Europe. Malipiero records the imposition of a special tax upon foreign ships loading wine in Candia, "to encourage our ships," he says. By "our ships" he meant Venetian, not Candiot vessels. So, again, Venetian subjects were forbidden to load in foreign bottoms, nor were Venetians permitted to insure goods loaded in other than Venetian bottoms. Going a step further it was enacted that no ships, foreign or otherwise, might reload at Venice if they had discharged cargo at any port inside the Adriatic, and if they did not bring at least two-thirds of their cargo into Venice itself.

In 1516 the great office of the *Cinque Savii alla Mercanzia* was established, and took over the general supervision of Venetian commerce, but always subject to the approval of the Senate. Quite early in its existence the Board of Trade, as we may call it, began to discover tendencies opposed to the rigid protectionist ideas of the Senate. The *Savii* argued in favour of freedom of traffic between the islanders and foreigners, coupled with a strict scrutiny of the Customs House. This, they urged, would certainly increase the revenues of the State, and any one who has studied the relations of the English Levant Company with Zante and Venice over the question of currants, will admit that they were right. But the invincible conservatism of the Venetian temperament, and the rigidity of her practice, both of them potent factors in the decline of the Republic, were too strong

for the more enlightened department, and Venice remained ruinously protectionist to the last.

(*d*) ***Religion.*** The ecclesiastical policy and attitude of the Venetian Republic was always marked by a certain independence of Rome. The State, while providing for the external ceremonies and functions of the Church with lavish splendour, was determined that the clergy should not exceed the limits of their ministerial vocation, should take no leading part in the direction of affairs. No relative of the Doge was allowed to accept preferment from Rome. When ecclesiastical matters were under discussion in the Senate, every senator in any way connected with the Curia Romana was bound to retire under the formula *expulsis papalistis*. No one but a Venetian subject could hold a Venetian bishopric. The Government claimed, though it hardly made good, the exemption of the Patriarch from examination at Rome before receiving the *pallium*. The Inquisition was admitted with reluctance. Its sittings and its sentences were invalid without the presence and the assent of three lay assessors appointed by the Government. The stake was never erected in Venice, and the whole proceedings of the Holy Office are marked by a leniency to be found in no other Catholic State in Europe. In spite of protests from Rome, the reformed religion was tolerated by the Government on condition that no scandal ensued, and no propaganda was attempted. The Germans held their services unmolested in the Fondaco de' Tedeschi, the English ambassador in his own house; the heretic Swiss from the Grisons were invited to come freely to Venice. Commercial or political reasons were at the root of this tolerance. The Republic desired to avoid a quarrel with Rome, but not at the expense of her trade or her political alliances. She was not, in consequence, a *persona grata* at the Vatican, and in Rome they said, "These gentlemen of Venice govern by rules of State, not by the law of the Inquisition."

The machinery of the Church in Venice presented some features peculiar to herself. The parish priests were origin-

ally chosen by the people, confirmed by the Senate, and inducted by their Ordinary. The bishops were chosen in the Senate and confirmed by Rome after examination. At the head of the Venetian hierarchy came the Patriarch appointed by the Senate, and confirmed by the Pope without examination, as Venice claimed. The patriarchate of Venice was really the same as the patriarchate of Grado, patriarchate of Istria and the Lagoons, which was suppressed by Pope Nicholas V. and transferred to the *Città dominante* in 1451, soon after Venice acquired the province of Friuli. The cathedral church of Venice, and seat of the Patriarch, was not the basilica of St. Mark, but the church of S. Pietro in Castello, the See of the early Bishops of Olivolo, who were absorbed in the patriarchate when Lorenzo Guistinian assumed that dignity. The clergy of the Republic were subject to taxation, though the Curia Romana declared that its assent was necessary. The Republic passed various measures against the excessive building of churches and to prevent the accumulation of real estate in ecclesiastical hands, but always under protest and opposition from Rome. These points of divergence, coupled with a standing dispute as to ecclesiastical versus secular jurisdiction over criminous clerks, led up to the famous quarrel between the Republic and the Roman Curia in 1605, when, as we shall presently see, the rights of secular princes in general and the position of Venice in particular were championed by the Republic under the guidance of Fra Paolo Sarpi.

Outside the ordinary hierarchy, something quite peculiar and apart stood the basilica of St. Mark, the private chapel of the Doge, and therefore of the Republic, with its Dean (the *Primiciero*, as he was called) and Chapter, with its Capella of musicians, the centre of all the gorgeous national ceremonies which focussed the religious sentiment of the people, the coronations of the Doges, the *Sposalizio del Mar*, the "Te Deums" for victory. While, to mark still further its independence in matters ecclesiastical, the State retained experts in canon law, *Consultori in Jure*, to advise her in her frequent clashes with Rome.

Three times in her early history the Republic came into serious collision with the Pope, thrice she was excommunicated, and twice placed under Interdict. On all three occasions the cause was political rather than ecclesiastical, connected with the aggressive and expansive tendency of the State, rather than with any infringement of ecclesiastical claims. In 1202 the Pope, in the interests of the Fourth Crusade, forbade the attack on Zara. The Republic ignored the veto, and was excommunicated. In 1308 the Republic endeavoured to establish herself in Ferrara. The Pope claimed Ferrara as a papal fief and ordered the Venetians to withdraw. The Doge in the Great Council struck the key-note of the Venetian position when he declared that the Pope has no concern with matters temporal. The Republic resolved to retain Ferrara. The Pope launched his excommunication and Interdict with results disastrous to Venetian commerce all over the world, and Venice was virtually forced to yield. At the Council of Constance the Republic declared that it would abide by the finding of the Council, thereby affirming its adherence to the Conciliar principle and the superiority of General Councils. It availed itself of this weapon when it found itself once more under Interdict for its aggressive action in the second war of Ferrara, and the appeal to a future Council was affixed to the doors of S. Celso in Rome, while in Venice the clergy were compelled to continue their sacred functions.

In all three cases the independent attitude of the Republic and her conception of the relations of Church and State were sufficiently defined. But the final struggle belongs to a later period of her history, the fatal period of the League of Cambray, which produced surrender all along the line, and to the last bold stand under Fra Paolo Sarpi against Pope Paul V.

(*e*) ***Justice.*** It is probable that in the early days of the Republic the judicial authority resided in the Doge. With the growth of the State, the expansion of its commerce, the influx of foreigners, the ducal attributes were gradually delegated to various courts of first instance. Their names to some extent indicate their nature. The earliest Venetian

tribunal, the *Proprio*, was a court originally of both civil and criminal jurisdiction, but it was eventually restricted to questions of dower, intestate estates, division of property, damage to property. The court of *Forestier* dealt with causes between foreigners and Venetians. The court of *Esaminador* was a court for the registration of contracts. The *Piovego* heard cases of disputed contracts, usury, bills of exchange, commercial suits, leases, annuities. On the criminal side there were the police magistrates, with the picturesque title of *Signori di Notte*, or Lords of the Night, and the *Executori contro alla Bestemmia*, who were the guardians of public decency and morals.

The appeal from these courts, civil as well as criminal, lay originally to the so-called *Quarantia*, or Court of Forty This was subsequently divided into the Criminal Forty, the Civil Forty, to hear appeals in civil suits in Venice and the New Civil Forty, to hear civil appeals from the provinces. Cases of moment, whether civil or criminal, were taken at once before the Forty. The procedure was as follows in criminal cases. The case was prepared by one of the *Avogadori del Comune*, or as one would say, in Scots, by the Procurator Fiscal. It was then submitted to the court, which decided either that there was "no ground for proceeding" or "to proceed." In the latter case the accused was called upon by proclamation to make surrender within so many days. If he did not he was outlawed and a price put on his person or his life. If he surrendered he was told to name his advocate, or if he was unable to afford counsel, one of the *avvocati dei prigioni*, or "prison counsel," was assigned to him, and a day named for the trial. At the trial the report of the Procurator was read, and, acting as counsel for the Crown, he supported his case and demanded sentence. The counsel for the defence replied. The court withdrew and voted its sentence, which was communicated to the prisoner privately. The presumption was against the prisoner, not in his favour, but Venetian procedure was enlightened and lenient in that it required the prisoner to be defended by counsel.

The Council of Ten (though, as a political body, extrane-

ous to the regular outline of the Venetian Constitution) soon established for itself a regular place in the Venetian Judicature. Taking cognizance, as it did, of all matters relating to public safety, life and property of citizens, and public and private morals, it rapidly became the highest criminal tribunal in the State. The terrors of the Ten have been greatly exaggerated—partly owing to the secrecy of its proceedings; partly because, in its capacity as guardian of public safety, the most striking cases in Venetian history came under its cognizance; partly because the tribunal itself desired to foster this feeling of dread which increased its prestige while facilitating its action. The mere appearance of its chief officer, the *Capitan Grande*, was sufficient to secure obedience and allay a tumult among the populace, who remembered that he represented a court which had tried and beheaded a Doge, and tried and beheaded a Commander-in-chief, though the greatest soldier of his day in Italy. But as a matter of fact the Council of Ten was governed by a code of procedure eminently just and strictly enforced. The famous secret denunciations of the lion's mouth—so fertile a subject of romance—could not even be submitted to the Ten until the Doge, his six councillors, and three chiefs of the Ten, had unanimously affirmed that the accusation was matter of public importance; nor could it be taken into consideration by the Ten except on a vote of four-fifths of the whole body. But trial by the Ten, unlike trial by the Forty, was a secret trial. The prisoner was not confronted with witnesses nor accusers, nor was he defended by an advocate. Torture might be applied only on a permissive vote of the Council. An examination of the archives of the Ten will not lead to the conclusion that it was either cruel or sanguinary.

Yet another secret tribunal, the *Inquisitori di Stato*, or Council of Three, acquired for itself an ominous reputation in Venetian history. Yet "the Three" was merely a sub-committee of the Ten appointed in 1539, chiefly for the supervision of the foreign affairs of the Republic, and above all, to guard against the insidious encroachments of Spain and

the corrupting power of Spanish gold. During the long decline of Venice, when the Republic was endeavouring to hold its own by diplomacy rather than by arms, suspicion of its own ambassadors became one of its haunting terrors, and it was before the Council of Three that such cases as those of Hieronimo Lippomano, of the unfortunate Foscarini, and of Lady Arundel were brought.

(*f*) ***Diplomacy.*** There is one department of administration in which Venice enjoyed undisputed supremacy during the period of her splendour, the Diplomatic Service. The State archives at the Frari bear abundant testimony to the diligence and ability of the Venetian diplomatic agents in that striking series of despatches from all parts of Europe, from England, Holland, France, Denmark, Germany, Russia, Poland, Constantinople, Rome, Madrid, which made Venice herself the centre of the world's news. The Venetian ambassador at foreign courts was the best informed of all his colleagues; at Rome, at Madrid and elsewhere, the Government applied to him for information which he gave or withheld on instructions from Venice, nor will it be forgotten that Lord Chesterfield advises his son, when abroad, to frequent the company of the Venetian ambassador, while modern diplomats have been known to express a desire that knowledge of Venetian despatches should be required from those about to enter the service.

The heyday of Venetian diplomacy may be taken, roughly speaking, as the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when, after the disastrous League of Cambray, Venice ceased to be a first-class power and, abandoning the attempt to preserve herself by arms, had recourse to the subtler methods of diplomacy. To enable her to attain her object she required and obtained from her agents the minutest details from all the courts of Europe. But even earlier, the despatches of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, more especially the great series from Constantinople and the East, are of the highest interest and importance.

Venetian diplomacy was served by two classes of agents. Residents, or as we might say ministers, and ambas-

sadors. The Residents were not patricians; they were burgher citizens, *cittadini originarii*, of whom we shall have something to say presently, and were chosen from among the secretaries in the Ducal Chancery. They received their diplomatic training as secretaries to the Senate or the Ten, where they were employed to decipher and to read the despatches addressed to those bodies. They were accredited to the smaller Courts of Italy, Turin, Milan, Florence, Naples, and occasionally to European Courts on special missions, or when diplomatic relations were not in full working order. They reported to the Senate, and their despatches are to be found among the papers of that Assembly. There is nothing to distinguish them either in fulness, ability, or cipher from the despatches of ambassadors. They received their instructions from the Senate, but whereas ambassadors were addressed by the "you" (*voi*) of an equal, Residents were treated to the "thou" (*tu*) of an inferior.

Ambassadors were elected by the Senate from among the Venetian nobility. They were usually men of advanced age who had served their country in various magistracies and had learned the art of reporting as podestà or captain in some Venetian dependency. Ambassadors were either Ordinary, that is Ambassadors-Resident, Liegers, or else Ambassadors-Extraordinary. Ambassadors-Ordinary were appointed for two years. If not members of the Senate at the date of appointment, they were frequently permitted to sit in the Senate without a vote, in order that, by hearing the despatches read, they might acquire a knowledge of the political condition of Europe. Their pay was two hundred ducats of gold a month, of which four months was anticipated to assist them to their outfit, and for the same purpose they received one thousand ducats for which they were bound to present accounts at the close of their mission, and forty ducats a month for small charges which they might spend as they chose. They were obliged to take four carriages, two coachmen, eleven horses,—to buy which they received three hundred ducats,—and two couriers besides their body servants.

A certain amount of plate also was supplied them by the Treasury. This they were bound to restore to the Mint on their return. In the case of Ambassadors-Extraordinary the above figures were about doubled, and they were required to take with them a band of musicians as well. The staff of an ambassador comprised a chancellor, secretaries, physician and chaplain, and, in the case of Constantinople, a large body of interpreter-dragomans, *giovani della lingua*, as they were called.

The journeys were long, fatiguing, dangerous; baggage was frequently lost. Ambassadors often delayed their departure with the result that pathetic or indignant despatches began to arrive from the retiring ambassador, whose services were thus involuntarily extended sometimes to three instead of two years. Arrived at his destination, the ambassador went through the usual formalities; presentation of credentials in company with his predecessor, visits to the officers of state and return visits to his colleagues. Except at Rome, and Madrid, where the Pope and the King had each presented the Republic with a palace, ruinously expensive to keep up, the ambassador was expected to find a suitable house and to entertain in a manner worthy of the Republic he represented. He reported regularly and fully to his Government, and was allowed to draw money for special purposes, such as secret service. An ambassador used this with great effect on one occasion at the time of the Armada when Philip II.'s plans for giving battle to the English fleet were taken from his study desk, after he had retired for the night, copied and restored before daybreak.

At the close of his mission the ambassador returned home as fast as possible, reported himself in the Senate and made surrender of all presents he had received. These he was usually allowed to keep. Within a month or two of his return he was expected to present and read to the Senate a full report (*Relazione*) on the history and actual condition of the country to which he had just been accredited.

(*g*) ***A Doge's day.*** It may be as well, after setting

forth the foregoing details, to resume, as far as possible, the aspect of the Venetian Government when the Republic was at her zenith. That can best be done by observing the ordinary routine of a Doge's life; for the Doge was, in theory, universally present at every operation of the State, at every movement of the governmental machinery; he was the official representative of the Republic as a whole and incorporated the majesty of Venice.

The Doge's private apartments in the Ducal Palace were at the extreme end of the wing which runs along the small canal under the Bridge of Sighs. His rooms were not numerous nor very large, most of them looked upon the inner court-yard of the palace, and one of them opened on to a small terrace-garden which commanded the Giant's Staircase. His Serenity began the day by receiving, in his private rooms, his six Privy Councillors, without whose presence no official act of his was valid, no despatches could be opened, no replies given to correspondence.

When the ducal correspondence had been opened and discussed, the Doge and his Privy Council passed to the Cabinet-meeting, held in the beautiful chamber of the *Collegio*, next door to the Senate Hall. Here the Doge presided over the deliberations of the Cabinet Ministers. The despatches which he had opened were read and considered. The agenda sheet was discussed. It contained the entire business of the Republic for that day, financial, commercial, diplomatic, colonial, judicial. The *Savii*, or Cabinet Ministers, introduced the various subjects affecting their departments, each of which was destined for treatment either in the Senate or in the Council of Ten. Next came the executive side of the Cabinet's functions. Letters to foreign Powers were drawn up, and orders were issued to governors or other officials in accordance with resolutions already passed in the Senate. Throughout all these proceedings the initiative lay with the Doge; he moved the first resolution, introduced the first draft; amendments and counter resolutions might be brought forward by the members of the Cabinet. Then,

when the day's work had been considered, came the audience of ambassadors, ministers, nuncios of foreign Powers, and of orators from the mainland or maritime dependencies, and the reception of distinguished foreigners introduced by their ambassadors, of all in short who desired to approach the Serene Republic by way of business or of compliment. These Envoys of foreign Powers had either sought audience or had been invited to attend. In the one case they had something to say, in the other something to hear. The ambassador was introduced, either alone or accompanied by a secretary, made reverence to the Doge, advanced to the dais and was invited to be seated on the Doge's right. If he had sought audience he began to unfold his subject. At each mention of his master's name he raised his hat. His business covered the usual field of diplomacy, compliments, treaties, alliances, commercial relations, tentative soundings as to attitude on foreign affairs, grievances, complaints, imparting or requesting information, petitions for favours on behalf of *protégés*. On all these multifarious topics it was the Doge who replied, and sometimes to three or four ambassadors in one day. He was the mouth-piece of the Republic, and was expected to answer in language whose dignity and gravity should adequately represent the majesty of the State, and yet should in no way commit the Government to any line of action. The formula usually ran, "This I can say to you, but if these gentlemen have anything further to add, they will do so if they see fit." Or "This I can say of myself, but the matter will be brought before the Council of Ten or before the Senate, whose decision will be communicated to you." If on the other hand the ambassador had been invited to attend, the Doge again was the spokesman, and was expected to inform the ambassador in appropriate tones of suavity, severity or indignation, that in reply to earlier communications his petition had been granted or rejected, that the Senate had arrived at such and such a resolution, which was then read to him by a secretary. At the close of the audience, if the ambassador desired to present a

distinguished compatriot, the Doge again was expected to find compliments suited to the occasion. The full proceedings of the *Collegio* are preserved in minutes and registers, and we know exactly what the ambassador said, what the Doge replied, what the ministers added if they thought fit.

Cabinet Council over, the Doge would proceed to the Council of Ten, if it were sitting. Here, too, he presided and had the initiative. Neither the debates nor the minutes of trials in the Ten have been preserved. We only possess the sentences proposed and occasionally a rehearsal of the crime. But while sitting with the Ten the Doge would be called upon to discuss questions of "high police"; treason, disaffected or riotous nobility, atrocious crimes in Venice or its dependencies, reports on the movements of suspected foreigners.

After dinner, if it were a Thursday or a Saturday, the Doge presided in the Senate, the range of whose functions would usually be sufficient to occupy the whole of the afternoon. The debates in the Senate have not been officially preserved, but some of the more important are recorded by senatorial diarists such as Malipiero, Priuli and Sanudo; we have, however, the resolutions and amendments with their preambles and the voting thereon. The ordinary business in the Senate would cover all local government, such as the granting of petitions, of patents, of copyright; the appointment of professors in the University of Padua; the voting of public money; the election of ambassadors, and of many important Government officials, chiefly in connection with the Mint and Finance departments and with the University. The Senate next proceeded to foreign affairs and heard despatches from all the Courts of Europe, from the governors of mainland and maritime dependencies; it debated and resolved on instructions to Venetian representatives abroad and replies to foreign representatives in Venice. Finally, if it were the proper season, the Senate would establish the trade-route, determine the cargo, and appoint the officers of the State fleet. And throughout this mass of business the Doge presided, and moved resolutions.

If it were Sunday, the Doge's presence was imperatively required in the Great Council. Here, unless some governmental crisis, some conflict between the various branches of the administration, were disturbing the normal movement of the State machine, the business would be chiefly elective, in which his Serenity would not be called upon to take any active part.

If we add to all this the numerous State and Ecclesiastical functions where the Doge's presence was obligatory, we see how full the day's work was for an old man representing, as he did, the vast and overflowing life of a great State at its prime—in proof of which hear Dudley Carleton, British ambassador to Venice in 1612: "I am sure you will lament with me this good old Duke Leonardo Donato, who died on Monday last seven night. . . . There was hope he would have lasted longer, and towards his end he assisted daily in their councils, and even the day he died he spent the whole morning in the College, from whence retiring at the accustomed hour, and having withdrawn himself into his *guarda-roba*, where he was alone, he was heard to cry out suddenly, and one of his servants running in, he fell into his arms, and never spoke more, but breathed an hour after. I had audience of him the Thursday before, which was the last he gave to any ambassador; and though he complained long of weakness, and indeed was much broken in looks, yet he retained his wonted vigour of spirit and readiness of speech. The day he died, as if he had some sense of his departure, he entertained the College with a whole hour's speech, testifying so much goodwill to the State . . . that he left them all weeping."

IV. Science, Letters, and Arts.

If in the region of Commerce and of Arms the first symptoms of decline are already perceptible by the opening

of the sixteenth century, in the region of the Arts and of private life the splendour of Venice was prolonged for another century and a half. The decay in Commerce and in Arms was a slow process, and the Arts and private luxury coming later, and in a large measure as an outcome of success in Commerce and in Arms, survived longer, and so to Europe and the outside world Venice never looked more brilliant than she did during the sixteenth century.

(*a*) ***Science.*** As was to be expected from an eminently practical people engaged in drawing their wealth from the sea, the Venetians were among the earliest of European nations to make serious contributions to geography. It is probable that Marco Polo brought back with him rough sketches of the places he had seen, and dictated descriptions which other hands endeavoured to represent in the form of maps. We know that Marin Sanudo, the elder, presented to the Pope (1321) maps of the Mediterranean, the Holy Land, and Egypt, now lost. In 1436, Andrea Bianco produced the most perfect map that had appeared so far. It is preserved in the Marcian Library at Venice, and has been frequently reproduced. Andrea Bianco's map is a sailing chart with winds and courses marked. The Bay of Biscay, the English Channel, and the coast of Holland are given with remarkable fulness; we find Alixart (Lizard), Falamua (Falmouth), Godiman (Dodman), Fabie (Fowey), Cao de Rame (Rame Head), Premua (Plymouth), and so on. No doubt the chart was studied by the sailing-masters of the Flanders galleys. Andrea Bianco was followed in 1459 by Fra Mauro, who made his famous planisphere for Alphonso IV. of Portugal. From that time onwards the mass of Venetian maps, *portolani*, *isolarii*, and other geographical matter, increases steadily, and is multiplied by the printing press. Both the Marciana and the Museo Civico possess rich collections.

The Government had always shown a special solicitude for the University of Padua, which was placed under the care of a State department, the *Riformatori dello Studio di Padova*. Everything was done to attract distinguished teachers. In the

region of physics, Padua was rendered famous by the presence of the most illustrious man of science that the Renaissance produced. Galileo Galilei lectured there in 1592, developing his studies in the telescope and the thermometer, and corresponding with Fra Paolo Sarpi, a name less known, but hardly less distinguished, in the world of science, the precursor of Gilbert White and of Harvey.

The European renown of Padua rested chiefly, however, on her schools of anatomy and medicine. During the sixteenth century, Vessalius, Colombo, Falloppius and Fabricius were exploring the human frame in their little oval dissecting-theatre, still extant in the University, while Savonarola, Mercurialis, and Sanctorio tentatively felt their way about the properties of drugs, and the methods for coping with the plague. The beautiful botanical garden at Padua, the most perfect scientific garden of its day, was opened for the use of scholars. A leader of modern science, Sir Michael Foster, testifies to the debt Europe owes to the "freedom" enjoyed in "the Venetian Republic and the bright academic circles of Padua," where, "under the protection of the Senate," Vessalius and his followers "had opportunities for the advance of knowledge which" they "could not have enjoyed elsewhere."

The fame of such masters, the fascination of Italy, the attraction of Venice, filled the University with students from all parts of Europe, and the coats-of-arms in the Aula Magna and along the corridors of the University bear witness to the variety of nations and the nobility of the families who sent their sons to take their "degree" in Padua.

(*b*) ***Letters.*** Beautiful as Venice undoubtedly was, stirring as her history had been, and passionately attached though the Venetians were to their city in the sea, yet this combination produced no literature of imagination. Broadly speaking, Venice of the Splendour has no poetry, no drama. No Venetian ever rose to sing the triumphs of the Fourth Crusade, the exultation at the fall of Genoa, the pious glow that shed an halo round the legend of St. Mark; no Venetian

was stirred to dramatic creation by the tragedies of Carmagnola, Foscari, or Falier. They were a practical people, too busy in the making and enjoying of life to turn aside and reflect on it. They lived their poems and therefore did not write them; and as for dramatizing their national episodes, the Council of Ten would never have permitted it. A national literature with the nation's life-blood for its theme was not for Venice.

A literature of culture, such as the Renaissance had produced in Florence, is equally wanting. But we must bear in mind that the learning of the Renaissance came late to Venice and found no congenial soil in the temper of the Venetians themselves. For the renown of their city and *décor* of their homes the great Venetians would play the Mæcenas, but the really learned men, Aldus, Musurus, Gregoropoulos, Chalcondylas, were foreigners. Moreover, when the Renaissance did reach Venice, its whole force was poured into other channels than literature, into architecture and painting—devoted, that is, to the sensible and sensuous glorification of the city as a whole.

In one department of literature only has Venice, at its zenith, anything essentially Venetian to show. The official historians are frigid and compassed; their style a heavy imitation of classical models badly digested, their matter measured to meet the suspicious eye of the Ten. Of chroniclers in the free, romantic manner of the Gattari, Cortusii, Corio, Matarazzo, and the hundred others that fill the volumes of Muratori, there are none. But when we come to the Diarists of the Golden Age we touch a spring that is pure, genuine, original. Of no Italian city have we so vivid, lively, all-embracing a portrait as that which Malipiero, Priuli and Sanudo have left us. Covering the years 1457 to 1535, they embrace the very apex of Venetian splendour. Written by men versed in affairs and prominent actors in the events they relate; penned not for the public eye, but for the honour of Venice and the love of truth, these Diaries are racy, veracious, outspoken records of all that took place in the Senate Chamber and Counting-house,

on board the fleet or with the army, of what was said at Rialto or what was written from Rome, of the doings and ceremony and splendour of the city, but also of the misfortunes, disasters and fears that haunted the minds of those who wrote them. The very spirit of Venice breathes through these pages, shrewd, humorous, trenchant, practical, but inspired by a passionate devotion to the City and the State. There is no juggle of *belles-lettres*, no mantle of rhetoric is cast about the naked truth, but the unmistakable note of the lover is there, and we surmise what the inspiration of the City must have been for men who could write so passionately about her.

In fact the literature of Venice was at its best when it was not striving to be literary. This same strong note of simplicity and directness is audible in the despatches of Giustinian and of Paruta. Stronger, more poignant still, nuder, more athletic, is the style of Fra Paolo Sarpi. Relying upon no rhetoric but the rhetoric of logical sequence, it produces its effect by antithetical juxtapositions. In the hands of the master it was forged into a weapon of the finest damask steel. In short, while the architecture and painting of the Golden Age at Venice were rich, redundant, ornate, the literature, as far as she had any of her own, was simple, spare and severe.

(*c*) ***The Printing Press.*** In close connection with letters the Republic possessed one special claim to recognition as the leading State in Europe. The Venetian Printing Press, though only the third Italian press in chronological order, being preceded by Rome and Milan, was undoubtedly the richest in production, the most sumptuous in workmanship, the widest in diffusion. The art of printing was brought to Venice by foreigners, by John of Speyer and Windelin his brother, by Nicolas Jenson from France, by Waldarfer and Erhardt Radolt, and many others attracted to the city of the lagoons first by the richness of Bessarion's library, which offered them food for their presses, then by the security of the city itself, and lastly by its commanding wealth and importance as a commercial centre.

There are two striking features of the Venetian Press considered as a whole; one is the aristocratic sumptuousness of its earliest productions, from John of Speyer to Aldus; the other is the democratic abundance, cheapness, serviceability of the output from the days of Aldus onwards. The Press opens with a series of monuments, the *Epistolæ Familiaries* of Speyer, the *Epistolæ ad Atticum* of Jenson, the *De Civitate Dei* by the same printer, which are unsurpassed, probably unrivalled, by the press of any other city. Frequently printed on vellum, with elaborately illuminated initials and rubricated colophons, they equal in beauty, and may possibly have been intended to imitate the manuscript.

But when we come to the Aldine Press there is a marked change. Though Aldus did not abandon the production of sumptuous books, his chief care, and perhaps his chief claim upon the gratitude of posterity, lay in the publication of accurate texts of the classics at a reasonable price and in convenient form. While Jenson and his fellows looked upon the Press largely as a means for putting out a handsome book, a beautiful work of art, Aldus regarded it quite as much as an instrument for the diffusion of scholarship. To that end he founded his famous academy of scholars like Musurus and Gregoropoulos, whose major preoccupation was the establishment of sound readings.

Once created, the Press of Venice far exceeded the Press of any other European State, in range of subject and in activity. The Government was not slow first to protect and encourage and then to organize the craft. The manufacture of paper was fostered, the exportation of rags forbidden. Printers and booksellers were incorporated as a guild in 1548-49.

(*d*) ***The Libraries.*** We have seen that one of the chief reasons which brought foreign printers to Venice was the richness of the Library of St. Mark. The quiet and security of Venice, untorn by rival factions inside the city, as were most other Italian towns, and protected against assault by the guardian lagoon, offered a sure asylum to men of letters,

like Boccaccio and Petrarch. To the Republic Petrarch bequeathed his much-loved books, and by the gift is said to have laid the foundation-stone of that famous Library, the *Biblioteca di S. Marco.* Of Petrarch's gift no traces now remain, and the real founder of the actual library is Cardinal Bessarion, who, as Malipiero records, left nine hundred volumes of Greek and Latin manuscripts to the Republic, which ordered the construction of a library in the palace. He adds, with a soldier-like disregard for letters, "these manuscripts were soon of little value, as you could get the books in print."

When printing became general and lucrative, printer-publishers applied for copyright to the Government. In return for this privilege, the Senate, in order to feed the State Libraries, required that a copy of each issue from the presses of Venice should be supplied to the Library of St. Mark and the Library of the University of Padua.

(*e*) ***The Arts: Sculpture and Architecture.*** On the whole it may be said that the great art of Venice is public art. Connoisseurship and private patronage do not play so large a part in the Republic as they did at Rome or Florence, for example. As Venice grew in wealth the city took to adorning itself first with architecture and sculpture, then by painting. In Venice, however, sculpture was, for the most part, an accessory subservient to architecture. The sculptures on St. Mark's (in as far as they form part of the design and are not applied later), the angles of the Ducal Palace, the figures of Venice on the palace façades, the exquisite doorway decoration, the balconies, borne on lions with undulating wave-like manes and little lions, *accroupis* on the corners, even Rizzo's *Adam* and *Eve* that face the Giant Staircase—one and all are part of the architect's design, rather than monuments of the sculptor's art.

The architecture itself, till we come to the period of the Renaissance, is a capricious mingling of styles, Byzantine, Gothic, Lombard, a *tour de force* of bizarre invention that achieves its justification *perchè Dio lo vuole.* St. Mark's is a

marvellous accident—never to be repeated. Strip it of its marbles, columns, incrustations, and you find the brickwork of a church like St. Mary's-in-the-Fields at Constantinople; the same arrangements of narthex in front of a five-bayed façade, the same great central stable-window, a somewhat similar setting of cupolas. St. Mark's has the casquet-like quality of so many Oriental churches; the cupolas might be lids of a jewel-case. But with its incrustations what a casquet it becomes, what a shrine for the "aureus Lucifer" as one old chronicler will style the Evangelist! Marbles from Constantinople and the coast of Syria, column after column, with strange Arabic *graffitti*, from Alexandria and Egypt—while St. Mark's was in the building each merchant was bound to bring back from his eastern voyages some vestures for the shrine that Venice was raising to her Saint and to herself—bronze horses from Byzantium for the outer gallery, porphyry knights from Acre for the angle of the Treasury, all applied just as they came to hand, regardless of structural meaning or purpose. And the Treasury itself was a storehouse of cups and goblets and curious jewels in agate, onyx, jasper, chalcedony, with quaint chasing in the precious metals and bossing in heavy, deep-toned, uncut gems. The altar frontal in gold and exquisite enamels, with figures of Emperor and Empress and Doge, the work of skilled Byzantine artificers, the golden mosaics of the interior vaults and the rich sobriety of the *opus alexandrinum* on the pavement were added, and there was St. Mark's, a marvellous mingling of East and West, the monument and symbol of the people that created it.

And the Ducal Palace, again. No other building in the world is like it. It had no archetype that we can trace. A massive, square, box-like structure, faced with white and red Verona marble, cut to look like bricks, and arranged in a lozenge-shaped diaper pattern, is carried on a two-storied arcade, the upper of light, and seemingly fragile tracery, the lower of solid, but still wide-spanned arches, when one considers the superincumbent mass. It is a *tour de force* of bizarre construction which nothing but itself could justify.

The same riot of fancy is discernible in the earlier private palaces, along the Grand and side canals. The "braided" string courses, the twisted rope pattern running up the angles from water-floor to coping, the angle-windows where the mullion carries the whole weight of the upper stories and roof, the quaint chimney-pots, so curiously fashioned in cluster-columns of rounded brick and spreading outward like the calyx of some flower, all denote a wealth of invention and a joy in creation that demonstrate the luxuriant life out of which they sprang, a life that was individual, untouched as yet by the mainland of Italy, peculiar to Venice of the Venetians.

But presently, as her relations with the mainland grew wider, comes a sedater, cooler note in Venetian architecture. The School of the Lombardi, touched by the finger of the Renaissance, chastened by a knowledge of classical models, gives to Venice such exquisite monuments as the Scuola di San Marco, the façade of San Zaccharia, the Guild-hall of St. John the Evangelist, and such private houses as the Palazzo Trevisan, the Ca'Dario, the Vendramini-Calergi; the marble incrustation is still employed, richness of colouring is still sought for, but the riot of fancy is pruned; the harmony of proportion is evolved from the din of an *a tutti*. The art becomes learned, and the pleasures of connoisseurship replace a debauch of the senses.

Later still the full-blown Renaissance blossoms for Venice in Sansovino's learned, measured yet luxuriantly ornate Libreria, in Palladio's chastened façade of S. Giorgio and his acknowledged *chef d'œuvre*, the Redentore. The graceful campaniles of San Giorgio Maggiore and San Francesco sprang up beside their more massive brothers of San Marco, San Stefano and the Frari. To this period, also, belong the bridges of Istrian stone (the first was built in 1478), with their graceful balustrades and coats-of-arms, recording the Government officials in whose day they were built;—an architecture in short denoting a period of sober enjoyment after the riot of youth. Finally the art settled down

to the correct, though frigid, creations of Sammicheli, and the sumptuous, if rather lifeless, masterpieces of Longhena.

(*f*) ***Painting.*** It may have struck the reader that so far in the history of Venice, however magnificent the Republic may have been, however prominent in arms or in commerce, that magnificence, that prominence centres round the State itself, round the name of Venice, not round the name of any individual Venetian. In the history of no other State can one find so much achievement combined with so little individual renown. This is eminently characteristic of the Republic where the idea of the State was everything, the individual member nothing. We hardly know the names of the men who made Venice famous by sea and by land, who carried the Lion of St. Mark from Holland to Cathay. But when we come to the arts, and more especially to the supreme art of Venice, painting, then the case is different. We find ourselves confronted by a galaxy of brilliant names of men who were known throughout the cultured world, and who seem to bestow, not to receive, the glory with which they are for ever associated.

One or two considerations suggest themselves in partial explanation of the fact. The arts were the only region of activity where the State was not jealous, where a man might freely be all that he could achieve for and by himself. Great wealth accumulated in commerce, great fame and popularity achieved by arms, were dangers to the State, called for suppression and restriction, lest the level equilibrium of the oligarchy be upset. But that Giorgione, Titian, Tintoret, should cover the walls of Venice with masterpieces that spread their names all over Europe, roused no suspicion, called forth no alarm. In the State there was no room for individual prominence, in Art there was. Moreover the State knew how to make the achievements of its individual artists redound to its own glory. Untorn by faction, secure against the violent changes which wrecked the other cities of Italy, the Republic, in its corporate capacity, could and did act as a great Mæcenas. It is the earliest and the richest patron of the Arts. The

State commissioned the Bellini, the Vivarini and Carpaccio to paint its history on the walls of the Great Council Chamber. It is the State that charged Titian, Tintoret and Veronese to adorn the ceilings of the Ducal Palace with those sumptuous presentments of Venice in apotheosis. The glory of the artist is the glory of the State. It was impossible for him to be too brilliant or too famous when all his fame and all his brilliancy were dedicated to the service of the Republic. And this public patronage of the arts spread from the great State-patron downwards. As the Government caused Venice to be portrayed on the walls and roofs of the Public Palace, so the members of the various guilds and confraternities caused the histories of their patron saints, or some subject connected with the guild, to be displayed on the walls and roofs of their meeting-place. As in the Ducal Palace it is the mundane, magnificent, sensuous Venice that is the theme, so in the Guild-hall, under the thin veil of a religious motif, it is the full, vivid, sensuous life of the City that is portrayed. The St. Ursula series are portraits of Venetian everyday life glorified as every Venetian would have wished them to be. In the *Miracle of the Cross* you have the boats, the canals, the gondoliers, the maid, the roofs, the chimneys of Venice as she was. In *St. Jerome* you have a Venetian dog of the very breed, build and character that may be found to this day in Venice. Again, as in the guild, so in the family, the Venetians desired to represent themselves. But in the private house the space is confined and the theme restricted, yet the central point, the head of the family, is seized and presented. And here we get that other great branch of Venetian painting, the portraits, the speaking likenesses of those the strong, vigorous, hale, shrewd, often sensuous old men who made and ruled the State. What Venice aimed at throughout, desired and insisted on getting, was portrayal of herself. No detail was too trivial, no *minutiæ* seemed otiose, no pains exaggerated in the effort to fix the likeness. There was a passion, almost of religion, about the workmanship. What the truths of Christianity were to a man like Fra Angelico and the really

religious painters of Tuscany, the truths of Venice were to Bellini, Carpaccio, and the supreme Venetian decorators.

The striking achievements of the Venetian School lay in the regions of aërial perspective and of colour. The great Venetian Masters were, perhaps, the first to place their figures and their subjects in a landscape that looked like a landscape and not like a painting on a wall immediately behind the subject. The Venetians aimed at and obtained the effect of distance. In Flemish and early Tuscan painters the landscape background is often of high importance and has received great care; but, while the subject of the picture is in the focus of the naked eye, the landscape background is seen as through a telescope; for you can note quite well what the little man is doing in the fields some miles away, what the swans are about in the reaches of the river, how the hunt fares up the hill-side. But in Titian's or Tintoret's backgrounds it is real landscape, seen as the eye would see it. That craggy mountain is really Marmarole and it is really in Cadore, not at the end of the studio; that river is really the Piave, and it is coming down from its mountain cradle in Visdende and sweeping through the veritable gorge at the Ponte degli Alpi.

Not impossibly the Venetian Masters were helped to this mastery over distance, to their just appreciation of aërial perspective, by the accident of their dwelling-place. They had ever before them the long levels of the lagoon, the distant yet dominating line of the Alps, the vast, vaulted sky over it all. The problem was ever before them demanding solution and finally received it. So too, in the region of colour, for the first time in the history of painting we come to what may, perhaps, be called a fluid use of colour. Colour is no longer considered as something extraneous to be put on a picture, it is the very essence of the picture itself. No other masters knew the subtleties, the intricacies of colour as did the Venetians; no other school handles colour with the same freedom and certainty; as though to the manner born they bathe in colour; their "delighted spirit" moves in that medium and is native to it, till the gamut is mastered and we can pass from the

cool and limpid morning-light of the Castelfranco Giorgione, through the golden, meridian glow of Bordone's *Ring*, to the hot and sultry sunset of Titian's *Bacchus and Ariadne;* from the gem-like *impasto* of Tintoret's *Miracle of St. Mark*, or the lovely *St. Ursula* of Mendicanti, to the smooth, rich brush stroke of the Catena in the National Gallery; from that delicious combination of green and rose-pink—that almost appeals to the palate—in Veronese's *Donor of the Feast*, back again to the delicate mastery over white in Catena's *Santa Christina* at the Mater Domini.

And here once more, Venice, the place, helped her painters to their victory. For eyes to see and hearts to understand, the mystery and problems of colour were for ever being displayed and resolved in the heavens above and on the waters beneath. There, for the artist to mark and master were the pearly whites of a Venetian morning—Catena's whites; the meridian glow on the Palace, the Piazzetta, the Molo; the shimmer of shot-colour on the waters at sunset; the fiery splendour of the afterglow in autumn, burning down to sullen crimson on the lagoon;—all these appear again on the canvases of Titian and Tintoret, while the delicate tinting of a scirocco day, its pearly greys and evanescent pinks and greens and mauves, give the key to the frescoes in the Palazzo Labia, the work of Tiepolo, last of the great Venetians, first of the modern *plein-airists*. It was Venice itself that bestowed upon her painters their two commanding qualities, aërial perspective and mastery over colour.

Finally, as to the emotional quality of the Venetian painters. Suavity is the note of Giovanni Bellini; his Madonnas are gentle, his old men gracious, his young saints, like St. Christopher in S. Giovanni Chrisostomo, are sweet with the sweetness of the sea-breeze in their blood. Gentile Bellini and Carpaccio are sumptuous and naïve; sumptuous in detail the procession of the Corpus Domini and the furnishings in the St. Ursula series; naïve in observation and record of human touches, the secretary writing, the queen in argument with the king; quaint and humorous in St. Jerome's

dog, fond of his master yet bored with the Vulgate, not looking at the spectator yet clearly appealing for sympathy. Splendour is the note of Titian, splendid in vitality the Madonna of the *Assumption*, splendid in bacchantic mania the rout that is after Ariadne, splendid in quality of lordly manhood the *Young Man* of the Pitti. Pomp of pageantry is Veronese's sphere—*The Feast in the House of Levi*, the suppliant family of Darius, the decoration of the Ducal Palace, and that noble monument to himself, the Church of S. Sebastiano. In Tintoret we find a note not audible elsewhere among the Masters of the Venetian School. He paints the splendours of Venice in a spirit very slightly less mundane than Veronese, but again and again we are startled by a touch of tragic pathos, that, like "the rumble of a distant drum," breaks through the joyous, pleasure-loving philosophy of his companions, and threatens to lay bare the deeper problems of life and of humanity. Dramatically tragic is the forest of spears against the evening sky in the *Crucifixion* at S. Cassiano; passionately tragic the beautiful devil —starving in the desert—crying "make these stones bread" to a compassionate Christ who cannot; tenderly tragic the stricken Madonna at the foot of the Cross, and the head of the beloved St. John, thrown back in a storm of grief, to gaze at his crucified Master; solemnly tragic the ghostly, lonely, white figure of Christ before the judgment-seat of Pilate. Tintoret is a poet as well as a painter. When he lifts the veil in these moments of tragic pathos, he has left the Renaissance behind, and is holding out hands to the modern world.

V. Private Life.

Ce peuple est une famille was the remark of an acute observer upon the general aspect of life in Venice; and he was right.

The feudal system had never touched the Republic, and absolute as the rule of the oligarchy was, no sharp distinctions of caste divided the State. The aristocracy and the people, the rulers and the ruled, did not face each other from two hostile camps, ready to fly at each other's throats and to tear the community to pieces in the struggle for mastery. Patrician, citizen and artisan felt themselves at one in the possession of Venice; the great civic functions brought them all out together for a common enjoyment of the show. The patrician, it is true, monopolized, on the whole, the provinces of commerce, arms, politics, but life was not confined or stinted for either citizens or people. Below the patriciate came a kind of aristocracy for the people, the Venetian "citizenship." Admission to it was granted by the Government, and conveyed the right to enter the Ducal Chancery, whence a man might rise to be Secretary to the Ten, diplomatic agent at some minor court, or even Grand Chancellor of the Republic, an office of great dignity, entrusted with all secretarial arrangements and custodian of the State archives. Apart from this career in the Chancery, most Venetians were enrolled as members of some religious confraternity or of some trade guild. The guild life offered a large field for activity, and prevented the citizen from feeling that he was absolutely excluded from all share in the vitality of the State. The people again were employed in arts and crafts and small trading, also enrolled in guilds down to the very sausage-makers and dock-labourers. There was little patent poverty, for public, and more especially private, charity was abundant. The census of 1582 gave only one hundred and eighty-six professional beggars in the whole city.

The population from top to bottom was pleasure-loving and luxurious. The Government, made public efforts to regulate private luxury, and sumptuary laws dealing with food, dress, jewellery, adornment of gondolas, follow one another in a rapid succession that proves their inefficiency. Married women were forbidden to wear pearls after ten years of married life. The number and value of pearls that might

be worn on the person were prescribed. But the Venetian proverb, "*legge Veneziana dura 'na settimana*," records the impossibility of regulating a taste that was shared by the whole population.

The luxury of Venetian houses impressed all strangers. The Frate Felix Faber, travelling in 1480, declares that the splendours of Venetian houses "shock the Turks and other infidels, who argue from this that Christians care nothing about and hope less from the future life." Casola, who saw Venice a little earlier, describes the bedroom of a lady of the Dolfin family. The room was small, but he thinks it must have taken upwards of two thousand ducats to furnish it. The fire-place was of polished Carrara marble, delicately carved in figures and flowers. The ceiling was wrought in gold and ultramarine. He will not describe the bedside hangings, for he fears his readers would not believe him.

For sport the nobles had their duck-shooting in the lagoons. The Doge, in particular, owned large preserves in the eastern waters, and it was the custom to invite ambassadors and other distinguished personages for a few days' sport; there was bull and bear-baiting in the Piazza; regattas for the people, and those curious human pyramids, called the *forze d'Ercole*, to the building of which one quarter of the town would challenge another; sham fights on one or other of the bridges over the small canals ended sometimes in a serious brawl between the popular factions of the *Nicolotti* and *Castellani*. But the great delight of noble and of commoner alike was the public spectacles, the great State ceremonies, whether annual like the festival of Ascension Day and the procession of the Corpus Domini, or occasional as upon the reception of some distinguished visitors. Foreign testimony to the splendour of Venice is abundant. Petrarch has left us a description of a tourney in the Piazza about the middle of the fourteenth century. "The crowd," he says, "was immense. Not an inch unoccupied, and yet no confusion, no tumult, no ill-humour. The sports were held in that Square to which the world cannot show a match. The Doge and his suite

viewed the spectacle from the platform in front of the church, where stand the four bronze horses, and to shield him from the sun, a rich and many-coloured awning was spread above us. I was there myself upon the Doge's right. The Piazza, the church front, the tower, the roofs, the porticoes and windows presented a living wall of people. At one side of the basilica was a magnificent pavilion for the Venetian ladies who, to the number of four hundred, lent splendour to the scene. Some cousins to the King of England were present, and the strangers were amazed at the sight of so much magnificence." The note of admiration for her splendour is expressed by all who visited Venice during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. She laid herself out to attract and to dazzle. The aristocratic club of the "Calza" or "Hose" was formed expressly for this purpose. It was composed of the younger nobility, and took a leading part in every kind of function public or private. The costume was becoming; tight, parti-coloured hose, embroidered with devices of bird or beast, a doublet of velvet with slashed sleeves, a shirt of finest embroidered linen, a cloak of silk with the emblem of the club embroidered on its lining, a black or red velvet cap with a jewel or medallion brooch and jewelled shoes, made up the bright attire of these young bloods, whose portraits are faithfully produced in Gentile Bellini's *Corpus Domini*.

Most splendid perhaps of all the splendid spectacles of Venice was the reception of Henry III. of France in 1574. That he might make his entry by the main water-door of Venice, the Piazzetta, he was lodged at Murano on the night of July 17th. A guard of honour, sixty halberdiers in *azure* and *or*, the colours of France, did duty outside. Inside forty young nobles of the *Calza* waited upon the King. Next morning, which was Sunday, after Mass, Henry and his suite embarked on a galley manned by four hundred rowers in *azure* and *or*. Fourteen galleys and an endless train of smaller boats adorned with oriental carpets, tapestry and silks, and above all the barges of the various guilds, with trophies of their several arts and crafts, formed an escort.

In splendid procession, a blaze of colour on the lagoon, they swept from Murano to the Lido where Palladio had raised a triumphal arch and Veronese and Tintoretto had painted it. The *cortège* then moved from the Lido to the Molo, and thence up the Grand Canal to the Palazzo Foscari, where his Majesty was lodged. Serenades, regattas, banquets, comedies, allegorical processions, sham fights, followed one another in profusion during the royal visit, and Henry was sped on his way to Padua by the Brenta with a memory of Venice he was unable to forget.

But while the city in the lagoon justified her claim to be the "revel of the earth, the masque of Italy," she was also earning that more sinister title "Gehenna of the Waters." Corruption was rife. The Council of Ten were called upon again and again to punish the licence of the young nobles to whom not even the nunneries were sacred. Bands of *bravi*, in the pay of the greater nobles, were a terror to the people, whose persons, homes, and families were constantly exposed to acts of rapine and of violence. The police were impotent to cope with the mischief in a city of such complicated alleys as Venice. The culprit often escaped and went to swell that array of *banditti* who haunted the borders of the Venetian territory, waiting till some service as a spy or an assassin would give a comrade the opportunity to purchase their return as his reward. The dark side of the picture is revealed by the archives of the Ten, and the criminal courts. But to Europe, to the outside world, the splendour of Venice was summed up in the enthusiastic eulogy of Philippe de Comines (1494): "The Grand Canal is the most beautiful street in the world, and lined by the finest houses. They are large and tall and made of solid stone. The older ones are all painted, and those built in the last hundred years are faced in white marble that they bring from Istria, a hundred miles away, and have large slabs of porphyry and serpentine upon their fronts. It is the most triumphant city I have ever seen. Here the highest honours are paid to ambassadors and strangers; here is the best of

governments, here the service of God is most solemnly celebrated." To all of which Frate Faber had already borne confirming testimony in 1459. "Never was city more beautiful," he says, "or more precious among all the cities in Christendom or out of it, than this city of Venice. Never have I seen anything more strange or marvellous, and never in any place have I sojourned so long a time."

The splendour of the Republic has long passed away. We read of her achievements as in a dream, and strain the imaginative vision to reconstruct her public and her private life; but her art still lives both in architecture and painting, and through it she is still a vital factor in the history of the world.

CHAPTER IV

THE DECLINE

I. The Causes.

Rome was not built in a day, nor did Venice succumb in a century. The process of construction had been slow, the process of decline was gradual. Moreover, if in the regions of commerce and arms the first symptoms of retrogression are already discernible at the opening of the sixteenth century, the outward pomp and splendour of the Republic combined to dazzle Europe and deceive its own citizens for many a year to come.

Broadly speaking, the causes of the decline may be considered under two aspects, internal and external, which were interdependent to a large degree. A certain rigidity or conservatism characterized the Venetian Government, and was either caused by or caused a corresponding lack of elasticity in the Venetian temperament which prevented the State and the people from adapting themselves to altered circumstances. When commerce began to decline the Government could hit upon no device for restoring it save to insist upon existing methods, aims and regulations. When the great trade-route was thrown from the Mediterranean into the Atlantic by the discovery of the passage round the Cape, Venice made no serious effort to meet the new conditions. The decline in her trade led her nobles to abandon commerce, and in 1535 a Venetian observer remarks: "*Non si dà più a negotiar in la città, ne alla navigation, ne ad altra laudevole industria.*" The accumulation of wealth gradually fell off, the spending of wealth began. Banking, as we have already seen, proved

disastrous; a change came over the temper of the aristocracy; splendour and pleasure became absorbing pursuits; great landed estates on *terra-ferma* and sumptuous houses in Venice occupied the leisure and exhausted the purses of the Venetian nobility. The expansion of commerce made the State; the decline of commerce proved fatal to it. And that decline was intimately connected with three dominating external events, the fall of Constantinople in 1453, the discovery of the Cape-route in 1486, and the advent of the European Powers in 1495.

(*a*) ***The Fall of Constantinople.*** With a feeble Christian Power in Constantinople, Venice, after crushing Genoa, had no rival in the Levant trade. But with an aggressive and expanding infidel seated on the Bosphorus her position entirely changed. She owned possessions, islands in the Levant, and factories in Asia Minor, that the Turk coveted. If she made terms with the Mussulmans and traded with them, Europe accused her of treachery to Christendom; if she fought them she was left alone to exhaust her treasury in the struggle. She was exposed to a suspicion chronic in Christian and Mussulman alike.

(*b*) ***The Discovery of the Cape-route.*** But a still more fatal blow was dealt at the very source of Venetian vitality by the discovery of the passage round the Cape of Good Hope. The shrewder heads in Venice recognized the danger at once, and Priuli notes in his Diary: "On receipt of the news (of Diaz's voyage) the whole city was distressed and astounded, and the wisest take it to be the worst tidings we have ever had; for it is well known that Venice reached the height of her glory and riches through commerce alone, and now by this new route the spice cargoes will be taken straight to Lisbon, whither Germans, Flemish, French will flock to buy them. They will find the goods cheaper in Lisbon than they can be in Venice; for before the freights reach Venice by the old route, they have to pay exorbitant dues for transit through Syria and the lands of the Soldan of Egypt." That puts

the fact in a nutshell. The discovery of the Cape-route saved the breaking of bulk between India and Europe, and saved the dues exacted by the Moslem masters of Syria and Egypt. The world's trade-route was shifted from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, and passed into the hands of the Portuguese, Dutch and English. Venice lost her monopoly of the Oriental traffic.

The Republic never made a serious effort to remedy the mischief to which she was fully alive. Probably she could not have helped herself. Had she attempted to share in the Atlantic trade she would have found herself taxed by Spain at Gibraltar, she would have offended the Soldan of Egypt by a brusque abandonment of the overland Syrian route, and she would have been obliged to change the traditions of her shipbuilding, for Mediterranean galleys were quite unsuited to Atlantic waves. Moreover, even had she succeeded in tapping the Atlantic trade and bringing it once more inside the Mediterranean to Venice, she would have found that the Dutch, Flemish and German merchants preferred to buy in Portugal, and so to avoid the dangers of the Alpine passes and the blackmail of Rhenish barons. In fact the discovery of the Cape-route destroyed for Venice the value of her geographical position upon which, in the long run, her whole career was built. The opening of the Suez Canal has already done much to restore to her that advantage. The Republic itself was alive to this point, for we find her instructing her Ambassador at Constantinople to urge upon the Sultan the opening of a canal from the Nile to the Red Sea, but in vain. Venice lost her Eastern trade, her commerce declined, and with it went her life.

(*c*) ***The Advent of Foreign Powers.*** The advent of the great European Powers, France, Spain, the Empire, equally contributed to the decline of the Republic. There were French and Spanish claims on Naples; Orleans claims on the Duchy of Milan; shadowy Imperial claims to grant investiture to Italian Princes. We have seen that the Orleans claim on Milan became active by the death of the

last Visconti. The claim of the French Crown on Naples and the Orleans claim on Milan were united in the person of Louis XII. Jean Lascaris, Louis' Ambassador at Venice in 1507, warned the Republic of its danger from Imperial claims, *sachans quel droyt ledit roi des Romains se dit avoir sur touties vous (vos) villes de la Lombardie.*" Italian Princes, in their rivalry, thought to use these various claims to further their own ends, and invited the foreigner to intervene. He did, with the result that the whole balance of Italian politics was upset. Neither Florence, Milan nor Venice, divided as they were, could cope with France or Spain in the field, nor guide, in the Cabinet, their policies which were governed by European not by Italian considerations. The result was fatal to Milan, and all but fatal to Venice. She retained her independence, it is true, but she was crippled.

Broadly speaking the decline of Venice may be traced to the shifting of two great centres of gravity, the commercial centre by the discovery of the Cape-route, the political centre by the advent of the foreigner.

II. The Events of the Decline.

(*a*) ***The Second Turkish War and the League of Cambray.*** In the preceding chapter we have seen that Venice had reached her fullest mainland expansion by the close of the fifteenth century. In the war of Ferrara she had come into collision with the Pope, had been really worsted, though she retained Rovigo and the Polesine by the peace of Bagnolo (1484), and above all she had adopted the fatal policy of appealing to the ultramontane Powers when she invited the French to make good their claims on Milan and on Naples in order to divert the attention of her two enemies Sforza and the King of Naples. It was a fatal policy which other Italian Princes had adopted before, however, and it eventually led up to the League of Cambray by which Venice was irretrievably crippled as a land Power.

Italian politics at this period present a bewildering morass of league and counter-league. The imminent descent of the foreign Powers led each Italian State to attempt, by diplomacy, some extension for itself or to prevent the expansion of a neighbour. The idea of a descent on Italy, proposed by an Italian, took root and ripened at the French Court until Charles VIII. finally made up his mind to conquer Naples. He found a warm supporter in Lodovico Sforza. Sforza had usurped the Duchy of Milan from his nephew, Gian Galeazzo, who was married to a daughter of Alfonzo of Naples, and feared that Alfonzo would attack him in order to restore his daughter and her husband. Charles came; met no opposition to speak of, marched through Italy, and conquered Naples. But this unexpected success alarmed all Italian Princes, and roused the jealousy of Spain and the Emperor. Milan and Venice entered an alliance with Spain and the Emperor to crush Charles. The actual work fell to the two Italian States. They attacked Charles at Fornovo (1495) on his way back to France, and though they won a victory the King himself escaped.

But the main result of the French descent was this. It brought a foreign Sovereign actively into the sphere of Italian politics, it roused the jealousy and cupidity of other foreign Sovereigns, the King of Spain and the Emperor. Italy now became the field for their rivalries. Statesmen who had thought to use the foreigner now found themselves pawns in the hands of more powerful ultramontane Monarchs; Italian States were absorbed in the clash of the larger European nationalities. Italian Princes found themselves reduced to the construction of feeble alliances liable to be destroyed by mutual jealousy the moment external pressure was removed.

Venice, by the creation of her land empire, was caught in the turmoil of Italian politics, which were governed now by events extraneous to Italy itself. In 1498, Charles VIII. died, and the accession of Louis XII. altered the whole aspect of affairs. Louis combined in his own person the claim of the French Crown to Naples and Genoa, and the

Orleans claim to the Duchy of Milan. Both Sforza and Venice appreciated the new situation. Sforza surmised an attack on his duchy, and Venice thought she saw an opportunity of extending her Lombard dominions at the expense of that duchy. Sforza proposed a defensive alliance, but he found that the Republic had already taken her line. She was still ambitious; still anxious to expand. She promised to assist Louis in his attack on Milan in return for Cremona and its district. That was a policy treacherous to Italy and fatal to herself, for it convinced every Italian Prince that the Republic was animated by that very "insatiable greed" which was pleaded in justification of the League of Cambray. Treacherously deserted as he considered himself to be, Sforza replied with similar weapons. He urged the Turk to attack Venice.

But the incentives of Sforza were not necessary. The Sultan Bajazet II. had already assumed an aggressive attitude. The Venetian Envoy, sent on a special mission to Constantinople, judged war to be inevitable. Antonio Grimani was appointed to the command of the fleet, but, on asking for precise instructions as to whether he should give battle or not if he fell in with the Turk, the Senate returned no decisive answer. The Republic dreaded the encounter. Its treasury was exhausted, and it had recourse to special taxation of the mainland, a step it was always loath to take, and raised about 54,000 ducats; moreover the political situation in Italy and Europe was so complicated that a war with the Turk seemed more perilous than ever.

The hostile fleets met in the waters of Sapienza at the south-west point of the Morea, a place already ominous in Venetian history as the scene of the great Genoese victory. Several days were spent in manœuvres and engagements. The final encounter took place on August 25, 1499. The result was a crushing defeat for Venice. Malipiero, who was present, blames the dispositions of the commander, and the disobedience of some of the crews; "had the others remained," he writes, "we should have had the Turkish

fleet in our power, as sure as God is God. Our French allies seeing this want of discipline, refused on their side to attack. They say our fleet is all very well to look at, but had not a chance of doing good service. All brave men in the fleet, and they are many, are weeping and calling the commander a traitor, because he had not the pluck to do his duty." On receipt of the news at Venice, Grimani was superseded and recalled in irons. He was tried, condemned and banished, but lived to be elected Doge in 1521.

To crown the misfortunes of the Republic came the tidings that the Turks were in Friuli. The local militia refused to take the field against them, nor did the mercenary troops show greater courage. Venice was forced to sue for peace in humiliating terms. For answer she received the brutal truth flung at her Envoy by the Grand Vizier. "You can tell the Doge," said the Turk, "that he has done wedding the sea. It is our turn now." The Venetian Envoy, returned to Venice, *re infectâ*, and the straits in which the Republic then found itself and the terrors that loomed ahead are recorded sadly but justly by the diarist Priuli. "The City is in dire calamity for fear of losing her maritime possessions, the source of Venetian honour and wealth. Her fame and her glory are bound up with the sea, nor is there any doubt that if trade and maritime possession fail the Venetians their reputation and their glory will dwindle away in a very few years." That was the truth of the situation. The better heads in Venice cherished no illusions. Europe would give the Republic no help, nay, some European Powers were secretly urging the Turk to further hostility; clouds were gathering on the mainland of Italy, and in 1503 she made peace with the Sultan.

After each brush with the Turk, the Republic, unsupported by Europe, suffered in loss of prestige. By the treaty of 1503, her position in the Morea was greatly weakened. Modon and Coron were lost, and Venice was warned to prepare for an attack on Cyprus or on Corfu. Yet never had the Republic been in greater need of peace at sea, a full

treasury and concentration of her resources to meet the storm that was brewing on the mainland. But her action throughout this difficult period was calculated to confirm the impression of her "insatiable greed," and to mass against her all the Italian Powers who were jealous of her grandeur, and the European Powers who coveted her possessions. By the help of the French and by an act of treachery to Italy she had come into possession of Cremona, and now she had no sooner signed a peace with the Turk than she took a step which confirmed the worst suspicions against her and precipitated the crisis.

Cesare Borgia, son of Pope Alexander VI., was endeavouring to build up a strong central Italian State. He called it recovering the States of the Church. The corner-stone of his edifice were the life of his father, the Pope, and the support of d'Amboise, the Minister of Louis of France, for whom he was to secure the Tiara when vacant. Cesare's success was remarkable. He held Urbino, Rimini, Forli, Imola, Faenza, Cesena, the whole Romagna in fact, and Venice watched his progress with suspicion. But suddenly the Pope died. Cesare was unable to control the conclave. D'Amboise was not elected Pope. The Borgia visions vanished into air. After the brief reign of Pius III., a masterful Pope, Julius II., ascended the throne and declared that, cost what it might, he would take and hold all that to the Church belonged, including of course what Cesare had professed to win back for the Church.

But the collapse of the Borgia designs, the dismemberment of his territory, and the insignificant reign of Pius III., had stirred the cupidity of Venice. By a rapid stroke she induced the leading cities of the Romagna to place themselves under her protection. The Duke of Urbino followed suit. Pope Pius protested, but feebly, and before negotiations could go far he died. In the interval between his death and the election of a new Pope, Venice pressed forward with feverish haste to secure Rimini and Imola. To the cooler heads her action seemed dangerous. "It would have been better," notes Priuli, "had they not snatched at every fly in the air

Ambition and cupidity blinded them. On the death of the Pope the Republic desired to make itself Lord of all the Romagna without considering what might happen."

Once again Priuli showed his statesmanlike quality; for the new Pope was the fighting Julius, pledged to recover for the Church what to the Church belonged—including Romagna—and therefore to make the Republic "consider," when too late, "what might happen." Venice endeavoured to persuade the Pope that she had no other desire in occupying the Romagna than to crush a cruel tyrant, Cesare Borgia, and declared that she herself would be a quieter and better-paying vassal. The Pope replied to the Venetian Envoy: "My Lord Ambassador, you give us good words and your Government evil deeds." This was followed by a Bull (1504) demanding restitution, to which the Republic replied by an emphatic refusal, and a rupture became inevitable. The Pope himself had declared to the Venetian Ambassador that he had neither money nor men wherewith to fight the Republic, but he threatened to appeal to the Sovereigns of Europe. Events were preparing allies for his Holiness.

By the secret treaty of Blois (September 22, 1504) Maximilian and Louis had come to an understanding. Louis was invested in the Duchy of Milan, and agreed to join Maximilian in an attack on Venice. Among the adherents named by the King of France was not his ally Venice but the Pope. It was impossible, however, that the rivalry of the Emperor and the King should not lead to a collision. Maximilian was really desirous of expelling the French from the Duchy of Milan. With that object in view he endeavoured (1507) to win the Republic to his side. He wanted command of the passes. Venice replied that she could do nothing hostile to her ally France, but promised neutrality, and declared that a neutral policy would prevent her from opening the passes to Maximilian if he came armed. The Emperor gave the Republic a month to reconsider its answer, and threatened, if it persisted in refusal, to join with France in partitioning its dominions. The Pope had already

made overtures to the Emperor, promising assistance on condition that Faenza and Rimini were restored to him.

On March 1, 1508, the Doge finally informed the Imperial Ambassador that the Republic, in virtue of her treaties, could not grant passage to the Imperial forces. Maximilian attacked the Republic in Friuli, Cadore and the Trentino, without success, and in June 1508 a truce was patched up. But the Pope was still outside Faenza and Rimini; and this cessation of hostilities did not suit his purpose. By the close of the year the Cardinal d'Amboise for the King of France, and Margaret of Austria for the Emperor, met at Cambray. They were armed with full powers and resolved to meet alone without the presence of either the Spanish Ambassador or the Papal Nuncio—whose views and wishes were, however, well known. After many stormy interviews during which the Cardinal and the Princess, as she herself reports, all but tore each other's hair, on December 10 they came to an agreement. A European league was formed for the purpose of "putting a stop to losses, injuries, rapine and damage which Venice had inflicted not merely on the Holy See but also on the holy Roman Empire, the House of Austria, the Duchy of Milan, the King of Naples and other Princes, seizing and tyrannically occupying their territories, cities and castles as though she was conspiring to the common ill; therefore we find that it is not merely useful and honourable but even necessary to summon all to a joint revenge in order to extinguish the universal conflagration caused by the insatiable cupidity of the Venetians and their thirst for dominion." So ran the preamble of the League of Cambray. Venice had sown the wind by her reckless extension on the mainland, by "snatching at every fly in the air"; the whirlwind was now upon her.

The preliminaries agreed upon, it remained for the contracting parties to divide the spoil. The Pope was to receive Ravenna, Faenza, Rimini, and the rest of the Romagna; the Emperor, Istria, Friuli, Treviso, Padua, Vicenza, Verona; the French, Brescia, Bergamo, Crema

and Cremona; the King of Spain, the sea-coast towns in Apulia; the King of Hungary, Dalmatia; the Duke of Savoy, Cyprus. Venice in short was to be reduced once more to the circumference of the lagoons. The Pope pledged himself to employ the spiritual armoury, and each member of the League undertook to secure for himself the share assigned him; and herein lay the salvation of Venice.

The Republic was not unprepared for the combination against her. From time to time her ambassadors had warned her that something of this nature was in preparation. The situation, however, was of extreme gravity. Without a single ally, her treasury exhausted by the Turkish War, she did not, therefore, lose heart. By February of 1509 she placed a considerable army in the field, while still endeavouring to conciliate the Pope and to seduce the Emperor by pointing to French ambition and offering assistance against it. But in vain. The Doge, Leonardo Loredan, summoned the Great Council and laid the situation before it. The cause of the attack, he said, was jealousy and nothing more. Every one was against them, they had only themselves to look to. He would himself set the example by sending all his plate to the Mint; and he did.

The attack began. On April 27, 1509, the Bull of Excommunication was launched. The Republic forbade its publication. No one was permitted to receive it; the police were ordered to pull it down wherever affixed; Doctors in Canon Law were appointed to advise the Government, which appealed to "a future Council," and succeeded in fixing its appeal to the doors of St. Peter's in Rome. The French also played their part. By May 14 the Venetian troops under Pitigliano and d'Alviano met the French forces in the Milanese at Agnadello on the Adda, and were utterly defeated. The results of the battle were disastrous. Bergamo and Brescia capitulated to the enemy. No one knew how long Verona, Vicenza, Padua would remain faithful. It was deemed necessary to prepare for the siege of

Venice itself; great supplies of corn were bought and water-mills set up.

Meantime the Imperial troops descended on Italy by the valley of the Adige to secure their share of the spoil assigned to the Emperor by the treaty of Cambray. Verona and Vicenza passed into their hands; so too Padua. Treviso still held for the Republic. But the Emperor himself delayed his arrival. The Imperial troops committed atrocities in the capitulated cities. A reaction set in. Padua returned to her allegiance. Maximilian arrived and was twice repulsed in attempts on the city, and finally in October he was compelled to abandon the effort to make good his claim on Padua.

The tide turned once more in favour of Venice. The Pope, having recovered Rimini, Faenza and the Romagna, had secured the objects for which he joined the League of Cambray. Moreover, as an Italian Prince, he desired neither the presence of the foreigner, nor the annihilation of Venice, which would upset the whole balance of Italian politics. Venice had still something to offer him, the settlement of all the outstanding questions as to the relations of Church and State, the nomination of bishops, taxation of clergy, mortmain, the trial of criminous clerks, the appeal to a future Council. By a surrender all along the line the Republic detached the Pope from the League and made formal submission in Rome on February 24, 1510. But the Council of Ten in dealing with ecclesiastics employed an ecclesiastical weapon; they entered a secret protest declaring these concessions null and void as being extorted under necessity, and to this protest they appealed later on in their famous controversy with Pope Paul V.

The imminent danger was past, but the recovery was slow and never complete. Gradually, captured cities, Vicenza, Verona, Bergamo, Brescia, weary of their foreign masters, returned to the Ensign of St. Mark, but not till they had suffered atrocities such as the smoke-caves of Vicenza in 1510, or the sack of Brescia in 1512. This return of the mainland cities, all of which were claimed either by the

French or by the Emperor in virtue of the treaty of Cambray, exposed the Republic to constant attacks from one party or the other. The weakness of the Republic is shown by the manner in which she was forced to side first with one and then with the other of the rival Sovereigns struggling for the supremacy in North Italy. The Republic believed that she had less to fear from France than from Spain and Austria, and her tendency was to alliance with the French. The death of Gaston de Foix in 1512, and the battle of Novara in 1513, induced the French to leave Italy, and the Spanish troops under Cardona menaced the Republic as the ally of France and pushed down to the very verge of the lagoon, but found the city of Venice impregnable.

The Republic was no more fortunate in the long struggles between Francis I. and Charles V., and by 1523, seeing that French arms were not prosperous and that Francis delayed to appear in person, Venice came to terms with Charles, who was the real arbiter of Italy. By these terms she was to hold her mainland possessions up to the Adda, on payment of a fine, and the Pope and the King of England were to be sureties for the observation of the treaty.

The settlement of the peninsula in 1529 by the peace of Cambray and Charles' coronation at Bologna in 1530 mark the opening of a new era in the history of Italy and of Venice. For the future the centre of political gravity lies outside Italy. The foreign names of the treaties and conventions—Blois, Cambray, Noyon, Brussels, Cognac, Madrid—which governed the opening years of the sixteenth century, prove how complete the change had been. For the future the Pope and Spain were the dominant powers in Italy, with France waiting to take an advantage. In face of the combination of Spain and Rome the whole aspect of Venetian history was altered. The Republic henceforth lived in a perpetual dread of losing her independence. She suspected everywhere, in the City no less than on her frontiers, Spanish gold and Spanish conspiracies. She retained her independence it is true, thanks to a double accident, the impregnability of the

lagoons and the mutual jealousy of conflicting powers, but she had come so near losing it that she trembled for it ever after. We are in the presence of a new Venice. A dwindling treasury and shrinking commerce left her too weak to face either France or Spain in arms. Her whole efforts were now directed to the preservation of her freedom by diplomacy, by the subtle balancing of rival Sovereigns. It is the epoch of the ambassadors, of the growing power of the Ten and its political sub-committee, the Council of Three.

Venice was under no delusion as to the true result of the League of Cambray. She had preserved her independence, but her own orators in the Senate told her frankly that she was helpless between the anvil and the hammer; that she had no money; that the war had cost her, between troops and subsidies to shifting allies, upwards of three million two hundred thousand ducats. The Doge himself had declared that the public treasury could not support the burden; that Spain made no more of the patriciate than of "two thousand five hundred flies." He appealed to private generosity and cited patriotic examples in the past. But he made no offer himself, and the appeal remained unanswered. Sanudo, the diarist, bursts out, "and I must add what pains me to record, when the Grand-Chancellor called for volunteers or subscriptions for Padua and Treviso not a man moved; a fact of great moment and of evil omen for our State." Everything points to the conclusion that during the crisis of the League of Cambray Venice ceased to be a first-class Power in Europe.

(*b*) ***Later Turkish Wars and the Loss of Cyprus.*** Although after the League of Cambray Venice ceased to be a first-rate Power, her possessions in the Levant still brought her into continual collision with the Turk. Europe, while lauding the Republic as the "bulwark of Christendom," left her alone, as usual, to carry on the struggle single-handed, and never at any time in her career are the annals of the Republic adorned with more illustrious names, Bragadin, Venier, Lazzaro Mocenigo, Francesco Morosini. As the prestige of Venice

declines, the prowess of individual Venetians becomes more conspicuous.

The second Turkish War closed, as we have seen, in a treaty which deprived Venice of Coron and Modon in the Morea and left her sensibly weaker. Throughout her relations with the Turk it was impossible for Venice to avoid a war if the Sultan desired it. Venetian possessions scattered about the Levant were always open to attack, Venetian shipping was exposed to Turkish piracy, measures of defence could always be declared a *casus belli*. Petrarch's description of the relations between Venice and Genoa very fitly portrays the situation between Venice and the Turk—"latens bellum defuisse nunquam puto." Her political position too was extremely difficult. If she preserved peace with the Turk, Europe, in alarm at Turkish progress, proposed alliances in which the Republic was invited to join; these mere invitations were sufficient to rouse the suspicion of the Sultans; if she refused them Europe accused her of treachery to Christendom.

In November 1533 an event took place which went far to precipitate the next Turkish War. The Venetian Admiral Canal was in the waters of Crete when, one evening, a fleet of twelve sail was reported making for Candia. Canal professed to take them for pirates and rowed out to meet them. It was a fine moonlight night. The Venetians—mostly Dalmatian seamen—attacked with *élan*. Greek fire caught the shrouds and sails of the Turkish squadron. Their commander threw himself into the sea but was captured; his galley and four others were taken, and the crews put to the sword. Venice, though vaunting her victory, sent most humble excuses to the Sultan Suleiman, while the death of Canal pacified the Caliph for a time and relieved the Republic of a grave dilemma.

In 1535, Charles V. made his famous expedition to Tunis and defeated the Turkish commander, Chaireddin Barbarossa. Suleiman recognized that he had now to deal with a great power, and when Francis I. urged him to attack the Empire

in Hungary, he lent a ready ear, and in 1536 he sent an envoy to invite Venice to join the enterprise. Venice refused. The Sultan imposed a tax on Venetian merchandise in Syria, put a large fleet on the sea and threatened Corfu.

Thus the third Turkish War began, and as usual Venice was left alone. The Turks besieged Corfu, but were forced to raise the siege, though Venice lost Scyros, Patmos, Ægina and Paros. The Republic made every effort to bring about a European combination against the Turk, and in the hope of success, she rejected overtures of peace. In 1538 an alliance between the Emperor, the Pope, and Venice was signed in Rome. The allies designed an army, on paper, and partitioned the Turkish dominions; the Emperor was to receive Constantinople, Venice, all that she had ever held in the Levant. But though Venice undertook serious preparations for war, her allies were of no assistance to her, and the French Ambassador suggested that the Emperor was merely pushing Venice into a ruinous struggle with the Turk in order to weaken and then absorb her, and he went so far as to recommend the Republic to come to terms with Suleiman.

Meantime the Turkish fleet was out and threatening Crete. When the Venetians were at last joined by a certain number of their allies, Doria, with counsel of prudence, merely hampered the Venetian commander, Capello, and the campaign closed abortively.

It was impossible for the Republic to support the continual drain on her finance. A campaign without results was almost equivalent to the dead loss of the fleet; the long inaction in winter quarters and the revictualling and refitting of the fleet for the next campaign came near to doubling the initial expense. A consideration of the state of their finances and the conviction that little trust could be placed in their allies forced Venice to open negotiations for peace. The Turks were known to be favourably inclined, and the French Ambassador offered his services in pursuit of the French policy to detach Venice from the Emperor. The Senate instructed their Ambassador at Constantinople to come to

terms, but to hold out on the question of Nauplia and Malvasia, which were to be ransomed, but on no account surrendered. The Ten, however, sent secret orders that if peace could be secured on no other terms Nauplia and Malvasia must go. A secretary of the Ten betrayed these instructions to the French Ambassador, who informed the Porte. When the Venetian Envoy came to treat he found the Pashas resolute. In 1540 peace was concluded on the terms demanded by the Turk. Nauplia and Malvasia were surrendered and Venetian prestige was still further crippled in the Levant.

It was certain, however, that Turkish arms would not stop short of complete supremacy in the eastern Mediterranean. Sultan Suleiman died in 1566 and was succeeded by Selim, surnamed the Drunkard. The new monarch was flattered into schemes of aggrandizement. Cyprus was suggested as a field for conquest and its famous vintages were extolled. In 1570 the Sultan sent an Envoy to Venice to demand the cession of the island. The Republic prepared for war and made the usual appeal to the Sovereigns of Europe. Philip of Spain promised fifty galleys, and for these the Venetian commander, Zane, determined to wait at Zara. A fatal step; for discipline was relaxed and the first flush of enthusiasm lost in the idleness of the Dalmatian port; while the Turk effected a landing and established a footing in the threatened island. Zane moved on to Corfu and there found the Papal forces commanded by Marc' Antonio Colonna and the Spanish under Doria who, however, declared that he had no orders to co-operate with the Venetians. By the 1st of September forty-nine Spanish and twelve Papal galleys had reached Corfu. But the season was held to be too far advanced for further operations. By this time, however, the Turks were masters of Cyprus, and the Venetian garrisons were shut up in Nicosia and Famagosta. Both towns offered an heroic resistance. But Nicosia fell. Most of its inhabitants were slain. Two thousand slaves and the richest of the plunder were put on board ship

to be sent to Constantinople; but one of the women-slaves, seizing a torch, fired the powder-magazine and blew her own and two other ships into the air. The head of the governor, Dandolo, was sent to Famagosta as a warning to Marc' Antonio Bragadin, who still held out in that city. Bragadin was buoyed up by hope that the allied fleet might still arrive in time to save him and his gallant garrison. But the fleet lay useless at Crete. Its commanders—no one opinion was supreme—discussed and disputed over plans of campaign. Doria urged caution, Palavicino wished to leave Cyprus and create a diversion by attacking the Dardanelles, Zane insisted on advancing to Cyprus and was supported by Colonna. News came that Nicosia had fallen. Zane redoubled his prayers. Doria refused to move. Violent words ensued and Doria sailed away westward. Zane was recalled to Venice to defend his conduct and Sebastian Veneir took the Venetian command. Meantime the Republic had succeeded in creating a new league between the Pope, Spain and Venice. The outline of a large force was sketched on paper, and the chief command was designed for Don John of Austria (1571). But whatever might have been its value, and the events that follow the battle of Lepanto prove how slight that really was, the League came too late to save Cyprus. Famagosta held out with admirable courage; men, women, children, priests, the Bishop of Limasol, all contributed to the defence. The breaches made by the Turkish cannon were stopped by sacks and gabions filled with earth, loop-holed for musketry. The Turkish commander himself reported that the town seemed defended not by men but by giants. Assault after assault was repulsed, and finally the Turks offered honourable terms which were accepted on August 2, 1571. The citizens were to embark on vessels supplied by the Turk, and the operation began, but suddenly Mustapha, the Turkish general, asked for security for the ships; Bragadin replied that he had none to give but the public honour. The answer threw Mustapha into a violent passion feigned or real; a scene of slaughter followed; only the heroic Bragadin was

spared for a yet crueller death. Eleven days later he was flayed alive in the Square of Famagosta. Cyprus was lost to Venice after a possession of ninety years. The Republic, too weak in herself to undertake its defence alone, was hopelessly hampered by allies who considered their own interests only and were less than half-hearted in hers.

Famagosta fell on August 2, and yet by the end of that month a very powerful fleet of upwards of two hundred and thirty sail was lying at Messina under the command of Don John, Sebastian Venier, and Marc' Antonio Colonna. The Venetians—incapable of acting alone—had been drawn away from the seat of war by their Imperial and Papal allies. The allies sailed to Corfu and there, after long debate, resolved to seek and engage the Turk. The Ottoman fleet was known to be lying off Lepanto. On a fine October morning they met. The Turkish admiral miscalculated the numbers and misunderstood the tactics of the Christian fleet. He engaged rashly, and his galley was captured and himself slain. The Turkish fleet was thrown into confusion, and after five hours' fighting the victory was complete in the centre and on both wings. Turkish losses have been variously reckoned, and have been put at 30,000 men, including many of the captains. One hundred and seventeen galleys fell into the hands of the allies along with 5000 prisoners. It was the greatest blow the Ottomans had ever received; the flower of their fleet was destroyed.

The news reached Venice in ten days' time, and coming on the top of the dolorous tidings of the loss of Cyprus caused boundless rejoicings. The ship that brought the despatch sailed in by the Lido with Turkish banners trailing at the stern, and on her decks a pile of Turkish turbans. All work was abandoned. The people shut their shops and wrote up "mourning for the death of the Turk." The Doge descended to St. Mark's to celebrate a *Te Deum*. The diplomat, scholar and historian Paruta pronounced a funeral oration on the fallen. Visions of the Venetian fleet in the Bosphorus and Cyprus regained, blinded the rulers

and the people to the true condition of affairs. But away south, with the fleet, the matter wore another aspect. The Senate might urge Venier to follow up the victory, might point out to Philip that now was the time to press home upon the Turk; all in vain. Don John took his fleet into winter quarters, and by the next year the Turk, with marvellous rapidity, had restored his shattered forces, and the fruits of Lepanto were lost. The Republic was forced to conclude a peace with the Sultan, and another of her maritime possessions was shorn away.

(*c*) ***Fra Paolo Sarpi and the Church.*** It is clear from the preceding sections that the Republic, though keeping a brave front to her enemies, was surely dying. On one point, however, the relations of Church and State, she was destined by the genius of one man to leave a lasting impress upon the history of Europe.

Owing no doubt to her early connection with the East and the slight bonds which bound her, originally, to the Italian mainland, the Republic had, in matters ecclesiastical, maintained an attitude of independence towards Rome. For good Venetians St. Mark was at least the equal of St. Peter. The great church of Venice, the centre of her religious life, was St. Mark's, the Doge's private chapel, not San Pietro, the cathedral of the bishop. The Patriarch of Venice and the bishops of Venetian dioceses must, by law, be Venetians. The actions of the Holy Office were invalid without the presence and the consent of lay Assessors appointed by the Government. The Republic embraced the Conciliar principle as enunciated by the Councils of Constance and Basel, and secured for herself, in spite of "Execrabilis," the right to that useful weapon in ecclesiastical warfare, an "Appeal to a future Council." In the war of Ferrara (1310) the Doge had gone so far as to declare that the Pope had nothing to do with "things temporal." But the fulmination of Excommunication and Interdict, with their disastrous consequences for property, for trade, for domestic life, brought the Republic to its bearings for a time. In the eyes of the

Curia Romana, the ecclesiastical policy of the Venetian State was tainted throughout with Erastianism. But individual Venetians, her Doges, her Senators, her nobility and people, were never on the whole other than good Catholics. The policy of the State was governed by considerations of aggrandizement, of commerce, of diplomacy, and might, on occasion, find itself in collision with Rome, but the Venetian, in his private life, was always an obedient son of the Church.

That was her general attitude, and in defence of her position as a sovereign State, there were various points upon which Venice, in common with France and Spain, and other Catholic Powers, inevitably came into collision with Rome and the claims of the Curia; the trial of criminous clerics in secular courts; the taxation of clergy; mortmain; the examination of bishops previous to confirmation by Rome; the visitation of religious houses; the erection of new churches and monasteries; the accumulation of real estate for pious purposes; the Index of Prohibited Books; the right to appeal either to a future Council or from a Pope misinformed to a Pope better informed. In addition to these points of possible friction, Venice, as a growing State, was in contact at certain points with territories where the Church was temporal Overlord; for example, along the Po and the borders of the Duchy of Ferrara.

As long as relations between Rome and Venice were friendly most of these questions could remain in abeyance, each side tacitly interpreting the position in its own way. But when a fighting Pontiff like Julius II. came to the throne and found that Venice had just laid hands on the Romagna the case was altered. The League of Cambray was formed, as we have seen, and the Pope fired the first shot by fulminating the Interdict. The grounds alleged covered many of the disputed points, nomination to Venetian Sees, taxation of ecclesiastical property, trial of criminous clerks. Venice replied by Appeal to a future Council. But the disastrous course of the war, the defeat of Agnadello and

the loss of her mainland dependencies, made it impossible for the Republic to hold out. She bought the Pope out of the league against her by a general surrender along the whole line of her ecclesiastical policy. By the terms of the agreement of February 15, 1510, she withdrew her Appeal to a Council; acknowledged the justice of the Interdict; abolished taxation of clergy without consent from Rome; renounced her claim to nominate to Venetian Sees, and agreed to surrender criminous clerks to the ecclesiastical courts. In the field of ecclesiastical as in the field of international politics, the League of Cambray proved ruinous to Venice. But, though worsted by the Church, Venice bethought her of a remedy sometimes adopted by the Church. On the day of her surrender she made a "secret protest," declaring the surrender invalid as being extracted under compulsion, and did not hesitate to plead this protest as a demurrer to any claims based on her surrender to Julius. That surrender, however, was outwardly complete. The Venetian Envoys made public submission in the atrium of St. Peter's, and though the actual scourging by the Penitentiary was omitted, the ambassadors were compelled to receive twelve white scourging-rods from twelve members of the Sacred College. Of course the Republic never intended to leave matters thus if an opportunity for recovery presented itself. And it did very soon afterwards in 1527, when Rome was sacked by the Constable de Bourbon and Pope Clement VII. was a trembling prisoner in the Castle of S. Angelo. Then on the pretext of saving them for the Holy See against Imperial plunderers she occupied and fortified the Papal possessions of Ravenna and Cervia, and the Senate passed the following resolution (August 17, 1527): "Forasmuch as our most prudent ancestors were wont to nominate the Bishops of all Sees in our dominions, and then to seek confirmation from the Supreme Pontiff, and whereas this laudable practice was maintained until the Pontificate of Pope Julius in 1510, at which date the untoward aspect of our affairs compelled us to give way, and whereas from that time onward so excellent

has been, and still is, our conduct towards the Pontiffs, more especially just now when we have spent and are about to spend such untold gold for the rescue of the Holy See,—we may be sure that were his Holiness free to act he would gladly return to the ancient mode of nomination to the prelacy, and seeing that such a fitting opportunity, given us by God Himself, should not be thrown away—the Bishopric of Treviso being now vacant by the death of Don Bernardo de Rossi,—we do proceed to nominate as heretofore;" and they did. But the Pope never acknowledged the recovery of right, though, in his desire to stand well with Venice, he reluctantly consented in 1533 to allow the taxation of clergy, and held out hopes that he might yield on the nomination of Bishops. In 1564 the Republic accepted and published the decrees of the Council of Trent, though it had entered a special protest against Chapter 35 affecting the trial of criminous clerks, and declared that it accepted the decrees on the understanding that they were modified in accordance with its wishes. But it is doubtful whether Rome shared this understanding. However that may be, the Pope, Pius IV., Gian-Angelo de' Medici, wrote to Venice thanking her for accepting the decrees, and presented the Republic with the Palazzo di San Marco at Rome as a residence for her ambassadors.

Nor was it long before another Pope, Gregory XII., began (1581) to press his rights under the decrees of Trent. He sent Monsignor Bolognetti to visit the religious houses in the lagoons, a right in secular dispute, and declared that he "declined to be Pope everywhere except in Venice." The Government protested that the Patriarch alone was entitled to perform this office. Bolognetti was recalled and Campeggio sent in his place. The Republic virtually yielded, while preserving the semblance of the rights it claimed. Campeggio associated with himself, as Visitor, the Bishop of Verona, and the Government announced their assent and satisfaction, declaring that the Nuncio visited with the Bishop, not the Bishop with the Nuncio.

In fact the Republic most heartily desired to avoid a serious quarrel with Rome. Her people were genuinely Catholic; there was no thought of their joining the Protestant schism. But there was a great danger lest the charge of heresy, of Protestant leanings, should be launched against the Republic, for that might have let loose the powerful combination of Rome and Spain, the *Diacatholicon*, as Sarpi called it, with the result that Venice would have been crushed and absorbed in the Italian dominions of the Spanish Crown. That was the dread ever before the eyes of Venetian statesmen after the League of Cambray had broken the power of the Republic. And this explains the yielding attitude of Venice towards Rome. It is only the imperative necessities of her commerce that induce her to resist as when she persisted in sheltering the Graubünden merchants, or insisted that Lutheran service should be tolerated at the German Exchange, and Anglican at the British Embassy, or when she wrung from an unwilling Pontiff the Concordat that limited the repressive operation of the Index on the book trade.

That concession was obtained in 1596. Matters were then working up to a crisis between the Republic and the Curia. Difficulties had arisen as to confines and water-rights on the Po; the Pope also claimed that the temporal as well as the spiritual jurisdiction in the See of Ceneda lay with Rome, not with Venice. During the next few years the bill of grievances on one side and the other mounted higher and higher. The presence of the English Ambassador, Sir Henry Wotton, and his private chapel, for instance, offended the Pope; he protested that heresy would get loose in Venice. Venice again complained of a Bull prohibiting the alienation, by gift or sale, of any ecclesiastical property. She declared that all real estate was being concentrated in the hands of the Church, and renewed the laws which forbade the foundation of churches, monasteries, hospitals without licence. The Nuncio protested against the taxation of the clergy of Brescia, and the Doge replied, "If the

clergy is protected it must pay its share of the cost ; " an answer which breathes the very spirit of the attitude the Republic was now about to assume in defence of the temporal right of Princes against the excessive claims of the Curia Romana.

While matters were in this strained position, Pope Clement died in March 1605. After a very brief Pontificate, Leo XI. was succeeded by Camillo Borghese under the title of Paul V. Borghese was a convinced defender of the extreme claims advanced by the Curia. He was hardly warm in his chair before he insisted that France should accept the decrees of Trent ; that Spain should exempt the Jesuits from tithe ; that Genoa should quash an order dissolving a Jesuit congress. When his eye fell upon Venice where so many points of divergence existed it was not likely that he would prove yielding.

As we have seen, the questions pending were numerous and thorny, and as though they were not enough in themselves, other cases arose to precipitate the rupture. The Patriarch, Matteo Zane, died, and the Senate nominated Vendramin as his successor, asking confirmation from his Holiness. The Pope declared that the nominee of the Republic must present himself for examination at Rome. While this question was pending, the Government had occasion to arrest and try two clerics upon charges of a highly scandalous nature. At first Pope Paul made no representations on the subject, and even addressed a Brief to the Republic thanking it for having enrolled the family of Borghese among the Venetian nobility. But the whole Spanish party was at work in Rome to poison the mind of the Pope against the Republic. Fuentes, the Spanish governor in Milan, was annoyed that Venice should have thwarted his designs on the Valteline by supporting the Grisons, and the massing of troops on the Milanese frontier of Venice warned the Republic to be prepared for attack in that quarter. Presently the Pope began to complain to the Venetian Ambassador in Rome, and instructed the Nuncio to make similar complaints in Venice. The Nuncio obeyed his

instructions, and the questions of bequests to ecclesiastical bodies and secular jurisdiction over clerics were argued without heat in the Cabinet. In the first case the Government urged that lay property had passed into ecclesiastical hands to such an extent that the revenues were seriously affected. In the second the Government recited its ancient privileges to try such cases as those under discussion. The Nuncio replied that the Government ought not to imperil souls by forbidding pious bequests. But at Rome the Pope was, probably under pressure from the Spanish party, growing vehement, and the Senate was forced into a grave and weighty reply which embodied the Venetian attitude on the subject. "We cannot," they said, "conceive how any one can pretend to prevent a Sovereign, born independent and preserved independent by the grace of God, from taking such steps as may be necessary for the preservation of his State when he has no intention to injure the Government of neighbouring Sovereigns." The whole difficulty, however, lay just there. If the Church and State could have agreed on a definition of their borders, no quarrel would have arisen. As it was, the Pope claimed sovereignty in all matters spiritual and ecclesiastical. The Republic never disputed his sole competence in the spiritual region, but seeing that ecclesiastics are both men and subjects, the State was not prepared to abandon all jurisdiction over them and admit an *imperium in imperio*. The definition of the spheres of Church and State in the region of matters and persons ecclesiastical was the core of the contention.

On December 10, 1605, the Pope addressed two Briefs to the Republic, one on the subject of ecclesiastical estates, the other referring to the criminal clerics. They were posted to the Nuncio at Venice with orders to present them. He hesitated, foreseeing a storm. But on more peremptory orders he handed them in on Christmas Day. The death of the Doge that same evening prevented the Briefs from being opened. But within a few days the new Doge, Leonardo Donato, was elected. When the Briefs were opened they were found to be duplicates of one Brief. By an error in

Rome or in Venice one Brief only and a copy of it had been handed in. The Brief threatened excommunication if the Republic did not withdraw her orders and annul her acts on the subject of ecclesiastical estates. In face of this threat Venice prepared for resistance. Fra Paolo Sarpi and other theologians were appointed as advisers, and under their guidance a reply was drafted. The tone was moderate. The Government pleaded undisputed usure and reciprocity, the Pope had forbidden alienation of ecclesiastical property to laymen, the State was within its rights in taking an analogous step, especially as she was spending such large sums in defence of Christendom. These are temporal questions, and "secular Princes by divine law, which no human power can abrogate, have the right to legislate in matters temporal." Her conscience before God was at peace, and she was sure that his Holiness, "better informed," would not persist in his threats.

The Pope did seem inclined to milder counsels, but behind him was the Spanish party anxious to embarrass the Republic because of her support to the Grisons in holding the Valteline. Venice was encouraged in this policy by the French. Neither the Republic nor France could afford to see the Spanish dominions in Italy join hands with the Austrian dominions in Tyrol by way of the Valteline and Stelvio. Embarrassments for the Republic were therefore embarrassment for France, and in this way the eyes of Europe were suddenly directed to the struggle which was now being waged between Venice and the Pope.

By February 25, the second Brief, the missing Brief, on the subject of the criminous clerks, was presented. Again the answer was moderate in tone. The Republic could not abandon immemorial rights and privileges conceded by preceding Pontiffs. By the time this answer reached Rome, Cardinal Zapata and the Spanish party had so wrought on the Pope that he was resolved to crush the Republic. In a Consistory held on April 16, 1606, his Holiness rehearsed the decrees about Church property to which he objected, and

"following the precedent of Innocent III. and the Emperor Constantine," he declared them null and void. As to the trial of clerks, the privileges on which Venice relied, those granted by Innocent VIII. and Paul III. referred to three specific crimes alone, and were confined in operation to the diocese of Venice. The Pope announced that he gave the Republic twenty-four days to repent, and failing to do so, he would launch an Interdict. The Cardinals agreed, and Baronius remarked that Peter had two functions, one to feed, the other to kill, his sheep; "*duplex est ministerium Petri pascere et occidere.*"

Venice never had any intention of yielding. Though well aware of her danger, and highly apprehensive of a Spanish attack from Milan, she thought her cause good enough to secure for her support from foreign Sovereigns whose secular rights were menaced by the Papal action in annulling laws passed by a free and sovereign State in matters temporal and criminal. That action savoured too much of the deposing powers to which post-Tridentine Pontiffs had laid claim; powers that were a standing danger to all Sovereigns, Catholic and Protestant alike. Her action was resolute and vigorous, her controversial attitude calm and dignified; the inspiration for both was drawn from the brain and the pen of the Servite monk, Fra Paolo Sarpi.

The Bull of Excommunication and Interdict was launched. The Republic forbade any of the Venetian clergy to receive it or any other publications from Rome. A local militia was raised to keep order in the city. The Nuncio was dismissed in the following terms: "Monsignor, you must know that we all, every one of us, Government, nobles, people are resolute to the highest degree. Your excommunication we count as nothing. Just consider what would be left you if others were to follow our example." An order was addressed to the clergy of the dominion declaring the Interdict null and void, and recommending each and all to continue their sacred functions, "it being our firm resolve to abide in the holy Catholic faith and in obedience to the Holy Roman Church."

The Capuchins, Theatines and Jesuits, who refused to obey, were expelled.

By this time all Europe was interested in the struggle. A war of pamphlets began. Diplomacy busied itself. France through her ambassadors urged the Republic to yield on the point of the prisoners. James loudly extolled the courage of the Republic, and through Sir Henry Wotton tentatively put forward the scheme for a league of England, Venice, the Grisons, Holland, and the Protestant Princes of Germany; but Venice declined to commit herself to such a Calvinistic *conciliabulum*. "What is this about Calvinists?" said the Doge, "we are as good Catholics as the Pope, and mean to die so." English and German soldiers of adventure, scenting battle from afar, flocked to Venice, and through their ambassadors put their services at the disposal of the State, while across the Milanese frontier Fuentes was massing troops, and rumours of machinations in Crema reached Venice. But Spain was neither ready nor able to set Italy in a blaze by attacking Venice. The defeat of the Armada had broken her prestige, and the revolt of the Netherlands was still raging. The Pope, too, was in a more conciliatory mood. Finding to his astonishment that the Republic resisted, and that the Interdict failed to act, he was anxious to terminate a situation which was far from conducive to the dignity of the Holy See. With this temper in the atmosphere, France was able to suggest and carry through a compromise. The Republic consented, out of personal regard for Henri IV. and without prejudice to her rights, to hand over the two prisoners to the French Ambassador, the Cardinal de Joyeuse. By the Pope's authority, but without any formal act, the Cardinal announced to the Cabinet that the Papal censures, the Excommunication and Interdict were withdrawn, and thereupon the Republic recalled its Edict and Protest. A Venetian Ambassador went to Rome. Diplomatic relations were reopened and the incident closed.

For a brief period Venice had once more held the attention of Europe. Her action in defending the rights of secular

Princes and formulating the respective positions of Church and State revealed to Europe one incidental result of the Reformation; the Interdict had lost its power, the Papal armoury was obsolete, it was never requisitioned again in defence of the Church. Protestant Europe was grateful to the Republic, but her action evoked the bitter hatred of the Catholic party. Every effort was made to crush the Theologians and Canonists who had written in her favour. Some were tempted to Rome, where one of them, Fra Fulgenzio Manfredi, was burned after a useless recantation. Fra Paolo, the moving spirit of the whole episode, was too cautious to be caught; commenting on Fra Fulgenzio's fate he remarked, "Of the details I know nothing; all I see is the beginning and the end, a safe-conduct and a pyre." The Venetian Government rewarded him handsomely, and offered him protection for his person. But he was stabbed, nearly to death, one October evening, when returning to his monastery, and the assassins found asylum and rewards in Roman territory. Sarpi himself had no doubt whence the blow came. He asked to see the dagger and remarked, "*Agnosco stylum Curiæ Romanæ.*" His life was threatened more than once; even the inmates of his own monastery could not be trusted; but he survived in honoured seclusion till 1623, devoting his life to study and to science. He died with a prayer for the Republic on his lips, "*Esto perpetua,*" "may she endure for ever." But she herself was already all but dead.

(*d*) ***The Spanish Conspiracy, Antonio Foscarini, and the Council of Ten.*** The permanent dread which haunted the minds of Venetian statesmen during the decline, was the possibility of absorption by Spain. Spain held Milan on Venetian borders, was powerful with Tuscany and the Church, paramount in Naples. Spain and the Church working together, the *Diacatholicon* seemed a standing menace to the Republic, whose independence thwarted Spanish ambitions in Italy, whose alliance with France prevented Spain from obtaining undisputed supremacy in the Peninsula. This dread of Spanish plots, of Spanish gold

and Spanish treachery was far from groundless. To Venice it seemed that her only safety lay in abundant secret information, and a skilful diplomatic use of it, and hence grew the power of the Ten and of its sub-committee of Three. It was to these that the State looked for safety in a period of bribery, plot and counterplot. Though to the outward world the Republic appeared peaceful, secure, splendidly self-indulgent, the Government was in a state of tremulous alarm, faithfully reflected in the following private memorandum by an Inquisitor of State: "1612. Right piteous is our condition. Alone we cannot exist. Allies we have none. Treaties we cannot make except on ruinous terms." Then follow jottings of sentences for suspicious relations with foreign ambassadors. Aloise Battagia, ten years prison for frequenting the Spanish Embassy and betting on elections. Aloise Gabriele, three years for betting at the Embassy. The Bishop of Lacossia banished, and so on.

Early in the seventeenth century events happened which illustrate this dread of Spain, and throw light on the dark places of the Republic and the operations of the Council of Ten.

In the spring of 1618 the city was surprised by the sight of three corpses hanging, each by one leg, from a gibbet in the Piazza, and soon after came news that three other executions had been carried out on board the Fleet. The Council of Ten, warned by the Ambassador in Rome and the Resident in Naples, had for a long time had their eye on a group of Frenchmen who had offered their services and been admitted to the pay of the Republic. It was said that these men were agents of Ossuna, Spanish Viceroy of Naples, who in conjunction with Bedmar, the Spanish Ambassador in Venice, was hatching a plot to seize the city. Two of the conspirators revealed the design, and supplied the proofs and the means of identifying the conspirators, with the result that they were arrested and executed. When the news became public the emotion was intense. The house and the person of the Spanish Ambassador were in serious danger, and the impression produced throughout Europe was equal

to that created by the Gunpowder Plot in England. Every one was convinced of the imminent danger from Spain. This impression was deepened when two years later (1620) a member of the Senate, Gian-Battista Bragadin, was executed for selling State secrets to Bedmar's successor, and this case was followed in 1622 by the case of Antonio Foscarini, which dealt a serious blow to the prestige of the Ten, in spite of the conviction that it alone was capable of dealing with Spanish intrigue.

Antonio Foscarini, of noble family, a senator and diplomat, had served his country as Ambassador to France, and in 1609 was transferred to the Court of St. James. There it was found that his despatches were tampered with and their contents sold. Foscarini had offended one of his staff, Muscorno by name, and this man, in revenge, published a libel on the Ambassador, accusing him of loose living and irreligion, adding that Foscarini himself had sold copies of his own despatches. Foscarini was recalled, tried and acquitted in 1618. But suspicion hung about him, and his actions were watched. In England he had been acquainted with Lady Arundel, and when that lady came to Venice for the education of her boys, Foscarini frequented her house and there he met other diplomats. That was enough. He was arrested, tried again, and condemned in 1622. He was strangled in prison and his body hung by one leg in the Piazzetta. Yet four months had barely passed when it was discovered that Foscarini had been condemned unjustly, on the evidence of an infamous informer. The Ten did all that lay in their power to make amends for their error. They published a statement of Foscarini's innocence, and exhumed and buried his body with pomp. But their action brought to a crisis and lent a handle to the resentment which had been slowly accumulating against their overweening influence in the State.

As a censor of morals the Council of Ten was frequently called upon to punish the lower members of the aristocracy, who occasionally treated the people as fair prey for their

appetite. The people came to regard the Ten as their champion against the insolence of the patriciate, while the severity of the Ten in repressing such crimes inspired dislike and dread of the tribunal in those families that had fallen under its cognizance. As guardian of public morals and as a commitee of public safety there was no department of life into which it might not inquire. But more than this, it had gradually usurped a position in the Constitution which did not originally belong to it. The Ten had gradually come to be the sole power in the machinery of government. It neglected the Great Council, could override the Senate in the management of foreign affairs, would even censure the Doge, thereby encroaching on the province of the Avvogadori or Procurators of State.

Growing dislike of the Ten, coupled with its grave judicial error in the case of Foscarini, came to a crisis in 1625, when a champion of the fundamental rights of the Great Council—the whole body of the patriciate—arose in the person of Renier Zeno. The reformers determined to challenge the position of the Ten in the Great Council. They relied for support upon the large body of nobles, who through decline in commerce and from other causes had become too poor to aspire to the great offices of State, but still retained their franchise as patricians of Venice. The Ten relied for support upon the solidarity of those wealthy families in whose hands the machinery of government had gradually been concentrated. Renier began by running a tilt against the Cabinet, composed no doubt of that inner circle of the governing clique against which the reform was intended. He had been elected a member of the Ducal Privy Council, and on a sharp word from one of the Cabinet he retorted that as Ducal Councillor he represented the Republic itself, whose servants the Cabinet Ministers must remember that they were. At a later meeting he used violent abuse about those who had attacked him. For this the Council banished him for a year.

The position was now clear. Zeno, either genuinely c

in appearance, was championing the rights of the whole patriciate as represented by the Great Council, to which he owed his election, as against the clique of officials represented by the Cabinet. Zeno went into banishment. In the meantime one of the Doge's sons, Federico Corner, was made a cardinal, and two of his sons were appointed senators. This was a breach of the Constitution. At the expiry of his term Zeno returned, was elected a member of the Ten, and in due course became one of the three Chiefs. He immediately protested against the triple violation of the law. The Doge cancelled the appointments, but complained bitterly of this treatment. Zeno insisted on reading an admonition to the Doge, basing his claim on his duty to the Great Council, to whom he, as a member of the Ten, had sworn that he would insist on the strict observance of the Coronation Oath. The Doge listened and submitted. Zeno pressed still further, and demanded that the admonition should be registered in the Chancery. This was violently opposed. Zeno rose to defend his motion, when a brother Chief of the Ten ordered him out of the tribune. Zeno refused to obey, declaring that his brother Chiefs of the Ten had not the authority. Thereupon the Council of Ten was summoned and immediately quashed Zeno's admonition. Zeno appealed to the Great Council; he declared that his colleagues had acted illegally, and threw himself on the Council, the only competent authority. His colleagues replied, but the Great Council supported Zeno, and he was hailed in the city as the reformer of abuses. Very soon after this triumph, however, Zeno was stabbed near the Porta della Carta. The flight of Giorgio Corner, the Doge's son, left little doubt whence the attack had come. The Ten took some steps to punish the guilty, but so slowly that the accused had time to save their persons from arrest and their property from confiscation. Zeno found support in the Great Council, who again elected him a member of the Ten. The Ten condemned his conduct, and imposed restrictions on his actions. He appealed to the Great Council, declaring that liberty was

being slaughtered. The Doge spoke. Zeno tried to interrupt him. A scene of confusion followed, and the sitting was suspended. The Ten met and ordered the arrest of Zeno, but instructed the police not to find him. He was condemned to banishment. The popular indignation burst out and the Great Council was divided into the Zenites, who boldly proposed a complete reform of the Ten, and the Cornerites, who supported that body. The upshot was the appointment of a committee of five to examine the constitution and regulations of the Council of Ten and to report within twelve days. Meanwhile the Great Council, by 848 votes to 298, ordered that the sentence pronounced against Zeno be cancelled and expunged from the minutes of the Council of Ten. When the committee presented its report on reforms a fierce discussion took place over the essential point, the criminal jurisdiction of the Ten in the case of nobles. That jurisdiction was fully reconfirmed to the Ten on the ground that such a tribunal alone could protect the citizens of the Republic from the oppression of the great and powerful, but it was solemnly affirmed that the Ten had no right to exceed the limits of their purview "without the express sanction of the Great Council, which alone is able to regulate the various magistracies of the Republic."

The final result of so much heat was the virtual re-establishment of the Ten ; an inevitable conclusion. No other power in the State was adequate to the task of preserving public order and guarding public safety.

A century later, in 1761, an attack upon the Ten through its sub-committee, the Council of Three, followed the same lines,—save that the arguments were tinged with the philosophical, revolutionary ideas of France,—and ended in the same way. The Three were defended by Foscarini in calm and weighty words which sum up the truth about the Venetian Constitution. "This tribunal," he said, "has frequently saved the State from dangerous conspiracies. Its impartiality is above suspicion if we remember that office lasts for one year only, and that its members can easily be removed by a decree of the

Great Council. It is certain from the universal testimony of all statesmen that no Oligarchy can last for long unless it provide some corrective for its defects. Those defects are want of secrecy and rapidity. In some corner of the State we must place a rapid and secret authority. Thanks to the Great Council the State has been able to preserve in efficiency such a tribunal, while preventing it from affecting in the smallest degree the fundamental constitution of the Republic."

The whole course of Venetian history, the conspiracies of Tiepolo and Falier, the struggle with Rome, the dread of Spain, had all proved the necessity for the Ten and the Three. It was beyond the power of discontented nobles or theoretical reformers to sweep them away.

(*e*) ***The loss of Candia; Morosini and the Peleponnese.*** We have now reached the last notable actions of the Venetian Republic. With such a state of suspicion and weakness at the capital as was revealed by the Spanish conspiracy and the cases of Bragadin and Foscarini, it was not possible for the home Government to assume a vigorous attitude in support of its commanders in the field. The long siege of Candia proved that there was no lack of courage or ability on the part of the Venetian generals, the essential weakness lay at home.

We have already seen that owing to piracy in the Levant peace between Venice and the Turk was always precarious and dependent upon the will of the Sultan to maintain it. In 1638 the first symptoms of a rupture became visible. The Algerine pirates had pushed into the Adriatic, and threatened to sack the treasure-house of Loretto. The Venetian commander, Marin Capello, came up with them and pursued them so closely that they took refuge under the guns of the Turkish forts at Valona, which opened fire on the Venetians. Capello, however, attacked the pirates, in spite of the forts, and sank most of them. Sultan Murad, on receipt of the news, ordered the immediate slaughter of all Venetians in Constantinople, but contented himself with imprisoning the Venetian Ambassador. Finally he came to terms, recognizing

the right of the Republic to attack pirates on the high sea, but demanding and receiving two hundred and fifty thousand ducats for damages at Valona.

Murad's successor, Ibrahim, reached an open rupture with the Republic. The immediate cause was the fact that some ships belonging to the Knights of Malta had captured a Turkish prize and run her into port in Crete. The Sultan resolved to conquer the island. He began extensive preparations in the arsenal at Constantinople, but gave out that he was about to take vengeance on the Maltese. The Republic, however, was warned on all hands that Crete was his real object. Venice took some steps for the defence of her possessions. She sent men and money, though in insufficient quantities, and her Governor-General, Andrea Corner, behaved with great vigour and ability, arming the local militia and repairing the forts. The Republic appealed to Europe for help, and ordered its Commander-in-chief, Girolamo Morosini, to await the allies—Naples, Malta, Tuscany and the Pope—at Zante. The Turkish fleet put out in April 1645 and sailed straight for Canea. The Castle of S. Teordoro was besieged, and so closely that to save it the governor blew it up, and Canea fell into the hands of the Turks in August of the same year. Morosini and the allies arrived off Crete only in November. But the weather, the advanced season and the usual division of opinion among the allied commanders made his succour inoperative. Both parties went into winter quarters.

The fall of Canea and the probable loss of Crete alarmed not only Venice but all Europe. Both in France and in Flanders volunteers were raised, and preparations made to send them to Crete in the spring. At Venice the question of money stared the Government in the face. The Treasury was unequal to the strain, augmented taxation unpopular. Recourse was had, most reluctantly, to an expedient that revealed the straits to which the Republic was reduced. A resolution was passed in the Senate that five Venetian families—not noble—upon guaranteeing the upkeep of one

thousand infantry for one year or on payment of the equivalent, sixty thousand ducats in cash, should be admitted to the patriciate; non-Venetian subjects were eligible to one or the other of these five nominations on guaranteeing one thousand two hundred foot for a year or the equivalent, seventy thousand ducats in cash. The measure was thrown out by the Great Council, possibly because of the restriction to five creations only; for we find immediately after that the Great Council entertained individual petitions for admission to the patriciate and conceded them to the number of sixty; some of the applicants paying as much as one hundred ducats for the privilege.

The funds thus raised considerably strengthened the Treasury and the campaign of 1646. The Flemish and French volunteers arrived and, under the command of Dusmenil, were employed in the defence of Rethymo. But they proved more harmful than useful. During a sortie they fell into a panic which communicated itself to the rest of the garrison. The Turks captured the city, and the brave Andrea Corner was killed.

The results of the fall of Rethymo were that the Turks embarked on the siege of the city of Candia, one of the most memorable sieges in history, destined to last twenty-two years, and to cover the decline of the Republic with a halo of heroism. But at sea the tactics of the Venetians underwent a complete change. Crete itself ceased to be the scene of operations which were now directed to blocking the Dardanelles, and to creating diversions by threats in the north-eastern archipelago. It was these new tactics which enabled Candia to hold out so long; and the operations were marked by a series of brilliant victories off the Dardanelles. The last was fought under the command of Lazzaro Mocenigo in 1657. Mocenigo had conceived the bold design of forcing the Dardanelles and threatening Constantinople itself. The Turkish fleet under Topal, the Capudan Pasha, defended the Straits. Mocenigo had detached a part of his fleet to water at Imbros and, during their absence, it came on to

blow. The Venetians were gradually driven toward the Asiatic coast and the Turks came out to attack. The Venetians beat them off and pursued them until the gale rose to a hurricane. Night fell, and the next day was stormy; but the following evening Mocenigo resolved to force the passage. The feat was all but accomplished when his powder magazine blew up. The yards came crashing down and killed the commander. His death arrested the forward movement of the Venetians, and the battle of the Dardanelles was fatal to Venice. These operations closed the second phase of the war of Candia. The centre of activity was transferred once more to Candia itself.

The war lasted eleven years longer, and Venetian heroism and resistance amazed Europe and fired the chivalrous imagination of the French, who recalled the prowess of the early Crusaders and dreamed of renewing the struggle between the Crescent and the Cross. In 1666, four thousand French volunteers, under Almerigo d'Este, in their impetuosity attacked the Turkish camp outside Candia, without reconnoitring the ground, and were caught in a trap of hidden ravines and defeated. But Candia was now defended by a great Venetian General, Francesco Morosini, and attacked by a great Turkish leader, Achmed Kuprili. By 1666 Achmed had three hundred cannon trained upon the town; assault and sortie, mine and countermine, were attempted with varying fortune but with no decisive result. The fame of the siege roused the utmost enthusiasm in Europe. Volunteers from Sweden and volunteers from France arrived, though not in compact and business-like bodies, but each intent to display his personal prowess. The young Seigneur d'Arcourt fought till wounded and then retired. He was followed by the Duc de la Feuillade leading such names as Castel-Thiery, Caderousse, Villemor, San Pol, d'Aubusson and Crequi, the very flower of French nobility. They, dreaming of deeds that made their forebears famous, clamoured for hand-to-hand encounters with the Paynim chiefs, they chafed under the caution of Morosini, who knew full well what sorties

really meant; but they forced his hand. On December 18, 1668, he let them go. They fought their fill and covered themselves with glory, but did not break the Turkish lines, and presently they sailed away. Later came François de Vendôme, Duc de Beaufort, and the Duc de Noailles at the head of twelve regiments, and no sooner landed than they too clamoured for a sortie. Morosini objected and then gave way, probably it was the sole condition upon which he could retain his fiery allies. The French pushed out under cover of night with orders to lie close till a signal that all was ready for the attack. The signal was given too soon. Dawn had not come. They fell into confusion and took friend for foe. Order was restored and they carried the first, second, and third lines of trenches, driving the Turks before them into a fortress on a hill. But suddenly two barrels of powder exploded. The cry went up that the ground was mined. The assault was checked, wavered, recoiled, and the day was lost. Once more the French sailed away and the Venetians were left alone to face the Turk.

Abortive negotiations for peace had been afoot between Venice and Constantinople since 1666. But now Morosini, in view of the desperate condition of Candia, entered into a treaty directly with his besieger, not for a capitulation, but for a peace. This was concluded on September 6, 1668. The garrison of the fortress marched out. The Turks took possession of the town, and so ended the war of Candia.

It was almost the last and certainly the most memorable exploit of Venetian arms during the decline of the Republic. Individual Venetians had covered themselves with glory, but the siege had demonstrated the inherent weakness of the State, the exhaustion of the Treasury, and the inability to maintain a constant succession of reinforcements.

The hero of the later portion of the siege, Francesco Morosini, lived to win some further renown for himself and for Venice. When war broke out between the Emperor Leopold and the Turk, and the Grand Vizir Mustafa appeared under the walls of Vienna, Venice at first declined

to join the Christian League. But a more favourable turn of events induced the Republic to adhere. She declared war on the Turk, and Francesco Morosini found little difficulty in conquering the Morea in the absence of the Turkish forces in Hungary. While bombarding Athens, a Venetian shell fired the powder stored in the Parthenon and blew that monument into ruins. The Morea was conquered in 1688, and the same year Morosini was elected Doge. But Venetian hold on the country was far from secure. The expulsion of the Turk led the Greeks to dream of independence, not of submission to Venice. The spirit of Greek nationality revived, and was fostered in each city, and eventually spread to the country. To Morosini's conquest the modern Hellenic movement may with probability be ascribed. But for the Republic of Venice the possession of the Morea was of little profit. She was too feeble to rule it vigorously, and she lost it again as lightly as she had won it. The peace of Passarovitz (1718) deprived her of the peninsula, and closed for ever the chapter of her conquests.

III. In the City.

Inside the city of Venice during the period of decline, the characteristic note was the public splendour, the private pleasure-chase, overlying and partially hiding State impoverishment and secret fear.

> "Once did she hold the gorgeous East in fee,
> And was the bulwark of the West;"

but now "the worth of Venice" had fallen. The State and the great nobles still braved it in the eyes of Europe, but the bulk of her population was growing hourly poorer, her streets and squares were becoming the accustomed haunt of dissolute, pleasure-seeking Europe. The healthy, vitalizing energies of commerce, of trade and industries, were sapped. The reiterated wail of her own magistrates leaves no room for

doubt. In 1610 the Board of Trade report that "the important trade of this once famous mart is all but annihilated." In the same year the Senate was assured that "foreign merchants who used to buy in Venice come no more, and industries decline; as industries decline, the population dwindles; as the population dwindles, consumption of foodstuffs falls off, the customs dry up, the revenue shrinks, and cannot meet the necessary expenditure, while private individuals also suffer, for house-rent is lowered if not altogether lost."

And the main causes of this decline in commerce are no less clearly indicated. The fleet is no longer able either to suppress entirely or to sweep away the terrible pirates of the Quarnero and the Dalmatian islands, the Uscocchi, a lawless crew of freebooters, who when pursued took shelter in Turkish or Austrian harbours and appealed for protection, causing thereby endless diplomatic embroglios for the waning Republic; and not only Uscocchi from the coast of Dalmatia but English buccaneers infested the waters of Crete, Matapan, Zante and Corfu, and levied a ruinous toll on shipping making up or down the Adriatic. Merchants would not trust their capital at sea in bottoms so liable to pillage, nor would Insurance Companies guarantee against so probable a loss. The strictly protectionist tariffs which were designed to secure the profits of trade with Venice for Venetian subjects, lost their meaning when Venetian subjects no longer traded, while they effectually prevented any one else from doing so.

And from these causes came the inevitable results; whatever wealth there was, and it was not small,—for we have seen how seventy private families paid about seven million ducats for admission to the oligarchy,—became gradually locked up in landed estates, while the mass of the population, which had been born and bred in commerce, sank deeper and deeper into the morass of poverty. Government was alive to the mischief, and attempted remedies which only served to emphasize the ill. The port of Venice was thrown open to foreign merchants, and when that produced no adequate result the Government resolved to lighten taxation; but of the two great customs

dues they abolished the wrong one. They took off the duty on imports and they left the duty on exports. They endeavoured to compel all shipping to come to Venice by maintaining the law which forbade a ship to go out in cargo unless she had discharged two-thirds of her incoming cargo in Venice. The only result was to encourage smuggling from the subject islands of Crete and Zante, where the English touched for wine, oil and currants, and refused to be haled as far as Venice to get them. The whole experiment, which had lasted from 1610 to 1684, proved a failure, and Venice returned to her protection policy.

The experiment was based upon a fallacy, the fallacy that the value of the geographical position of Venice had undergone no change. "The position of our city," said one of her ablest ministers, "is such that she serves as a mart for all parts of the world as she has done heretofore." But he forgot, or ignored, the fact of the Cape-route by which the geographical advantage of Venice had been destroyed.

But as a curiosity and as a pleasure-house Venice still remained unrivalled in Europe. Gorgeous ceremonies for the reception of distinguished visitors; the theatre at San Cassiano, where the Opera and Ballo of *Andromeda* was given in 1637, serenades, banquets, faction fights among the people, delighted the populace and attracted the foreigner. Young Englishmen of birth, on the Grand-tour, would not miss Venice, where they were presented to the Doge and taken over the armoury and the treasury of St. Mark. Plagues like those of 1577 and 1630 might sweep off fifty or eighty thousand inhabitants, but the scourge passed by, the Masques and Balls began again, and all that remained of the memory were splendid churches like the Redentore or Santa Maria della Salute. *Bravi*, gamblers, broken men,—the *instrumenta* for all sorts of wickedness,—quacks—with their vapour baths and decoctions, their salivations of mercury and fumigations—that the Government endeavoured to suppress, witches who sold philtres so strong "that in place of expelling the fiend they expelled the life," flourished and fattened on a cosmopolitan population; but

the chorus of foreigners is unanimous in applause. "Renowned Venice," so runs the tenor of their laudation, "the admiredest citie in the world, a citie that all Europe is bound unto. Did you know the rare beauty of the Virgin-Citie you would quickly make love to her." "La plus triomphante citie que j'aye iamais veue." "This most noble city, as well for the situation and for the freedom which citizens and very strangers have, and for manifold other causes, is worthily called in Latine 'Venetia,' as it were *Veni etiam*, that is 'Come again.'"

CHAPTER V

THE END

(*a*) ***The War of the Spanish Succession.*** The essential weakness of the Republic was revealed by the attitude she found herself obliged to adopt in the war of the Spanish succession. She desired to be neutral, but could not defend her neutrality. Venice was invited to join France and to block the passes against the Imperial troops. The Republic found herself in a serious dilemma. Her poverty offered an argument both to those who advocated an alliance with France and to those who leaned to neutrality. Neutrality, said the one, is all very well if you can enforce it; alliance, said the other, is only desirable when you can afford it. Venice elected to remain neutral, to protect her towns if possible, and to protest against violation of her territory. But while she was discussing the question the belligerents had already descended on Venetian soil. Catinat and Eugene had opened their campaigns in the Veronese, were feeding themselves at the expense of the neutral territory, and occupying such quarters as they could lay their hands on; and all the time each party accused the Venetians of helping the other. The position was humiliating, and might at any moment become dangerous. Yet Venice was outwardly a city of splendour. She astonished the King of Denmark by the magnificence of the entertainment she offered him (1709). The winter was unusually severe. People could walk from Venice to the mainland upon the ice. The opportunity was seized to enhance the strangeness of the spectacle.

The peace of Utrecht in 1713 put an end to the war. It did not affect Venice as a neutral State except that it

relieved her from the presence of unwelcome friends. Both France and Austria had learned, however, that the Republic was incapable of resistance, and the knowledge was not forgotten when Napoleon appeared on the scene.

Five years later, in 1718, Venice, as we have already noted, lost the Morea by the peace of Passarovitz.

(*b*) ***Angelo Emo.*** But the Republic was not to die without once more displaying her energy at sea. The sea had been the field of her earliest achievements, it was to witness her last memorable act. The Barbary pirates, in spite of treaties and in spite of tribute, continued to infest the Mediterranean. The task of reducing them was entrusted to Angelo Emo, the last of the great Venetians. Emo sailed in 1784 on board his ship the *Fama* in command of twenty-four vessels, all told. In 1785 came the siege and bombarding of Tunis, rendered famous by the invention of floating batteries designed by Emo. The effect was good but not decisive. Next year, however, Sfax yielded to the floating batteries, and though the admiral did not succeed in capturing Tunis, he reduced the Bey to terms, and received the thanks of France from Louis the Fourteenth. But Emo died in 1792. The death of her admiral was a severe blow to Venice. He alone was capable of restoring her navy to something like efficiency, and he was prepared to do so. Had he lived and succeeded it is possible that the French would not have found Venice so easy a prey nor so submissive to Napoleon's imperative demands.

(*c*) ***In the City.*** It is doubtful, however, whether Emo would have met with sufficient support. We find a member of the Government expressing his views, the tone is one of despair. "If there be a State," said the Doge Renier, in 1779, "which needs unity at home, it is ours. Forces, military or naval, we have none; no, nor alliances either. We live by luck, by accident, upon the mere reputation for prudence which our Government enjoys." "All is disorder," says another. "The people are without employment. What once sufficed our ancestors to live on and left a margin to assist the State, now, even with the strictest economy, will not support existence."

"The populace that used to earn a certain if laborious livelihood, now turns to begging and supports itself on the doubtful chance of alms. Its bed at night is the hard stone of some bridge, and one asks oneself whether they are really citizens of this sovereign State or wandering animals."

This was a field in which the revolutionary ideas that were filtering through from France were not slow to take root. In 1785 the Government was alarmed at the discovery of secret lodges of "Free Masons," frequented by some members of the aristocracy. Every indication pointed towards collapse.

But these were alarms and preoccupations known only to the Government, carefully hidden from the eyes of citizens and strangers. In the social life of Venice there was an air of refinement and of delicacy that verged upon the effeminate. The visiting-card of Lodovico Manin, the last Doge, bore the design of a languorous, nude Adonis, asleep beneath an oak. The town was ready to divide itself over the fashion of a toupee. The supreme magistrates were called upon to settle disputes between an actor, a playwright and a ballarina, whose quarrels engaged the entire attention of the city and threatened a breach of the peace. Longhi, Guardi, Canaletto painted for them, and produced an aftermath of the great Venetian masters. Gozzi and Goldoni created the stage; Calmo, Buratti, and Baffo supplied them with satire and *facetiæ*. Above all, the Venetians delighted in music, and the four great Conservatories, the Pietà, Mendicanti, Incurabili, and Vergini disputed the honour of rendering the works of Galuppi, Jomelli, Hasse, Porpora, Lotti, Cimarosa. Goethe in 1784 reports "a soprano took the part of King Saul, the protagonist of the piece. Never have I heard such a voice;" and Rousseau says, "*Je n'ai l'idée de rien d'aussi touchant que cette musique.*" At the opera the public would go into ecstasy over a favourite singer. "Oh, bless you! bless you! bless the father that begot you." "Ah, darling! I must fling me at your feet," and so on. The actors strutted, ogled the boxes, chatted with the prompter, took snuff. The

young bloods from their *palchi* made shots with candle-ends, or spat on the heads of the people in the pit, nor took offence at fescennine replies. It was a great family party at the play.

But beyond the Alps a storm was brewing destined to sweep away the Republic and its easy, graceful existence on a whirlwind of revolution.

(*d*) ***Napoleon.*** Napoleon was in Italy by 1796. He engaged Austria, and once again Venetian territory became the battle-field of France and the Empire. The Republic could do nothing but idly protest. Napoleon drove the Austrians before him, and eventually came to terms with them at Leoben. He was anxious to return to France, and was not at all sure that his retreat through Italy might not be cut off; at least he professed to suspect the Venetians of that intention, and accused them of murdering French troops. He sent Junot to complain and to demand satisfaction, and no sooner was he settled with Austria than he turned his attention to the Republic. A deputation of Venetians found him at Gratz, and they were left in little doubt as to Buonaparte's projects. The State was doomed, for it had neither spirit, ships, nor men to withstand the Corsican. Napoleon was bent on the annihilation of the Republic, and an accident afforded him a pretext. The French commandant, Laugier, was cruising in the Adriatic in the *Liberatore d'Italia*. He approached the Lido, and the governor, thinking that he meant to sail into the lagoon, opened fire. Laugier was killed. A Franco-revolutionary faction inside the city kept the authorities in alarm, and the Government was panic-stricken. "We are not safe in our beds," said the Doge. On May 12, 1796, the Great Council agreed to accept a form of government to be submitted by General Buonaparte. On the 16th the French took possession of the town. The Republic of Venice, after an existence of upwards of one thousand years, disappeared for ever from the history of the world.

A BRIEF

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CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

Date.	Doge.	Venetian History.	Italian History.	General History.
				The Kahriyeh Jamí at Constantinople, (before 413).
452.		Peopling of the lagoon.	Attila destroys Aquileia (452).	
466.		Tribunes elected at Grado.		
				End of Western Empire (476).
			Theodoric at Ravenna (493).	
				Justinian (530-564).
				Sta. Sofia begun (532).
			S. Vitale begun (534).	
			Belisarius and the Gothic Wars (535).	
568.		Torcello built.		
			Alboin and Lombards (570).	Mahomet (570-632).
584.		Longinus at Venice.		
		Earliest Imperial privilege.		
600 to 690.		Lagoons threatened by (1) Slav Pirates; (2) Lombard Dukes of Friuli.		Churches at Wearmouth and Jarrow (*cir.* 680).
		Period of concentration and internal rivalry.		Leo the Isaurian (680-741).
697.	Anafesto.	Election of First Doge.		
		Treaties with Lombards.		
709.		Battle of the Pineto; founding of Jesolo.	Commercial treaty between Venice and Luitprand, King of the Lombards (709).	

Date.	Doge.	Venetian History.	Italian History.	General History.
717.	Tegaliano.	Quarrels between the Sees of Aquileia and Grado.		
726.	Orso.	Exarch Paul takes refuge in lagoons.		
728.		Capture of Ravenna.		
		Commercial rights acquired.		
		Heraclea and Jesolo quarrel.		
			Lateran Council (732) separates Patriarchates of Aquileia and Grado.	Victory of Charles Martel at Tours (732).
737 to 742.	Six *Mastro Miles.*	Dogeship abolished. Master soldiers elected yearly down to 742.		
742.	Deodato Doge.	The Doge in Malamocco, not in Heraclea.	Pepin in Italy. Donation to Papacy of Ravenna and Exarchate (742).	Charlemagne (742-814).
755.	Gaulo.			
756.	Monegario.	Family feuds.		
764.	Galbaio I.		Fall of Lombard Kingdom.	
774.		Growth of population.	Franks established (774).	
		See of Olivolo created.		
784.		Expulsion of Venetians from the Pentapolis.		
787.	Galbaio II.	Quarrels of Frankish and Byzantine factions.		
797.		Fortunatus, Patriarch of Grado, Francophil leader.		
			Charlemagne crowned (799).	
803.		Venice declared to belong to Empire of the East, with trading rights in Italy.		Treaty between Charlemagne and the Emperor Nicephorus (803).
804.	Obelerio.	Heraclea destroys Jesolo.		
		Doge destroys Heraclea.		
		Concentration at Malamocco.		
805.		Doge visits Charlemagne.		
		Byzantine party appeal to Nicephorus.		
809.		Pepin attacks lagoons.		
810.		Repulse of Pepin.		

Date.	Doge.	Venetian History.	Italian History.	General History.
		Rialto (Venice) chosen as capital.		
811.	Particiaco I.	Embellishment of city. First Ducal Palace. S. Pietro di Castello, S. Zaccaria (811-830).		
827.	Particiaco II.			
829.		Translation of St. Mark and beginning of the Church. St. Mark patron of Venice instead of St. Theodore.		
829.	Particiaco III.			
836.	Tradonico.	Dalmatian pirates. Saracenic war.		
840.		Diploma of Lothair, oldest document of Venetian diplomacy, defines relations with mainland.		
				Normans (860).
864.	Particiaco IV.	Revolution; murder of Doge.		
				Alfred (871-900).
881.	Particiaco V.	Destruction of Comacchio. First commercial war.		
887.	Candiano I.	Defeated by pirates.		
888.	Tribuno.	Campanile begun.		
				Magyars (889).
900.		Lagoons fortified.	Hungarian invasion of Italy (900).	
912.	Particiaco VI.			
927.		Diploma of Rudolph confirms Venetian right to coin money.		
932.	Candiano II.	Venetian ascendency in Istria.		
939.	Particiaco VII.			
942.	Candiano III.			
944.		War with Narentine pirates; victory.		
959.	Candiano IV.			
971.		Venice trading with infidels is threatened by Emperor of East.		

Date.	Doge.	Venetian History.	Italian History.	General History.
		Ambition of Doge.		
976.		Palace and church burned.		
976.	Orseolo I.	Early taxation.		
		Present palace and second church began.		
978.	Candiano V.			
979.	Memmo I.	The faction feuds of Morosini and Caloprini.		
982.		Donation of S. Giorgio Maggiore.		
				Danes in England (988).
991.	Orseolo II.	Confirmation of treaties with East and West.		
996.		Market on the Sile.		
998.		Dalmatian expedition.		
		Defeat of the pirates.		
		Capture of Lagosta.		
		Doge, Duke of Dalmatia.		
		Sposalizio del Mar.		
999.		Emperor Otho visits Venice.		
1002.		Saracens defeated at Bari.		
		Plague.		
1008.	Orseolo III.		Rise of Pisa and Genoa.	
			Normans in Apulia (1017).	
1026.	Centranico.			
1032.	Flabianico.	Orseolo ostracized.		
		Curtailment of Doge's powers.		
		Two Ducal Councillors appointed.		
1042.	Contarini I.			Westminster Abbey (*cir.* 1042).
				Battle of Hastings (1066).
1071.	Selvo.		Hildebrand, Gregory VII. (1073-1085).	Growth of Norman power (1060-1093).
1075.		Normans attack Dalmatia.		
			Canossa (1076).	
1082.		Defeat of Venetians by Normans at Casopo.		
1085.	Falier I.	Venetian victory over Normans at Corfu.		

Date.	Doge.	Venetian History	Italian History.	General History.
		Chrysobol of Emperor Alexis, confers rights in Constantinople.		
				Crusades (1095-1270).
1096.	Michiel I.	Expedition to Levant.		Capture of Jerusalem (1099).
				Westminster Hall and London Bridge (*cir.* 1099).
			Origin of Papal claim to Ferrara through Countess Matilda (1100).	
1102.	Falier II.			
1114.		War with Hungarians in Dalmatia.		
		The Pala d'Oro.		
1118.	Michiel II.	Expedition to Levant.		
				Lincoln Cathedral (1123-1147).
1128.		Fall of Tyre.		
		City lighted at night.		
1130.	Polani.			
1142.		War with Padua about the Brenta.		
1148.	Morosini I.	War with pirates.		
		Campanile of St. Mark's.		Frederick Barbarossa (1152-1190).
			Roncaglia (1154).	
1156.	Michiel III.			
1166.		Revolt of Zara.	Lombard League.	
1171.		Emperor Manuel attacks Venetians in Constantinople.		
		Money raised by creation of funds.		
		Venice attacks the Eastern Empire; failure.		
		Constitutional reforms.		
		Origin of the Great Council.		
1172.	Ziani I.			
			Battle of Legnano (1176).	
1177.		Pope Alexander III. and Barbarossa in Venice.		
		Truce of Venice.		
1178.	Mastropiero I.			
1189.		Creation of the *Quarantia*.		
1193.	Dandolo I.	The earliest *Promissione Ducale*.		

Date.	Doge.	Venetian History.	Italian History.	General History.
				Oxford (1200).
1201.		Contract for the Fourth Crusade.		Fourth Crusade (1200-1204).
1202.		Fleet sails. Siege of Zara.		
1204.		Capture and sack of Constantinople. Venetians acquire the islands of the Levant and Crete.		
1205.	Ziani II.			
1211.		Crete colonized.		
				Magna Charta (1215).
			St. Francis of Assisi d.(1226). Thomas Aquinas b. (1227).	
1229.	Tiepolo I.	The rise of a new aristocracy of wealth. Curtailing of Ducal authority by the *Promissione.* Doge's income settled.		
1230.		Revolt of Crete.		
				Cambridge (1231). Inquisition (1233).
1234.		SS. Giovanni e Paolo.		
1237.		Venice joins Lombard League.	Ezzelino da Romano, 2nd Lombard League (1237).	
1240.		Siege of Ferrara.	Cimabue (1240-1320).	
				Hanseatic League (1241-1669).
1249 *circ.*		Codification of Venetian law. Creation of new Magistracies. *Magistrato del Petizion. Cinque alla Pace. Inquisitori sopra il Doge defunto.*		Cologne Cathedral (1249).
1249.	Morosini II.	A modified form of Inquisition in Venice.	Patarini and Albigenses.	
1253.		*Signori di Notte* established.		
1253.	Zeno.	Genoa and Venice quarrel in Acre.		
1258.		Venetian victory.		

Date	Doge.	Venetian History.	Italian History.	General History.
1260.		Genoese in treaty with Greeks as against Latins, supported by Venice.		
				Constantinople recovered by the Greeks (1261).
1264.		Treaty with Paleologus.		Paleologus Emperor.
1268.		The method of election to Dogeship established.		
1268.	Tiepolo II.			
				Rudolf of Hapsburg (1272-1291).
				Edward I. (1272-1307).
1275	Contarini II.	Extension of the *Promissione*. War with Ancona for dominion in Adriatic indecisive.		
1281.	Dandolo II.			
				Sicilian Vespers (1282).
1284.		First golden ducat.		
1285.		Venice under Interdict for making terms with Andronicus Paleologus.		
		The Mint organized.		
		Magistracy of *Cataver* to assess incomes.		
1289.	Gradenigo I.	War with Genoa over the trade in Black Sea.		
1294.		Defeat of Venice at Laizzo (Scanderun).		
1296.		*Serrata del Maggior Consiglio.*	Marco Polo (1256-1323).	William Wallace (1296).
		Establishment of the Oligarchy.		
1298.		Defeat of Venice at Curzola.	Duomo at Florence (1298).	
1299.		Peace with Genoa.	Dante (1265-1321).	
		Development of the Venetian Constitution.	Giotto (1276-1337).	
1300.		Conspiracy of Bocconio.		
1308.		War with Ferrara. Interdict.		
1309.		Venetians retreat.		
1310.		Conspiracy of Tiepolo.		

Date.	Doge.	Venetian History.	Italian History.	General History.
		Establishment of Council of Ten.		
1311.	Zorzi.	Revolt of Zara.	Henry VII. dies at Buonconvento (1311).	
1312.	Soranzo.	War with Zara.		
		First mercenary troops.		
				Bannockburn (1314).
				Morgarten (1315).
1317.		Trade with Italy, England and Flanders.	Rise of the Houses of Este, Carrara and Scala.	
1329.	Dandolo III.		Scala takes Treviso (1329).	Ottoman Turks in Europe.
1332.		First war with Turks.	Petrarch (1304-1374).	Wycliffe (1324-1384).
1336.		War with Scala.	Boccaccio (1313-1375).	
1337.		League against Scala.	Brescia and Bergamo seized by Visconti (1337).	
1339.		Peace by which Venice acquires Treviso and Bassano.		
		Constitution granted.		
1339.	Gradenigo II.			
1340.		Inundation.		
		Miracle of St. Mark's ring.		
1343.	Dandolo IV.	League against Turks soon dissolved.		
1346.		Quarrel with Genoa over Crimean fur trade.		Crecy (1346).
1348.		Plague.	Black death.	Black death.
1350.		War with Genoa.	Rienzi (1343-1354).	
1351.		Ecclesiastic dispute as to succession dues and pious bequests.		
1353.		Battle of the Bosphorus.		
		Battle of Lojera ; Venetian victory.		
1354.		Petrarch in Venice to advocate peace ; refused.	Genoa places herself under Visconti.	
		Genoese fleet threatens lagoons.		
1354.	Falier II.			
1355.		Battle of Sapienza ; Venetian fleet destroyed.		
		Conspiracy of Falier.		

Date.	Doge.	Venetian History.	Italian History.	General History.
		Doge beheaded.		
1355.	Gradenigo III.	Peace with Genoa. Hungarian War.		Chaucer (1328-1400). Froissart (1337-1410).
1356.	Dolfin.	Loss of Dalmatia.		Golden Bull, establishing Imperial Electorate (1356).
1361.	Celsi.			
1363 to 1365.		Revolt of Candia finally crushed. Petrarch leaves his books to the Republic.		
1365.	Corner I.	Ducal Palace. Canal façade built.		
1368.	Contarini III.	Revolt and submission of Trieste.		
1369.		War with Carraresi.		
1373.		Peace, favourable to Venice.		
1377.		Quarrel with Genoa at Cyprus.		
		Tenedos given to Venice.	Early use of cannon at Vas-Quero.	
		War with Genoa.	Rise of the Medici.	
1379.		Venetian defeat at Pola. Venice threatened. The Genoese blockaded at Chioggia.		
1380.		Surrender of the Genoese fleet.		
1381.		Peace of Turin.		
1382.	Morosini III.	Genoese rivalry ends.		
1382.	Venier I.		Fall of the Scalas.	
				Sempach (1386).
			Milan Cathedral begun (1387).	
1388.		Argos and Nauplia acquired. Venice joins with Visconti against Carrara.	Carrara on the ascendant.	Bajazet (1389-1404).
1400.	Steno.	*Compagnia della Calza.*		
			Death of Gian Galeazzo Visconti (1402).	
1404.		Venice against Carrara.		
1405.		Padua falls.	End of the Carraresi (1405).	

Date	Doge.	Venetian History.	Italian History.	General History.
1406.		Venice in possession of Treviso, Padua, Vicenza, and Verona.		
1411.		War with Sigismund.		
1412.		Venetian victory at Motta.		
1413.		Peace.		
1414.	Mocenigo I.	Venice declares for the superiority of General Councils.	Filippo Maria Visconti (1391-1447).	Council of Constance (1414-1418).
1416.		Battle of Gallipoli and treaty with Sultan.		Huss (1415). Agincourt (1415).
1418.		War with Sigismund.		
1420.		Acquisition of Friuli.		
1423.	Foscari.	The people lose all voice in election of Doge. "*Communitas Venetiarum*" changed to "*Signoria.*" Hall of the "Maggior Consiglio" opened.		
1424.		Venice in alliance with Florence against Visconti.		
1425.		Carmagnola General. War.		
1426.		Peace of San Giorgio. Venice acquires Brescia.		
1427.		War. Battle of Maclodio.		
1428.		Peace of Ferrara. Venice acquires Bergamo.		
1429.		War.		Villon (1431). Joan of Arc (1431).
1432.		Trial and execution of Carmagnola.		Council of Basel (1431-1449).
1433.		Peace with Visconti.		
1434.		War with Visconti.		
1437.		Venice sues for investiture by Emperor.	Bessarion (1395-1472).	
1438.		Gattamelata's campaign. Venetian Fleet on Garda.		Printing (1438).
1441.		Peace with Visconti.		
1447.			Visconti dies (1447).	
1448.		Bartolomeo Colleoni.		
1450.			Sforza, Duke of Milan (1450).	
1453.		Fall of Constantinople.		Fall of Constantinople (1453).
1454.		Peace of Lodi.		

Date.	Doge.	Venetian History.	Italian History.	General History.
1457.		Doge deposed.		
1457.	Malipiero II.			
1462.	Moro.	Proposed crusade against Turks; accepted.	Pius II. (1458-1464).	
1464.		Doge at Ancona.		
		Death of Pope.		
		Venice alone at war with Turks.		
		Malipiero's Annali (1457-1500).		
1470.		Negropont lost.		
1471.	Tron.			
1472.		Caterina Cornaro m. James King of Cyprus.		
		Turks in Friuli.		
1473.	Marcello.			
1474.		Siege of Scutari.		
1474.	Mocenigo II.	Great loan from subject cities.		
1475.		Colleoni's will.		
		Turks propose peace; rejected.		
1476.	Vendramin.	Turks in Friuli.		
1478.	Mocenigo III.	First stone bridge.		
1479.		Peace with Turks.	Ludovico Sforza seizes Milan.	
			Turks at Otranto (1480).	
1481.		S. M. dei Miracoli.		
		Fire at Ducal Palace.		
		War with Ferrara		
		Pope intervenes.		
1483.		Interdict.		
		Venice appeals to a Council.		
1484.		Venice invites France to claim Milan.		
		Peace of Bagnolo.		
		Venice acquires Rovigo and the Polesine.		
1485.	Barbarigo I.	Giovanni Bellini (1427-1516).		
1486.	Barbarigo II.	Mantegna (1431-1506).		Diaz rounds Cape of Good Hope (1486).
		Crivelli (1468-1493).		
		Carpaccio (1478-1522).		
1488.		Annexation of Cyprus.	Savonarola (1452-1498).	Columbus (1492).
1494.		Charles VIII. asks Venice to assist him in Italy.		
		Comines at Venice.		
1495.		Venice in league against French.		
		Battle of Fornovo.		

Date.	Doge.	Venetian History.	Italian History.	General History.
				Vasco di Gama (1497).
1498.		Venice in league with Louis XII. ; price Cremona.	Rise of Cesare Borgia.	
		Second Turkish War.		
1499.		Battle of Sapienza.		
		Venice acquires Cremona.		
1501.	Loredan I.	Giorgione (1477-1511).		
		Procuratie Vecchie (1496-1520).		
1503.		Peace with Turks.	Death of Alexander VI. (1503).	
		Venice occupies Romagna.		
1504.		The Pope prepares a league against Venice.	Julius II. (1441-1513).	Treaty of Blois (1504).
				Venice omitted as ally of France.
				Pope substituted.
1507.		Maximilian demands the passes.	Michael Angelo (1475-1564).	
		War ; Alviano in command.	Raphael (1483-1520).	
1508.		League of Cambray.		
		Partition of Venice decreed.		
1509.		Interdict.		
		Agnadello.		
		Venetian mainland possessions lost.		
1510.		Venice submits to Julius' demands, and he withdraws from league.		
1512.		Mainland possessions return to Venice of own accord.	Battle of Ravenna. Death of Gaston de Foix (1512).	
		Sanudo's Diaries (1496-1535).		
		Priuli's Diaries.		
		Titian (1477-1576).		
1513.		Cardona on the borders of the lagoon.	Leo X. (1513-1521).	
1518.		Truce with the Emperor.		Luther (1483-1546).
1520.		Truce renewed.		
1521.	Grimani I.			
1523.		Treaty with Charles V.		
1523.	Gritti.			
			Battle of Pavia (1525).	
			The Holy League (1526).	

Date.	Doge.	Venetian History.	Italian History.	General History.
1527.		Venice reclaims Ecclesiastical rights which she surrendered to Julius II.	Sack of Rome (1527).	
1529.			Peace of Bologna (1529).	Peace of Cambray (1529).
1536.		*Libreria* begun. Sansovino (1479-1570). Third Turkish War.	Settlement of Italy.	
1537.		Loss of Scyros, Patmos, Ægina, Paros.		
1538.		Alliance of Venice, Pope and Emperor against Turk. Turks attack Crete. Inaction of Allies.		
1539.	Lando.	Treason of Cavazza, Secretary to the Ten. The Council of Three created.		
1540.		Peace with Turk. Loss of Nauplia. University of Padua flourishing. Vesalius (1514-1564). Colombo (1516-1559). Faloppius (1523-1563). Fabricius (1537-1619).		
1545.	Donato I.	Differences with Rome over the See of Ceneda.		Council of Trent (1545-1563).
1553.	Trevisan.	Tintoret (1512-1594). Palladio (1518-1580).		
1554.	Venier II.	Paolo Veronese (1528-1588).		Abdication of Charles V. (1555).
1556.	Priuli I.	Appearance of the Uscocchi in Dalmatia. Bad effect on Venetian commerce.		Elizabeth (1558-1603).
1559.	Priuli II.			Peace of Cateau Cambresis (1559).
1560.		Venice accepts decrees of Council of Trent. Pope gives Venice the Palazzo di San Marco in Rome.		
1567.	Loredan II.			
1570.	Mocenigo IV.	Fourth Turkish War. Turks attack Cyprus.		

Date.	Doge.	Venetian History.	Italian History.	General History.
1571.		Siege and fall of Famagosta.		
		Battle of Lepanto.		
1572.		Venice deserted by her Allies.		
		Peace with Turk.		
1573.		Loss of Cyprus.		
1574.		Reception of Henry III of France.		
1575.		Plague.		
		Church of the Redentore vowed.		
1577.	Venier III.	Fire at the Ducal Palace.		
		Palace rebuilt.		
1578.	Da Ponte.	Uscocchi.		
		Troubles with the Emperor.		
		Pope claims right to visit religious houses.		
		Venice opposes.		
1582.		Reform of the Ten.		
1584.		*Procuratie Nuove* begun.		
1585.		Reception of Japanese Embassy.		
1585.	Cicogna.			
1588.		Rialto bridge built.		Armada (1588).
		Pope objects to presence of Henry's Ambassador in Venice.		
				Henry IV. (1589-1610).
1590.		Venetian alliance with the Grisons.		
1592.		Galileo at Padua.		
1595.	Grimani II.			
1596.		Concordat on the Index.		
1598.		Venice imposes high tariff on trade with England.		
		Uscocchi.		
		Disagreement with Rome over secular jurisdiction, Ceneda and the Po.		
1601.		Fuentes in Milan.	Spain dominant in Italy (1601).	Treaty of Lyons (1601).
1602.		Fuentes closes the Valteline.		
1603.		Further quarrel with Rome.		
1605.		Questions of mortmain.	Paul V. (1605).	
		Ecclesiastic property.		
		Taxation of Clergy.		
		Examination of Bishops.		
		Secular jurisdiction over criminous clerics.		

Date.	Doge.	Venetian History.	Italian History.	General History.
		Borghese enrolled in Patriciate.		
1606.	Donato II.	Receipt of Papal Breves.		
		Interdict.		
		Appointment of Fra Paolo Sarpi as Counsel for the Republic.		
		Jesuits, Theatines and Capuchins expelled.		Inigo Jones (1572-1652).
		Sir Henry Wotton proposes a league with England and the Protestant Powers.		Rubens (1577-1640).
1607.		Du Fresne, Joyeuse and de Castro arrange terms of an agreement.		
		Accepted.		
		Attempted assassination of Sarpi.		
1612.	Memmo II.			
1615.	Bembo.			
1617.		Spanish Conspiracy.		
1618.	Donato III.			
1618.	Priuli III.			
1620.		Bragadin sells senatorial secrets to Spanish Ambassador.		
1622.		Case of Foscarini.		
1623.	Contarini IV.			
1624.	Cornaro II.			
1625.		Attack on the Council of Ten, led by Zeno.		Velasquez (1599-1660).
1630.	Contarini V.	Great Plague.		
		S. Maria della Salute vowed.		
1631.	Erizzo.			
1638.		Rupture with Turks.		
		Theatre at S. Cassian, *Andromeda*.		
1645.		Fifth Turkish War.		
1646.	Molin.			
1655.	Contarini VI.	Attack on Crete.		
1656.	Cornaro III.	Siege of Candia.		
		Heroism of Morosini (1646-1668).		
1656.	Valier I.			
1658.	Pesaro.			
1659.	Contarini VII.			

Date.	Doge.	Venetian History.	Italian History.	General History.
				Versailles built (1661).
1668.		Peace ; loss of Crete.		
1674.	Sagredo.			
1676.	Contarini VIII.	Attempts at Free Trade abandoned (1610-1684).		
1685.	Guistinian.	Morosini conquers the Morea.		
1688.		Bombardment of Athens.		
1688.	Morosini IV.			
1694.	Valier II.			
1700.	Mocenigo V.			
1701.		Eugene and Catinat in the Veronese.		War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1713).
1709.	Corner IV.	Reception of the King of Denmark.		
1716.		Loss of the Morea.		Blenheim (1704) Passarovitz (1718).
1722.	Mocenigo VI.	Tiepolo (1696-1770). Pietro Longhi (1702-1762).		
1732.	Ruzzini.			
1735.	Pisani.			
1741.	Grimani III.			
1752.	Loredan III.			
1761.		Attack on the Council of Three ; fails.		
1762.	Foscarini.			
1763.	Mocenigo VII.			
1779.	Renier.	Attempted reforms by Pisani.		
1784.		Bombardment of Tunis by Emo.	Goethe in Italy (1784).	
1785.		Freemasons in Venice.		
1789.	Manin.			
1792.		Death of Emo.		
1796.		Fall of the Republic.	Napoleon in Italy.	

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